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Abstract 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
Interest towards media analytics has increased significantly by both practitioners and 
academia alike. The hot topic is whether or not qualitative texts contain information relevant 
to stock financials, and if they do, whether the impact can be used to earn abnormal returns. 
In order to answer this, we study the impact media factors have on financial metrics in a 
novel specification that combines all the major media factors in a holistic media model. To 
transform qualitative texts information into a “sentiment score”, we develop a new 
methodology to estimate sentiment more accurately than currently prevailing methods.  
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Our study focuses on the S&P 100 constituents between the time period of 2006 and 2011. 
As a source of qualitative texts, we use major news publications and earnings announcements 
retrieved from LexisNexis -database using a web scraper program developed for the purpose 
of this study. We retrieve the financials data for our study using Thomson Reuters 
Datastream -database. 
In order to estimate investor sentiment, we employ both the customary word count, as well as 
our novel Linearized Phrase-Structure -methodology. For word count, we test the Harvard 
Psychological -dictionary and a finance-specific dictionary by Loughran and McDonald 
(2011). As our data is panel in nature, we analyze the correlations in our error terms in line 
with Petersen (2009), first without clustering and then clustering by firm and by time. We 
find time-effect in our error terms, and therefore employ a Fama-Macbeth (1973) 
methodology with clustering done in quarters. To mitigate a methodological choice driving 
our results, we run our specifications with a multitude of alternative specifications.  
RESULTS 
We find that Linearized Phrase-Structure (LPS) outperforms the predominant naïve word 
count methodology. Also, we find that if employing word counts, researchers should employ 
context dependent dictionaries, such as Loughran and McDonald’s (2011). In terms of our 
main variables, we find that the existing media factors are not mutually exclusive, and impact 
financial metrics in chorus. Alas, we do not find statistically significant relationship between 
sentiment and abnormal returns. However, we find a relationship between aggregate market 
news volume and abnormal returns, and also between sentiment and abnormal volatility. We 
infer that our findings support limited attention –theory, and provide evidence against market 
efficiency. 
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TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Kiinnostus media-analytiikkaa kohtaan on kohonnut viime aikoina merkittävästi. 
Keskustelun keskipisteessä on ollut kvalitatiivisten tekstien suhde rahoitusmarkkinoihin, ja 
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Muuntaaksemme kvalitatiiviset tekstit ”sentimenttiarvoiksi”, kehitämme uuden menetelmän 
sentimentin arviointiin.  
LÄHDEAINEISTO JA MENETELMÄT 
Tutkimuksemme keskittyy S&P 100 indeksin yrityksiin aikavälillä 2006 – 2011. 
Kvalitatiivisten tekstien lähteenä käytämme suurimpia kansainvälisiä uutislähteitä sekä 
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haemme Thomson Reuters Datastream -tietokannasta. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
“A new breed of forecasters is using ‘sentiment analysis’ to pick out the emotionally 
charged words and phrases which pepper online exchanges.” 
- The Economist
1
 
Media analytics has experienced a surge in interest from both practitioners and academia 
alike. Recent academic papers, as well as the wallets of Wall Street investors, have voted for 
different media factors having an impact on financial metrics. The jury is still out, but the 
buzz is growing by the minute. 
The thought that media factors are linked with financial metrics is based on the idea that 
qualitative texts have an impact on financial metrics beyond quantitative information. The 
idea has a two-fold rationale. First, if qualitative information has information content beyond 
quantitative information, media text can have an impact on financial metrics. Second, if style 
and tone of text affect the beliefs, preferences and decisions of investors, then qualitative texts 
can have an impact on financial metrics even in the absence of new information content. The 
two reasons are not mutually exclusive, and can in fact affect investors’ decisions in tandem.  
The thought that qualitative texts have information content is based on several findings. First, 
qualitative texts are thought to be used by managers to communicate adverse information to 
the public. The argument is that qualitative information is harder to process and can therefore 
cloud the full impact of adverse information from investors (e.g., Bloomfield, 2002; Davies et 
al., 2008; Engelberg, 2008). The idea gained wide recognition in the 1990’s with the seminal 
article of Skinner (1994). More recently, for instance, Li (2008) has put forth similar 
evidence. Second, qualitative texts are thought to be used by managers to communicate future 
estimates to investors. The rationale is that managers have more freedom in writing 
qualitative texts which are loosely regulated vis-à-vis quantitative information which is 
strictly regulated (e.g., Li, 2006; Davis et al,. 2008). In summary, the two categories of 
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findings indicate that qualitative information has informational content over and beyond 
quantitative information. 
The idea that qualitative information impacts agents’ beliefs, preferences and decisions is 
rooted in cognitive psychology, and the recent exciting findings of behavioral finance. The 
key theory behind the impact is ‘framing’ which states that agents are impacted by the 
framing of a problem (e.g., Tversky and Thaler, 1990; Starmer, 2000). As framing is 
documented to have an impact on agents’ behavior, the linguistic style and tone choices of 
qualitative texts can impact agents’ decisions. Indeed, a multitude of studies have found that 
recipients of messages are attentive to both content and style (e.g., Chung and Pennebaker, 
2007). For example, the way stock market commentators describe price movements 
influences investors’ expectations of future prices even in the absence of any fundamental 
information (Morris et al., 2005). 
If qualitative texts can impact investors, they can explain variations in financial metrics. 
Recent literature has focused on analyzing three different media factors that have been 
hypothesized to explain variations in financial metrics. First, extant literature has analyzed the 
impact of firm specific news volume on financial metrics (e.g., Fang and Peress, 2009). 
Second, prior literature has studied the effect of aggregate market news volume on financial 
metrics (Hirsleifer et al., 2009). Third, the impact of sentiment on financial metrics has been 
explored (e.g., Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 2011). With all 
the aforementioned variables, findings have documented an impact between the factors and 
financial metrics. 
Until today, the surge in interest has mainly focused on analyzing sentiment’s impact on 
financial metrics. In the epicenter of sentiment studies stands the methodology used to 
estimate investor sentiment. So far, extant literature has preferred the use of simplistic 
methodology for the sake of objectivity, replicability and transparency (e.g., Tetlock et al., 
2008). The pivotal studies shaping the field of content analysis in finance have relied on word 
count methodology in combination with a specific dictionary (e.g., Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et 
al., 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 2011). The dominant dictionary used has been the 
Harvard Psychology dictionary. However, with the seminal article of Loughran and 
McDonald (2011), that shows that Harvard Psychology dictionary misclassifies words in 
financial context, the preferred choice of dictionary has become unclear. Also, critique 
towards the naïve word count methodology has gained footing (e.g., O’Hare et al, 2009). In 
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summary, academia stands in cross-roads: having to decide on the direction that future 
research will take in terms of methodology. 
If qualitative texts impact financial metrics, the question remains whether or not that impact is 
reflected in the financial metrics according to the propositions of the efficient market 
hypothesis. The findings of prior literature show that this is not the case. The extant literature 
has documented both overreaction and underreaction effects. However, the majority of the 
findings demonstrate an underreaction effect (e.g., Chan, 2003; Loughran and McDonald, 
2011).
2
 An underreaction effect occurs when information content dominates over tone (e.g., 
Tetlock, 2007). Therefore, prior literature’s evidence seems to indicate that information 
content is the dominating effect in the impact qualitative texts have on financial metrics.  
If underreaction is indeed the dominant effect, scholars must attempt to understand why that 
is the case: what are the drivers behind the inefficient market causing an underreaction. There 
are several competing theories. We will introduce three potential explanations. First, ‘limited 
attention’ -theory has been proposed by some scholars (e.g., Hirsleifer et al., 2009) to explain 
underreaction. Limited attention states that agents have limited cognitive capabilities, and 
therefore face constraints in information processing depending on the volume and complexity 
of information. Second, cognitive biases from psychology can explain underreaction.
3
 Third, 
due to the leniency of qualitative text regulations, agents discount information in qualitative 
texts, leading to underreaction. As uncertainty relating to the information diminishes with 
time, the discount factor approaches zero, and financial metrics respond correspondingly (e.g., 
Mercer, 2004; Davis et al., 2008).
4
 The outcomes of the aforementioned theories often bear 
great resemblance to each other. However, the underlying rationales are different. 
To sum up, prior literature has presented evidence that qualitative texts have an impact on 
investors beyond quantitative information. Furthermore, recent literature has presented 
findings linking different media factors, in particular media sentiment, with variations in 
financial metrics. The majority of evidence is pointing towards an underreaction effect. To 
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 Tetlock (2007) and Antweiler and Frank (2006) find an overreaction effect with qualitative texts from Wall 
Street Journal. We hypothesize that the informational content of qualitative texts depends on the source of the 
qualitative text. Hence, we argue – in line with Tetlock et al. (2008) – that Wall Street Journal articles 
recapitulate previous news and have no new information content. However, the tone of the articles still affects 
investors, and therefore causes overreaction that reverses with time. 
3
 For instance, two related biases: anchoring and conservatism, can explain underreaction. 
4
 Depending on the past context, agents’ aforementioned behavior can in fact be rational. Key consideration 
impacting the discounting is the source credibility: the track record of the author in publishing accurate 
information via qualitative texts. 
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explain the effect, academia has proposed several competing theories; no consensus exists at 
the time of the writing. 
1.2 Motivation and definition of research questions 
As we briefly mentioned, content literature in the domain of finance stands in a cross-roads. 
The methodology used to estimate investor sentiment is the center piece of any study focusing 
on the link between sentiment and financial metrics. Therefore, the choice of investor 
sentiment estimation methodology should not be taken lightly. Extant literature has preferred 
the use of simplistic methods in estimating investor sentiment. However, concerns have 
started to mount up on the validity of such a naïve methodology. Furthermore, the status quo 
methodology, word counting, is facing a critical choice within it: the choice of preferred 
dictionary. Before the pivotal study of Loughran and McDonald (2011), the default choice 
dictionary for academia was the Harvard Psychology dictionary. However, as Loughran and 
McDonald showed, Harvard Psychology dictionary misclassifies many words in the financial 
domain. Loughran and McDonald conclude in their paper that scholars should use their 
context dependent dictionary in future research. However, they add that their dictionary 
should be tested in a sample consisting of different qualitative texts than 10-k reports
5
 to 
verify that their results hold outside the domain of 10-k reports. 
Taking the next step in estimating investor sentiment stands to benefit both academia and 
practitioners alike. As erroneous estimation methodology results in a measurement error in 
investor sentiment estimates, the benefits of improving the methodology are obvious. 
Moreover, Loughran and McDonald (2011) show that erroneous methodology can result in 
type I errors, and spurious correlations, that can in fact result in incorrect conclusions based 
on misleading findings. Therefore, improved methodology can change our understanding of 
the link between investor sentiment and financial metrics from the point-of-view of academia. 
On the other hand, improved methodology yields more accurate sentiment estimates – 
something investors find most valuable. In an era where  new methodological discoveries 
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 10-K reports are a commonly used financial reporting format used in the United States. These reports present a 
summary of a company's performance and are submitted annually to the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
Typically, the 10-K contains much more detail than a company’s annual report, e.g. detailing out a company’s 
history, organizational structure, equity, holdings, etc. 
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result in sentiment funds being raised from nothing to something in an instance,
6
 the 
significance of a breakthrough in investor sentiment estimation methodology is clear. 
However, sentiment is not the only media factor of interest. Firm specific news volume (e.g., 
Fang and Peress, 2009) and aggregate market news volume (e.g., Hirsleifer et al., 2009) have 
been linked with financial metrics. Yet, no study to date has researched the impact of all the 
media factors simultaneously. We argue that the factors are not mutually exclusive. 
Moreover, by exploring all the media factors simultaneously in a holistic media model, one 
can potentially extract new insights on the impact each of the factors have on financial 
metrics, and whether or not all of the factors are indeed separate and significant factors of 
different financial metrics. Furthermore, the insights provided by a study utilizing a holistic 
media model can be invaluable to the theory building behind the argued relationships between 
financial metrics and media factors. 
Besides the aforementioned methodological and theoretical considerations, the extant 
literature has so far utilized a narrow scope in event windows and sources of qualitative texts. 
Therefore, prior literature’s findings are subject to critique concerning data dredging. A study 
employing a large set of event windows with a wide cross-section of qualitative text sources 
would be free from such critique, and therefore add valuable evidence to the existing 
literature. The new evidence would shed more light on the impact that qualitative texts have 
on financial metrics, and on the state of market efficiency. 
To sum up, we are interested in finding answers to the following questions: 
Methodological questions 
 How can media sentiment be estimated more accurately, using contemporary 
computer science research? Can a more sophisticated methodology outperform extant 
naïve methodology? If so, are the results based on the new methodology different 
from those of the old methodology? 
 What is the preferred dictionary for the status quo methodology? Can the novel 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) dictionary outperform the Harvard dictionary in a 
sample consisting of other qualitative texts than 10-k reports? 
                                                 
6
 In 2011, professor Johan Bollen from Indiana University’s School of Informatics and Computing published a 
study linking twitter sentiment with Dow Jones Industrial Average returns. Within days, Johan Bollen had 
licensed his algorithm to Derwent Capital Management, a hedge fund that incepted a 40 USDm fund based on 
that sentiment estimation algorithm. 
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Theoretical questions 
 What are the significant media factors driving variations in financial metrics? Is 
market disseminating information efficiently? 
 Can we draw new inferences on the impact that qualitative texts have on financial 
metrics, and on the theory underlying the impact, based on the analysis of all the 
media factors simultaneously?  
Practical questions 
While we do no aim to answer the following in this paper, a paper by Mitra and Mitra (2010) 
highlights also the following practical questions: 
 Trading: could sentiment analysis be used by traders to give insight into questions on 
which assets to buy, hold or sell? 
 Risk control: could information in media and news contain early warning signs that 
could be important in predicting risk? How could risk managers use media analysis to 
better understand how different events might impact their portfolio risk? 
1.3 Contribution to existing literature 
Based on the research questions of previous sub-section, we aim to contribute to the prior 
literature by: 
 Developing a more sophisticated methodology for estimating investor sentiment 
 Testing the three documented  major media variables on financial metrics 
simultaneously in an attempt to create a holistic media model, and to isolate the 
significant media factors that drive variations in financial metrics 
 Testing the prior literature’s principal methodology for estimating investor sentiment: 
the vector word count, with the two most prevalent dictionaries utilized: the Loughran 
and McDonald (2011) dictionary; and the Harvard Psychology dictionary, in order to 
clarify the efficacy of the extant methodology, and the preferred dictionary for the 
methodology 
 Testing Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) dictionary in an out-of-sample test with 
qualitative texts other than 10-k reports.  
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 Analyzing the impact different media factors have on financial metrics in a robust 
study employing a comprehensive cross-section of different qualitative texts with 
multiple event windows in order to attenuate concerns over data dredging 
 Draw conclusions on the theory underlying the link between financial metrics and 
media factors  based on the findings of the study 
 Put forward evidence concerning the efficiency of the market, and the informational 
content of qualitative texts, based on the findings 
1.4 Limitations of the study 
The limitations relating to our study can be divided into two different broad categories: first, 
the limitations relating to our sentiment estimation methodology; second, the limitations 
relating to the data we are using.  
Despite the fact that the methodology we have developed for the study: Linearized Phrase-
Structure (LPS)
7
, is a significant improvement from the naïve word count methodology used 
in the extant literature, there are caveats that the reader should bear in mind. The main 
limitations relating to our sentiment estimation methodology are: 
 Inability to distinguish topic of a text and its relevance (i.e., the article discusses the 
target company briefly, or is entirely focused on the target company) 
 Failure to assess the credibility of a text source (i.e., local newspaper vis-à-vis 
Financial Times) 
 Inability to differentiate between information concerning: past, present, or future, in a 
text (i.e., discussion on the historical profit development vis-à-vis speculation on the 
future profit development of a company) 
 Use of only negativity sentiment – both in sentence and article level – to measure 
sentiment (an alternative would be to use a number of different metrics: for instance, 
disagreement -sentiment of Das, 2010, might yield additional insights to the link 
between sentiment and financials) 
To overcome the aforementioned limitations would require substantial work, and is outside 
the scope of this study. We therefore urge future research to focus on the limitations we have 
mentioned in order to improve sentiment estimation methodology. 
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8 
 
The second category of limitations in our study is data related. The following data limitations 
should be considered when interpreting our results: 
 LexisNexis database coverage of qualitative texts (i.e., not all important qualitative 
text publications are covered by LexisNexis due to, for instance, copyright issues) 
 Missing qualitative texts relating to key products that do not mention the company 
name (i.e., influential technology paper reviews the new Nokia Lumia phone but does 
not state Nokia’s name in the article) 
 Excluded qualitative sources (e.g., Social media, non-written qualitative media such as 
television or radio) 
 Time period: financial crisis (i.e., unusual patterns in data can exist due to the 
exceptional circumstances relating to the macroeconomic environment). As discussed 
later in context of our univariate results, we notice that negative returns combined with 
higher news volume often concentrated to years 2009-2010 
 Daily data instead of intraday data (i.e., we are missing the potential intraday effects 
from our study) 
 Sample firms: S&P 100 (i.e., we are missing small-firm related effects due to our 
sample consisting of solely large firms). It is possible that the effects we are interested 
in could be more prominent for small cap companies. Furthermore, the size and news 
coverage within the S&P 100 varies significantly
8
. Further studies could overcome 
this limitation possibly by either standardizing news volume per company, or selecting 
a sample of companies with even more similar news volumes. 
Even though our data has limitations, we do not hypothesize that the limitations would 
significantly affect the nature of our results, or the interpretations we have drawn from our 
findings. 
1.5 Main findings 
The findings of our study can be divided into four different broad categories. First, we 
provide evidence to the on-going methodological debate concerning sentiment estimation. 
Second, we offer insights on the effects that the three different dominant media factors have 
on financial metrics. Third, we present findings that contribute to the theory building behind 
the hypothesized relationship between media factors and financial metrics, and to the 
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discussion concerning the information content of qualitative texts. Fourth, we provide 
evidence on the state of market efficiency. 
To test the different methodologies used to estimate investor sentiment, we run a 
comprehensive benchmarking test. We test the extant literature’s prevalent methodology: 
word count, with Harvard Psychology dictionary and Loughran and McDonald (2011) 
dictionary, against our novel more sophisticated methodology: the Linearized Phrase-
Structure (LPS) -model. The result is clear: Linearized Phrase-Structure -model outperforms 
the prevalent methodology. Our test utilizes a comprehensive cross-section of qualitative texts 
according to multiple standard criteria for assessing a classification algorithm’s performance. 
Therefore, we argue that our results are a clear indication that Linearized Phrase-Structure -
model improves sentiment estimation significantly. Also, we find that the context specific 
dictionary of Loughran and McDonald (2011) outperforms the Harvard Psychology dictionary 
in financial context. As a result, we infer that our benchmarking test offers support to 
Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) claim that academia should prefer their context dependent 
dictionaries over Harvard Psychology dictionary when assessing sentiment within the 
financial domain. After establishing the accuracy of used methodology in sentiment 
estimation, we move to analyze the different media factors prior literature has linked with 
financial metrics. 
We find that investor sentiment is not linked with abnormal returns or volume, but does have 
a relationship with abnormal volatility. We hypothesize that the noise in prior literature’s 
sentiment estimation methodology has resulted in spurious correlations illustrated by the 
findings of extant literature in the case of abnormal returns and volume.
9
 Also, we find 
qualitative support that underreaction is the effect related to sentiment and financial metrics.  
Next, we confirm the findings of Hirsleifer et al. (2009) by documenting that aggregate 
market news volume impacts abnormal returns and volume. The impact is characterized by an 
underreaction effect. We infer that the findings provide strong support for Hirsleifer et al. 
(2009) proposed ‘distraction hypothesis’ that is based on limited attention theory.  
Finally, we find that firm specific news volume is not related to abnormal returns. However, 
firm specific news volume is related to abnormal volume and volatility (only the short event 
windows are significant with abnormal volume). We infer that noise traders are attracted to 
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attention grabbing stocks; therefore, increasing the volume and volatility of such stocks. Also, 
the fact that only the short event windows are significant in terms of volume, offers some 
support to limited attention theory: as more firm specific news translate to more attention 
towards a given firm, the lag in information dissemination should decrease. Hence, trades 
occur more likely close to the event date, and abnormal volumes should only be exhibited in 
the shorter event windows. 
Our findings indicate that the dominant emerging pattern between financial metrics and media 
factors is underreaction. The implications drawn from the finding are two-fold. First, as 
underreaction is linked with new information in qualitative texts (e.g., Tetlock, 2007), the 
evidence supports the assertion that qualitative texts have novel information content. Second, 
as the relationship between aggregate market news volume is theorized to be related to limited 
attention, and we are unaware of competing explanations, we infer that limited attention 
indeed does impact the markets as is indicated by the statistically significant relationship that 
aggregate market news volume has with financial metrics. Moreover, as other media factors 
also portray a pattern of underreaction, we suggest that limited attention is the underlying 
theory explaining the pattern for all the media factors. Our rational is as follows: as limited 
attention is a phenomenon present in the markets, as demonstrated by aggregate market news 
volume, its effect cannot exist in isolation from other media factors. Therefore, it should also 
affect other media factors, and hence have an impact on the relationship other media factors 
have with financial metrics. We therefore suggest that limited attention is in fact the key 
underlying theory explaining the underreaction pattern associated with media factors and 
financial metrics. 
In terms of market efficiency, our findings provide valuable evidence to the discussion 
concerning the state of market efficiency. We find that aggregate market news volume and 
momentum factors explain variations in abnormal returns in contradiction to the theoretical 
definition of the efficient market hypothesis. However, we can only infer that the findings are 
in contradiction to the theoretical definition of market efficiency as we have not tested the 
economic significance of our results. In other words, we do not know if the relationship is 
significant ex-post trading costs, and therefore we cannot draw inference on whether or not 
the findings are in contradiction to the economic definition of market efficiency (e.g., Jensen, 
1978) that states that markets are efficient as long as abnormal profits do not persist ex-post 
trading costs.  
11 
 
Based on our findings, we conclude that future studies could keep on developing more 
sophisticated methods for estimating sentiment more accurately, especially taking into 
consideration what qualitative information is most relevant for stock performance. In terms of 
market efficiency, we suggest that future research should study the effectiveness of specific 
trading strategies to provide insights to the economic state of market efficiency. Such studies 
should focus on trading strategies that take advantage of days with high aggregate market 
news volume. Also, sentiment estimates could be valuable when designing trading strategies. 
To elaborate more, future research could study a trading strategy that uses sentiment estimates 
to forecast future stock volatility. Based on the volatility forecasts, the trading strategy could 
in theory take positions in derivatives to earn alpha.  Also, a trading strategy utilizing an index 
such as the VIX volatility index could prove useful. 
1.6 Structure of the study 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior literature and builds the 
foundation we will construct our hypotheses on. Section 3 highlights our contribution to the 
existing literature, and introduces our hypotheses for the study. Section 4 explains the data we 
are using, the process of gathering it, and presents brief variable descriptions. Section 5 
introduces the methodology in the study: the sentiment estimation methodology, and the 
statistical methods and specifications used to analyze the relationship between our main 
variables and financial metrics. Section 6 presents the findings of the study, and discusses 
their impact. Section 7 concludes, and introduces areas we suggest for future research. 
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2 PREVIOUS LITERATURE REVIEW 
The impact of different media factors on financial metrics has spurred up considerable interest 
during the last decade. Three different major media factors have been linked with variations in 
financial metrics. In order to understand the implications and context of media analytic 
studies in the domain of finance, the reader must be acquaint with a vast cross-section of 
different research topics in finance, psychology and computer sciences. Therefore, we aim to 
introduce the reader briefly to three major areas that are necessary for the interpretation of our 
findings. First, we will discuss the efficient market hypothesis that sets the ground for any 
study in finance researching the link between a variable and abnormal returns. Second, we 
will introduce the reader to behavioral finance, and the cognitive biases that underlie the 
nascent field
10
. Third, we acquaint the reader with content analysis research both in finance 
and other disciplines. 
The first part of the literature review will go through the efficient market hypothesis; the 
modern finance paradigm, and the competing school of thought; behavioral finance, to set the 
ground for our research. With the birth of behavioral finance, the last few decades have 
witnessed a fierce debate concerning the state of market efficiency: a debate that, at times, 
seems to have resembled more a religious quarrel than an academic debate. To illustrate, we 
offer the following quote from Haugen’s11 (1999) book (Chapter 7, Note 5, p. 71):  
“On April 16, 1998 at the UCLA Conference, The Market Efficiency Debate: A Break 
from Tradition, while delivering a paper on market efficiency, Fama pointed to me in 
the audience and called me a criminal. He then said that he believed that God knew that 
the stock market was efficient…” 
The quote illustrates an alarming situation: at times, the debate concerning market efficiency 
seems to have transmogrified into philosophic credence and lies beyond scientific endeavor 
(e.g., Lee and Yen, 2008). As we hope to provide evidence to the market efficiency 
discussion, we acquaint the reader with both schools of thought, and the debate between them, 
to set the context in which our findings will be evaluated. 
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 Behavioral finance is a crucial part of our study, as behavioral finance justifies the rationale as to why 
qualitative texts can impact agents’ behavior even in the absence of new information in qualitative texts. 
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 Haugen is a well-known critic of efficient markets and an advocate of behavioral finance 
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After reviewing efficient markets hypothesis and behavioral finance theories we will move on 
to examine the research on content analysis in the domain of finance. We will show that the 
previous research has demonstrated that by turning qualitative information into quantitative 
information investors can reap abnormal profits in violation of the efficient market 
hypothesis.
12
 We will focus on reviewing the main findings of previous literature and on 
demonstrating the different suggested links between theory and investor sentiment.  
The section will proceed as follows. First, we will discuss the modern finance paradigm and 
the efficient market hypothesis. Second, we will briefly go through behavioral finance. 
Finally, we will explore the previous research in the field of content analysis with a focus in 
finance. 
2.1 Efficient market hypothesis 
The literature concerning the efficient market hypothesis is extensive, and a comprehensive 
review of the literature is a daunting task.
13
 Hence, our intention is to introduce the reader 
briefly to the theory of the efficient market hypothesis [EMH], the history of the hypothesis, 
and the debate surrounding the EMH, to establish the context for our study and the ensuing 
discussion on the impact of our results on modern finance paradigm. If the reader is familiar 
with the EMH literature, he or she may choose to skip the sub-section in question. 
The sub-section is organized as follows. First, we will introduce the reader to the EMH, and 
the different efficiency forms. Second, we will go through the different arguments concerning 
the debate surrounding the state of the EMH. Finally, we will discuss limits to arbitrage – a 
topic crucial to both efficient market hypothesis proponents as well as to behavioral finance 
advocates. 
2.1.1 Different forms of efficiency 
At the age of 25, Eugene Fama (1965) wrote the following in his seminal PhD thesis: 
“Independence of successive price changes is consistent with an “efficient” market, that 
is, a market where prices at every point in time represent best estimates of intrinsic 
values. This implies in turn that, when an intrinsic value changes, the actual price will 
adjust “instantaneously,” where instantaneously means, among other things, that the 
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 However, the violation depends on the definition of efficiency. More discussion on the topic will follow. 
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 For reviews on the EMH, see, for instance: Fama (1991), Lo (1997), Dimson and Mussavian (1998), Farmer 
and Lo (1999), Beechey et al. (2000), Lee and Yen (2008), and Sewell (2011). 
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actual price will initially overshoot the new intrinsic value as often as it will undershoot 
it.”  
The concept of an efficient market had been defined
14
. 
Paul Samuelson provided the first formal economic argument for the EMH (Samuelson, 
1965) while Harry Roberts made the distinction between weak and strong form tests (Roberts, 
1967) which became the classic taxonomy used with the EMH. Building on the growing 
evidence regarding the EMH, Fama published his seminal review of the efficient market 
theory and evidence (Fama, 1970). In his article, Fama (1970) defined the efficient market to 
be categorized into three types of efficiency: the weak form, the semi-strong form and the 
strong form. However, Fama (1991) later changed the categories. The weak form tests was 
renamed to tests for return predictability, the semi-strong form tests was relabeled to event 
studies, and the strong form tests was renamed to tests for private information. In spite of the 
change to categories, we will use the original taxonomy, and the characterization relating to it, 
as it is more widely recognized and used.  
Fama (1970) defined the market to be in line with the weak form efficiency if the prevailing 
prices reflect all historical prices. At that time, a competing group of theories, the chartist 
theories,
15
  suggested that past prices contained significant amounts of information concerning 
future prices. However, the empirical evidence was in line with the weak form efficiency and 
the chartist theories were quickly abandoned from the academic research. In 1991, Fama 
changed the name of the weak form tests into tests for return predictability and included in the 
category such variables as dividend yield and interest rates in addition to historical prices. 
Under the semi-strong form efficiency, prices will fully reflect all available public 
information and adjust to any new information instantaneously and in an unbiased manner 
(Fama, 1970). In other words, overreactions will be as common as underreactions if they 
occur.  Later on, Fama (1991) changed the category name to event studies in the wake of the 
large event study research spurred up by the first event study in 1969 by Fama, Fisher, Jensen 
and Roll.
16
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 The most well-known of the chartist theories is probably the Dow Theory which is often cited as the origin of 
technical analysis. 
16
 In fact, the first published event study was by Ball and Brown (1968), however, Fama et al. (1969) was the 
first event study undertaken. 
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Strong form efficiency is defined to fully reflect all available information so that no individual 
has higher expected trading profits than others because of monopolistic access to some 
information (Fama, 1970). In other words, all private information is fully reflected in the 
prevailing prices. However, Fama (1970) states that the strong form efficiency is in reality an 
extreme null-hypothesis; a clean benchmark, for tests against market efficiency. In fact, such 
groups as corporate insiders do have monopolistic information and hence prove that the 
strong form efficiency is not a strictly valid theory. Consequently, the strong form efficiency 
is not expected to be an exact description of reality but instead can be used to find out how far 
down through the investment community do the deviations permeate from the strong form 
efficiency. In 1991, Fama relabeled the strong form efficiency into tests for private 
information. However, the content of the category remained the same. 
 
2.1.2 Debate concerning the state of the efficient market hypothesis 
In the zenith of its time, during the 1960s, most of the evidence was in favor of the EMH. 
With few exceptions such as Cowles (1960), Niederhoffer and Osborne (1966) and Scholes 
(1969), all evidence seemed to support the EMH.
17
 However, as time passed, evidence 
contradicting the EMH began to mount up and concerns were raised that the EMH was 
flawed.  
In 1978, a special edition of the Journal of Financial Economics (Vol. 6, Numbers 2 to 3, 
June/September) was devoted exclusively to the anomalies surrounding the EMH. The special 
edition was the overture for the forthcoming variety of anomalies that would cast doubt on the 
EMH.   Such anomalies included:
18
  
 Small firm effect: Small-capitalization firms earn higher than average returns vis-à-vis 
their expected return based on different asset pricing models (e.g., Banz, 1981; 
Reinganum, 1981; Keim, 1983; Brown et al., 1983; Schwert, 1983; Fama and French, 
1993; Rouwenhorst, 1999)  
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 Lee and Yen (2008) hypothesize that the seemingly scarce evidence against the EMH during the 1960s might 
not be as scarce as it might first appear due to four following reasons. First, the scientific paradigm proposed by 
Kuhn (1970) might act as a protective belt for the EMH. Second, testing bias was present as reported by LeRoy 
(1989). Third, improper statistical methods were used as suggested by Taylor (1982). Fourth, the empirical 
evidence might have been misinterpreted to support EMH when in fact it was against it, as pointed out by Arbit 
and Boldt (1984), and Lee and Yen (2008), in the case of Fama et al. (1969). 
18
 The following list is incomplete and excludes several well-known anomalies (e.g., stock splits). However, the 
aim is to simply illustrate the voluminous number of anomalies related to the EMH. 
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 Value (price-earnings ratio) effect: Firms with low price-earnings ratios outperform their 
counterparts with high price-earnings ratios (e.g., Nicholson, 1960; Basu, 1977; Ball, 
1978; Basu, 1983; Campbell and Shiller, 1998; Rouwenhorst, 1999) 
 Dividend effect: Dividend yields, initiations and omissions forecast future abnormal 
returns (e.g., Long, 1978; Charest, 1978; Rozeff, 1984; Shiller, 1984; Fama and French, 
1988b; Campbell and Shiller, 1988; Michaely et al., 1995) 
 Seasoned equity offering effect: Companies issuing seasoned equity underperform their 
peers in the long-run (e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1995; 
Teoh et al., 1998; Brav et al., 2000; Jegadeesh, 2000; Ritter, 2003) 
 Share repurchases effect: Positive long-term abnormal profits persist when firms tender 
for their shares or initiate an open market repurchase program (e.g., Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen, 1990; Ikenberry et al., 1995; Grullon and Michaely, 1998; Ikenberry et al., 
2000) 
 Earnings announcements: Stock prices tend to respond to earnings with a substantial 
delay (e.g., Ball and Brown, 1968; Foster et al., 1984; Rendleman et al., 1987; Freeman 
and Tse, 1989; Bernard and Thomas, 1989 and 1990; Brown and Pope, 1996) 
 Closed-end fund discount effect: Closed-end funds commonly trade in organized 
secondary markets at a discount relative to their net asset value (e.g., Thomson, 1978; Lee 
et al., 1991; Pontiff, 1996; Shleifer, 2000) 
 Excess volatility: Stock prices experience greater volatility that can be explained by 
fundamentals (e.g., Shiller, 1981; LeRoy and Porter, 1981; Shiller, 1982; Grossman and 
Shiller, 1981; Campbell and Shiller, 1988; West, 1988; Shiller, 1992; Hansen and 
Jagannathan, 1991) 
 Day-of-the-week effect: The day of the week can be used to forecast future returns, 
whether it be a Monday, a day around holidays, or an end-of-month day (e.g., Cross, 
1973; French, 1980; Gibbons and Hess, 1981; Lakonishok and Levi, 1982; Keim and 
Stambaugh, 1984; Rogalski, 1984; Smirlock and Starks, 1985; Ariel, 1987; Lakonishok 
and Smidt, 1988; Ariel, 1990; Hawawini and Keim, 1995)  
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 January effect: The turn-of-the-year is followed by abnormal positive returns in January 
(e.g., Rozeff and Kinney, 1976; Keim, 1983; Reingaum, 1983; Haugen and Lakonishok, 
1988; Ritter, 1988; Haugen and Jorion, 1996; Haug and Hirschey, 2006) 
 Reversal effect: When shares are ranked on basis of their past returns during three to five 
years, past winners tend to become losers and vice versa  (e.g., DeBondt and Thaler, 1985; 
DeBondt and Thaler, 1987; Fama and French, 1988a; Poterba and Summers, 1988; 
Chopra et al., 1992; Richards, 1997)  
 Momentum effect: Past year’s winners tend to outperform past year’s losers during the 
next three to six months (e.g., Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Fama and French, 1996; 
Campbell et al., 1996; Brennan et al., 1998; Rouwenhorst, 1998; Rouwenhorst, 1999; Lo 
and MacKinlay, 1999; Lo et al., 2000; Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001;  Lewellen, 2002)  
The commanding empirical evidence inconsistent with the EMH spawned a new school of 
thought in finance during the 1990s under the nomenclature of behavioral finance. While 
several of the reported anomalies have perished under scrutiny from the proponents of the 
EMH, others have survived the ordeal. As a consequence, the nascent school of Behavioral 
Finance asserts that the inefficiency of capital markets is the norm, not the exception, and as 
such, the EMH serves as a description of an ideal world; not the real world. Instead the 
behavioral school advocates the use of more eclectic approaches (e.g., Shiller, 2003). 
However, as striking as the evidence against the EMH may appear, the advocates of the EMH 
have evidence of equal proportions to cast at the zealots of behavioral finance. The debate is 
fierce and ongoing. 
The followers of EMH argue that the behavioral finance school runs head on to the enigmatic 
joint-hypothesis problem first introduced by Fama (1970). The joint-hypothesis of the 
efficient markets has puzzled researchers for decades. The implication of the joint-hypothesis 
is that when testing for market efficiency; how prices reflect available information, one must 
also test simultaneously for an asset pricing model (i.e. the Sharpe-Lintner-Black model 
[CAPM] of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Black (1972)). Hence, one can test market 
efficiency conditional to an asset pricing model or asset pricing model conditional to market 
efficiency. Therefore, inherently, all tests of market efficiency are at the same time tests of an 
asset pricing model. As a consequence, the supporters of the EMH have argued that the 
anomalies deviating from the EMH are in fact ‘bad-model problems’ (e.g., Fama, 1991, 1998; 
18 
 
Malkiel, 2003) produced by misspecified asset pricing models.  Furthermore, with long-term 
returns, the bad model problem escalates, as the asset pricing model plays a larger role in 
measuring abnormal returns than it does in the short-term.
19
  
Proponents of the EMH have also raised concerns over data mining as a source of spurious 
regularities (e.g., Fama, 1991, 1998; Schwert, 2003; Malkiel, 2003). Given the current state 
for availability of data with sophisticated databases like CRSP, the concern is indeed not 
without merit. Furthermore, as suggested e.g. by Merton (1985), exciting new findings get 
reported while the outcomes that confirm the norm never see the light of day (See: Fama, 
1998; Schwert, 2003 and Malkiel, 2003). As the EMH is the norm, the vast empirical 
evidence inconsistent with the EMH is in fact far from a random sample and as such suffers 
from a severe case of sample bias.  
As samples can exhibit specific patterns that can lead to spurious regularities when data 
mining techniques are employed, out-of-sample tests are warranted. The proponents of the 
EMH argue that such tests refute the majority of anomalies (e.g., Fama, 1998). Furthermore, 
even if out-of-sample tests would confirm an anomaly, the issue of time dependence; whether 
or not the anomaly persists over time, is not resolved (Malkiel, 2003).  A case in point, as 
demonstrated by Schwert (2003), is the Dimensional Fund Advisors (DFA) that incepted 
mutual funds targeted to exploit discovered anomalies (i.e. size- and value-effect). However, 
the DFA mutual funds have not succeeded in generating positive abnormal returns. Therefore, 
the anomalies in question seem to have dissipated, or failed the test of economic significance. 
Schwert (2003) offers a different view: when anomalies are discovered they simultaneously 
disappear as practitioners employ strategies to take advantage of the anomalies. Hence, 
research findings cause the market to become efficient. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) put 
forward a similar view arguing that markets cannot be completely efficient as otherwise there 
would be no incentive for professionals to uncover information. Thus, they build on Schwert 
(2003) by assigning the discovery function to professionals. 
In the event that an anomaly persists in out-of-sample tests during different time periods, the 
conclusion is still ambiguous. Fama (1998) argues that anomalies tend to disappear when 
reasonable alternative approaches are used. For instance, Fama argues that by switching the 
asset pricing model more than a few of the anomalies disappear. Also, by altering the return 
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metric from buy-and-hold abnormal returns [BHARs] to average abnormal returns [AARs], or 
cumulative abnormal returns [CARs], mitigates several of the anomalies. Likewise, by 
implementing value weights in place of equal weights a number of the anomalies are erased.   
In addition, there are countless anomaly specific debates on-going. For instance, concerning 
the small firm -effect, Malkiel (2003) argues that the well-documented anomaly is in fact a 
result of survivorship bias as the modern computerized databases include only small firms 
that have survived; not the ones that went bankrupt.
20
 Therefore, the apparent anomaly is a 
result of a sample bias.  
If an apparent anomaly is accepted as a real anomaly, there are still issues that need to be 
resolved. First, Fama (1998) maintains that anomalies are chance results: apparent 
underreactions will be about as frequent as overreactions. If so, the market is in fact efficient. 
Shiller (2003) counters Fama’s proposition by stating that there is no fundamental 
psychological principle that people tend always to overreact or underreact, hence it is no 
surprise that research on financial anomalies does not reveal such a principle either. For that 
reason, the random split is by no means proof of market efficiency.
21
 Second, the proponents 
of the EMH reason that if the EMH is to be replaced, it can be done only by a better specific 
model of price formation (e.g., Nichols, 1993; Fama, 1998; Schwert, 2003).  Fama (1998) 
argues that as the behavioral finance school has not tested consistently a specific alternative 
asset pricing model, the EMH cannot be rejected as there is no alternative. Furthermore, Fama 
continues by claiming that the existing behavioral models do not produce rejectable 
predictions that capture the menu of anomalies, instead they capture the anomaly they are 
designed to capture failing disastrously with other anomalies. In Schwert’s (2003) opinion, 
the future models must go beyond explaining discovered anomalies to improve our 
understanding of asset pricing.  
In addition to the documented anomalies, recent financial crises have expedited the spiraling 
decay of the EMH. Many former EMH scholars have jumped ship stating that such prodigious 
prices cannot be explained by rational valuations under any circumstances.  Consequently, the 
role of the market as an efficient capital allocator has been questioned widely. The supporters 
of behavioral finance have reasoned that irrational bubbles are in fact the product of feedback 
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models
22
 (e.g., Smith et al., 1988; Shleifer, 2000; Shiller, 2000a, 2003). In contrast, the 
efficient markets proponents maintain that the bubbles are in fact large systematic patterns in 
the variation of expected return through time (e.g., Fama and French, 1989; Fama, 1991; 
Malkiel, 2003).  For instance, Miller (1991) explains the market crash of October 1987 as 
follows: external events, minor in themselves, could have cumulatively signaled a possible 
change in what had been up to then a very favorable political and economic climate for 
equities. Therefore, the crash was in fact a result of a rational shift in equity prices to 
accommodate the change in expected returns. Nothing is as clear in prospect as it is in 
retrospect. Nevertheless, irrespective of some of the differing views concerning the reasons 
for crises, both sides agree on the importance of market frictions in their formation; in other 
words, the importance of limited arbitrage opportunities (e.g., Shleifer, 2000; Shiller, 2003; 
Malkiel, 2003; Schwert, 2003). 
2.1.3 Limits to arbitrage 
The concept of ‘limits to arbitrage’ has grown into a major topic in finance. Following the 
seminal articles of Miller (1977and Jensen (1978):, the surge in interest has been substantial. 
In fact, in 2002, the Journal of Financial Economics released a special issue dedicated to the 
limits of arbitrage (Vol. 66, Numbers 2 to 3, November/December 2002). Besides short-
selling and transaction costs, limited arbitrage has been associated with noise-trader risk (e.g., 
De Long et al., 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Shleifer, 2000) and fundamental risk (e.g., 
Barberis and Thaler, 2003). The key argument relating to limited arbitrage is that market 
frictions, whatever they might be, prevent arbitrageurs from undertaking arbitrage; as a result, 
prices can deviate from their fundamental values. Therefore, limited arbitrage contradicts 
Friedman’s (1953) seminal assertion that rational traders will quickly undo dislocations 
caused by irrational traders.  
Regarding short-selling constraints, arbitrageurs are unable to short the stock profitably and 
therefore cannot profit from their knowledge (e.g., Miller, 1977; Jones and Lamont, 2002).
23
 
As a result, prices can deviate from their fundamental values and anomalies can exist. 
24
 In the 
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 Feedback models date back all the way to the Dutch Tulip mania. 
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 The cost of shorting has also been associated with Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect theory. The 
rationale is that psychological factors influence arbitrageurs to avoid shorting due to fear of psychological 
anguish produced by the need to cover an unprofitable short position (Shiller, 2003). 
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 A case in point is the 3Com sale of Palm Pilot in the early 2000 (e.g., Lamont and Thaler, 2001). 3Com 
executed a 5% carve-out of its subsidiary’s Palm Pilot’s outstanding shares. As the shares began to trade, the 
implied value of the 95% ownership of Palm Pilot by 3Com exceeded the market value of 3Com. As a result, the 
situation implied a negative value for the rest of the 3Com’s business as a whole. The existence of arbitrageurs 
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case of transaction costs, the argument is simple: anomalous profits can exist statistically but 
not economically. In other words, the anomalies will lack economic significance after 
transaction costs are included (e.g., Jensen, 1978; Shleifer, 2000; Barberis and Thaler, 2003).  
Concerning noise-trader risk, arbitrageurs are unable to determine the duration of a bubble. 
As arbitrageurs often face short-term investment horizons, they are unwilling to bear the risk 
of offsetting noise-traders in fear of that their time-horizon will lapse before the price will 
revert to fundamentals (e.g., Shleifer, 1990; De Long et al., 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Shleifer, 2000; Malkiel, 2003)
25
.   
On the subject of fundamental risk, arbitrageurs are unable to hedge their position with a 
similar security due to the fact that substitute securities are rarely perfect. As a consequence, 
arbitrageurs are left with a proportion of fundamental risk that can effectively limit arbitrage 
(e.g., Barberis and Thaler, 2003). Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) elegantly demonstrate, in 
the context of index inclusions, how difficult it actually is to find a good substitute security 
for an individual stock, therefore exemplifying how important fundamental risk is in 
arbitrage. 
Limits to arbitrage are widely accepted by both EMH and behavioral finance proponents. The 
discussion has focused mainly on whether or not the limits are against market efficiency. 
Behavioral finance scholars have maintained that limited arbitrage undercuts the EMH and is 
a vital part of behavioral finance (e.g., Shleifer and Summer, 1990; Shleifer, 2000; Barberis 
and Thaler, 2003; Ritter, 2003).  However, the supporters of the EMH have argued that 
limited arbitrage is not against the EMH. They maintain that an economically more accurate 
hypothesis (e.g., Jensen, 1978) is not in contradiction of the EMH but in fact a realistic 
representation of the EMH. In reality, the clean benchmark where all information is available 
and no transaction costs exist is not a truthful illustration of the real world (Fama, 1991).  
Therefore, anomalies that do not pass the test of economic significance: when marginal profits 
                                                                                                                                                        
should have prevented such a radical deviation, as the market value of any business can be, at worst, zero due to 
limited liability. However, arbitrageurs were unable to short the Palm Pilot stock due to extremely high 
borrowing costs. Therefore, the price anomaly persisted until 3Com spun-off more of Palm Pilot’s shares, 
alleviating the mismatch between supply and demand. 
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 An example of the risk is the notorious Royal Dutch and Shell relative arbitrage trade (e.g., Froot and Dabora,  
as1999). In 1907, Royal Dutch and Shell agreed to merge their interest on a 60-40 basis and pay dividends 
according to the same basis. Therefore, under modern finance theory, whenever the stock prices are not in 60-40 
basis an arbitrage profit opportunity exists. Nevertheless, historically, the basis has deviated significantly from 
60-40. In fact, Royal Dutch/Shell arbitrage trade can be viewed as one of the most popular equity arbitrage 
trades undertaken by the trading desks of Wall Street in the recent history - indeed even the notorious Long-
Term Capital Management had the trade in their books at the time of their collapse in the fall of 1998 
(Lowenstein, 2002). 
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of acting on information exceed the marginal costs, are not in fact anomalies at all. The 
proponents of the EMH have argued that the vast majority of apparent anomalies fall prey to 
the aforementioned (e.g., Fama, 1970, 1998; Malkiel, 2003). The view of some of the EMH 
supporters is excellently encapsulated by Richard Roll’s response to Robert Schiller’s 
comments concerning market inefficiencies at a symposium (Roll and Shiller, 1992) 
“I have personally tried to invest money, my client’s money and my own, in every 
single anomaly and predictive device that academics have dreamed up… I have 
attempted to exploit the so-called year-end anomalies and a whole variety of strategies 
supposedly documented by academic research. And I have yet to make a nickel on any 
of these supposed market inefficiencies… a true market inefficiency ought to be an 
exploitable opportunity. If there’s nothing investors can exploit in a systematic way, 
time in and time out, then it’s very hard to say that information is not being properly 
incorporated into stock prices.” 
To some extent, the term ‘efficiency’ has become blurred: on one side, researchers stress that 
anomalies should be exploitable in the sense that they would yield abnormal profits; on the 
other side, scholars argue that an anomaly is real if it dictates that prices deviate from 
fundamentals, hence economy is not allocating assets efficiently to the best investment 
opportunities (e.g., Statman, 1999; Barberis and Thaler, 2003). As a result, the argument is 
pinned down to whether or not efficiency is viewed from an ‘investor’ or an ‘economist’ point 
of view. Therefore, one might say that opposing camps are viewing the different sides of the 
same coin. In fact, Brav and Heaton (2002) demonstrate that the behavioral models and 
rational models describing efficient markets are, in terms of predictability and mathematics, 
practically indistinguishable from each other even while having very different assumptions 
concerning the world they model.  Whether or not the on-going debate is more about 
semantics than substance is for the reader to find out.  
23 
 
2.2 Behavioral finance  
 “The efficient market hypothesis is the most remarkable error in the history of 
economic theory.” 
- Lawrence Summers, U.S. Secretary of Treasury, on Black Monday crash of 1987 
The tide was turning for the modern finance paradigm. The growing amount of empirical 
evidence in contradiction to the efficient market hypothesis was stirring up debate concerning 
the validity of the efficient markets hypothesis in the academic society; behavioral finance 
was born.
 26
 
In order to understand the debate concerning the validity of the efficient market hypothesis, 
the reader must understand the arguments of the opposing side: behavioral finance scholars. 
Also, to understand the argument that qualitative texts can impact agents even in the absence 
of new information content, the reader must know the underlying cognitive biases that are the 
basis of the argument. In this section, we introduce the reader briefly to the nascent field of 
behavioral finance, and the underlying cognitive biases discovered by psychologists. 
The roots of behavioral finance can be traced back all the way to John Maynard Keynes’s 
reference to ‘animal spirits’ in 1936. Keynes stressed the role of uncertainty and confidence 
in shaping the economic life. In Keynes’ view, economic agents’ psychology could be easily 
manipulated and disturbed, hence underlining the importance of psychology in the economic 
system. In fact, an argument can be made that behavioral finance is the vindication of 
Keynesian ideas.
27
 However, behavioral finance does diverge from Keynesian tradition in its 
emphasis of experimental and empirical evidence and the use of formal models to derive 
predictions. Indeed, behavioral finance can be seen to be close in spirit to Keynesian tradition 
but with its own methodology and analytical framework (Stracca, 2004). 
To better understand the context of behavioral finance, it is appropriate to briefly go through 
the notions underlying prevailing modern finance paradigm. The modern finance approach 
posits that agents are rational. By rational, the approach assumes two features: Firstly, agents 
react to new information correctly updating their beliefs according to Bayes’ law. Secondly, 
given those correct beliefs, agents act rationally to maximize their expected utility using either 
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life vis-à-vis modern economic psychology. For a discussion on manias and panics in financial markets relating 
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objective probability distribution according to the expected utility theory (Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944) or subjective probability distribution in line with the subjective expected 
utility under the notion of Savage (1964).
28
 The initial wealth and preferences of agents do not 
matter as long as financial markets are efficient (Constantinides, 1982). As a result, prices 
will reflect fundamentals: the phenomenon coined the efficient market hypothesis.
29
 The 
appeal of the modern finance approach is the simplicity and the superior analytical 
tractability. However, as we have shown in the efficient market hypothesis section (2.1.), the 
empirical evidence contradicting the prevalent paradigm is vast and covers large ground; 
aggregate stock markets, cross-sections of average returns as well as individual trading 
behavior. 
Behavioral finance differs from the efficient market hypothesis by arguing that the behavior 
of agents deviates from the rational behavior dictated by maximization of expected utility 
(e.g., Starmer, 2000; Barberis and Thaler, 2003; Ritter, 2003; Stracca, 2004).
30
 Indeed, a vast 
literature in the field of psychology has documented numerous cognitive biases that affect the 
behavior of humans
31
 causing them to form beliefs, and act in contradiction to Bayesian law. 
Hence, agents exhibit, what is characterized as irrational behavior by modern finance, because 
of mistaken beliefs and preferences. For instance, the impact of emotional and visceral factors 
in individual decision making is well documented (e.g., Lowenstein, 2000 and Romer, 2000). 
However, the fact that emotional factors affect decision making is not proof of irrational 
behavior per se: the question is whether or not emotional responses deviate from rational 
responses - the answer is unequivocally: yes. Despite the aforementioned, modern finance 
ignores the impact of emotions on agents’ behavior, as well as other cognitive biases and their 
impact. Modern finance proponents have rebutted the importance of cognitive biases on the 
basis of learning. The argument is that through repetition agents will learn their way out of 
biases. In addition, modern finance proponents suggest that strong enough incentives will 
remove biases altogether. Barberis and Thaler (2003) reason that while learning and 
incentives can attenuate biases it is unlikely that they will completely remove them. Camerer 
and Hogarth (1999) point out that while incentives can reduce biases no study has made 
rationality violations disappear altogether by raising incentives. In fact, the whole concept of 
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 To be precise, behavioral finance advocates more eclectic models than those based on Von Neumann - 
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 See e.g., Kahneman et al., 1982; Camerer, 1995; Rabin, 1998; Kahneman and Tversky, 2000; Gilovich et. al., 
2002. 
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learning is dubious if learning implies a painful loss of self-esteem and the recognition of 
intellectual inferiority in comparison to peers; issues demonstrated to have influence over 
agents’ behavior in experimental psychology (Griffin and Tversky, 1992). To summarize, the 
argument of mainstream finance that learning will eliminate individual agents’ cognitive 
biases is unresolved. 
Nonetheless, agents’ irrational behavior is by no means proof of irrational markets. Even in 
the existence of irrational behavior, the aggregate market would be rational. For irrational 
traders, ‘noise traders’, to be driven out of the market, rational traders, ‘arbitrageurs’, must 
be able to correct prices (Friedman, 1953). However, as we have demonstrated, limited 
arbitrage prevents this and arbitrageurs are often unable to exploit opportunities created by 
noise traders.
32
 Hence, prices can in fact deviate from their fundamental values. 
In order to say more about the structure of the deviations, behavioral finance turns to the 
extensive experimental evidence on cognitive biases compiled by psychologists. However, 
mainstream finance theorists argue that the extensive evidence is a double edged sword: a 
Pyrrhic victory
33
 for behavioral finance at best. The predicament is that the vast amount of 
cognitive biases provide behavioral scholars with so many degrees of freedom that they can 
explain practically anything with their models - a phenomenon often dubbed ‘model 
dredging’ (e.g., Ritter, 2003). In other words, there is always a story that fits the evidence ex-
post.
34
 However, opposing views have been presented: Barberis and Thaler (2003) maintain 
that mainstream theorists have an equivalent amount of flexibility. As Arrow (1986) 
vehemently argued, rationality per se does not yield many predictions. In fact, the predictions 
in rational models are often based on auxiliary assumptions, hence offering additional degrees 
of freedom for modern finance theorists. Barberis and Thaler (2003) conclude by urging both 
sides to test their theories empirically: especially the assumptions of the theories.
35
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 A victory with devastating cost to the victor; it carries the implication that another such victory will ultimately 
cause defeat. The origins of the saying originate from the ancient Pyrrhic war fought by King Pyrrhus of Epirus. 
34
 See, for instance, Hirshleifer (2001) on the topic of making ex-ante predictions on which model dominates 
35
 The emphasis of testing assumptions is directed more towards modern finance theorists: since the influential 
argument of Milton Friedman, to evaluate theories based on the validity of their predictions rather than their 
assumptions, testing assumptions has been neglected. 
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The remainder of the sub-section is organized in two parts: First, we will discuss the cognitive 
biases unearthed by psychologists. Second, we will discuss the most prominent non-expected 
utility theory: the prospect theory and its successions.
36
  
2.2.1 Cognitive biases 
Cognitive capabilities of humans are limited. In an effort to guarantee survival throughout the 
human evolution, the brain has adapted to solve complex problems in a manner that optimizes 
deliberation cost and outcome (e.g., Arruñada, 2008). However, as the modern environment 
has transformed rapidly around us, the brain has become maladapted to the current 
surroundings. Hence, humans: ‘agents’, can demonstrate seemingly irrational behavior at 
times due to the misaligned optimization of deliberation vis-à-vis outcome. For instance, 
agents employ heuristics, rules of thumb, based on past experience to solve a problem.
37
 
Indeed, heuristics can still be a superior approach to solving problems (e.g., Langlois, 2003). 
However, that is not always the case. Heuristics simplify a multifarious world, consequently 
resulting in biased decisions when an agent is confronted with a complex problem (e.g., 
Stracca, 2004). By a complex problem, we mean information ambiguous to the agent, such as 
statistical information (e.g., Arruñada, 2008). In fact, even individuals trained in statistics use 
heuristics when making decisions requiring statistical reasoning (Tversky, 2004), leading to 
irrational behavior. A case in point is the 1/N allocation rule of retirement funds to different 
asset classes (e.g., Benartzi and Thaler, 2001). Agents seem to allocate 1/N portion of their 
retirement funds to the available N asset classes without respect to the actual underlying 
assets they are investing. For instance, when asked to allocate assets between equity and debt 
funds, agents will allocate assets on a 50-50 basis. However, when asked to allocate between 
equity fund and balanced debt-equity fund
38
, agents will again allocate assets based on a 50-
50 ratio. Therefore, allocating 75% to equity in the latter example vis-à-vis the 50% allocated 
in the former example: an obvious example of irrational behavior.  
To touch upon the most common cognitive biases in more detail, we will briefly describe the 
ones most commonly connected to behavioral finance. To our knowledge, no universally 
accepted categorization of the biases exists. Hence, the following categorization is our own 
and therefore subjective. 
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Overconfidence, self-attribution, hindsight and optimism 
Overconfidence is one of the most documented cognitive biases. According to Daniel et al. 
(1998), overconfidence is defined as overweighing ones private information signals but not 
the public information signals. Hence, agents are overconfident about their abilities and rely 
excessively on personal judgment. For instance, overconfidence manifests itself as too narrow 
confidence intervals in estimates (e.g., Alpert and Raiffa, 1982) and ill-equipped probability 
estimates; events estimated certain only occur circa 80% of the time, and events estimated 
improbable actually occur approximately 20% of the time (e.g., Fischhoff et al., 1977). In 
fact, Odean (1998a) argues that overconfidence leads agents to interpret information in a 
distorted manner: overweighing salient and anecdotal information while ignoring abstract and 
statistical information
39
. Kahneman (2003) expands the argument stating that agents become 
overconfident especially in low-information environment and Tversky (2003) demonstrates 
that overconfidence takes place regardless of the level of expertise in the subject matter.
40
 
Also, Barber and Odean (2001) illustrate that men are more overconfident than women 
exhibited by excessive trading. Indeed, overconfidence is thought to explain excessive trading 
behavior as agents believe to have superior information and intellectual capabilities vis-à-vis 
their peers
41
. In fact, overconfidence has been argued to explain several phenomena in the 
field of finance. For instance, investors diversify their portfolios much less than would be 
recommended by normative models, and exhibit a strong ‘home bias’ in their investments.42 
In the field of corporate finance, Roll (1986) suggests that takeover activity evidence displays 
a pattern of overconfidence and optimism in managers’ decision making: managers have too 
rosy views on suggested assumptions for the synergy calculations materializing. Hence, 
takeover bids are often too high vis-à-vis the implied fundamental values and too many 
takeovers get done in comparison to what should occur in rational markets. Roll (1986) 
christens the phenomenon ‘the hubris hypothesis’.  
Overconfidence is often linked closely to self-attribution and hindsight biases (Barberis and 
Thaler, 2003). Self-attribution causes agents to credit themselves for the past successes while 
failures are attributed to external factors such as bad luck. Hirshleifer (2001) demonstrates 
that when agents receive positive feedback on their private information, agents’ confidence 
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 Daniel et al. (1998) show that several professions requiring expertise succumb to overconfidence. Such 
professions include: lawyers, investment bankers, engineers, psychologists etc. 
41
 See, for instance, DeBondt and Thaler, 1995; Odean, 1998b, 2000; Barber and Odean; 2000, 2002a 
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 See, for instance, French and Poterba, 1991; Lewis, 1999; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Huberman, 2001 
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increases excessively whereas receiving negative feedback will not sufficiently decrease 
agents’ level of confidence. In other words, agents overweight positive feedback on their 
private information while underweighting negative feedback, resulting in unrealistic belief of 
superiority and talent: overconfidence.
43
 Another bias that is intertwined with overconfidence 
is the hindsight bias. Hindsight bias causes agents to believe that they have forecasted an 
event ex-post the event, when in fact they might have done no such thing. Therefore, 
hindsight bias results in overconfidence in one’s ability to forecast future (e.g., Fisher and 
Statman, 2000). 
Optimism is another bias closely related to the aforementioned biases. Whereas self-
attribution and hindsight biases can be seen to be directly linked with overconfidence, 
optimism is often documented to influence an agent in chorus with overconfidence; for 
instance, the hubris hypothesis (Roll, 1986) links overconfidence with optimism. Optimism 
causes agents to display unrealistically rosy views of their abilities and prospects - for 
instance, over 90% of those surveyed think they are above average in such domains as driving 
skill (Weinstein, 1980). Buehler et al. (1994) document that agents illustrate a systematic 
planning fallacy: they predict shorter completion times for tasks vis-à-vis the actual 
completion times.
44
 In the field of corporate finance, optimism has been coined with the 
famous pecking order theory. As managers hold rosy views on the prospects of their 
company, they consider equity to be undervalued by the markets. Overconfident on their 
beliefs, they avoid issuing equity at all cost even to the point of dismissing lucrative 
investments in order to avoid issuing equity (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Heaton, 2002).  
Representativeness: law of small numbers & conservatism, and anchoring 
Representativeness refers to heuristics that influence agents’ behavior. Two opposite heuristic 
rules apply when agents determine the representativeness of a set of data. The first rule is the 
so called ‘law of small numbers’ which theorizes that agents tend to overweight recent events; 
‘the sample rate’, at the expense of prior events; ‘the base rate’ (e.g., Gilovich et al., 1985; 
Rabin, 2002). In other words, agents tend to infer from too few data points the actual 
population parameters. Gilovich et al. (1985) present an illustrative real life example: the so 
called ‘hot hand’ phenomenon. In basketball it is commonly believed that when a player has 
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made several baskets in a row, they are ‘hot’, and more likely to score on the next opportunity 
they have. However, no empirical evidence supports this claim. Therefore, the ‘hot hand’ 
phenomenon is an example of erroneous deduction about the population parameters on the 
basis of too few data points. The second rule of interest is commonly referred to as 
conservatism. Conservatism can be viewed as the opposite of law of small numbers. Under 
conservatism, agents tend to overweight the base rate at the cost of the sample rate. In other 
words, agents adapt too slowly to changes (e.g., Edwards, 1968). Intuitively one might think 
that the two cancel out on aggregate. However, that is not the case, and the agent is not 
Bayesian on average after taking into account both heuristics (Camerer, 1995). In fact, the 
saliency of the underlying model to which the data is being matched to determines the 
dominant effect: if the data is representative of a salient model then the sample rate is 
overweighed, if not, then the base rate is
45
.  
A closely related bias to conservatism is anchoring. When forming an estimate, agents anchor 
to initial - potentially arbitrary - value and then adjust away from it. However, the adjustments 
are not sufficient (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974). Indeed, in the case of conservatism, an 
argument can be made that agents anchor to the base rate and adjust then away from it. 
However the adjustments are insufficient, hence leading to the overweighing of the base rate 
(e.g., Ritter, 2003). In financial context, anchoring is observed in most speculative markets 
where the prevailing price is taken as the equilibrium price, the ‘fair price’. However, 
frequently the prevailing price significantly deviates from the fundamental value. Therefore, 
the belief that the prevailing value is the fair price is false (Mullainathan and Thaler, 2000). 
One potential explanation for anchoring is the excessive deliberation cost of computation to 
derive the fundamental price (e.g., Stracca, 2004). Therefore, to ease decision making, agents 
anchor on to representative values - sometimes completely arbitrary ones.  
Belief perseverance and confirmation bias 
Lord et al. (1979) documented that once agents have formed opinions, they are reluctant to 
search for evidence that would contradict their initial opinions. Furthermore, if such evidence 
is presented, agents will treat it with excessive skepticism. In fact, Rabin and Schrag (1999) 
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argue that agents will go as far as interpreting spurious relationships in favor of their initial 
hypothesis in an attempt to avoid emotional cost of being wrong
46
.  
An extreme form of belief perseverance is the confirmation bias where agents misinterpret 
evidence contradicting the original hypothesis to be in fact in favor of it. An interesting 
example in the field of academic finance is the pivotal event study of Fama et al. (1969). The 
researchers concluded that their results were in line with, at that time, the nascent efficient 
market hypothesis. However, scholars have later on raised differing views on the 
interpretation of the results, arguing that Fama et al. (1969) ignored the clear price drift in the 
data: a clear sign of an inefficient market instead of an efficient one (e.g., Arbit and Boldt, 
1984; Lee and Yen, 2008). 
Loss and ambiguity aversion 
Cognitive abilities have developed over a long period of time. In a hostile living environment, 
quite different from the modern environment, it was imperative to avoid unnecessary risks 
that could potentially be lethal. Risk aversion, on the other hand, causes negative events to 
have a greater impact on agents than positive events (e.g., Baumeister, 2001). Indeed, agents 
will go to great lengths to avoid materialization of negative events in order to protect 
themselves from emotional agony (e.g., Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998a). The 
described behavior is termed the disposition effect. Disposition effect, in the context of 
finance, hypothesizes that agents will hold losing assets longer than they should in order to 
avoid the anguish of realizing losses.
47
 
Connected with risk aversion, and the resulting loss aversion, is ambiguity aversion. Agents 
dislike uncertain situations. In the context of modern finance, when agents do not know the 
objective probability distribution; hence, forced to use subjective probability distribution, 
agents will express a view on the probability as if the subjective probability distribution were 
objective. As subjective expected utility (SEU) does not allow agents to express their 
confidence on the subjective probability distribution, it cannot capture such aversion (e.g., 
Barberis and Thaler, 2003). Heath and Tversky (1991) argue that ambiguity aversion has 
much to do with how competent agents feel about assessing the subjective probability 
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distributions: the more confident agents feel about their competence, the more likely they are 
to take the uncertain choice. The manifestations of ambiguity aversion have been widely 
documented.
48
 A finance-related example would is the tendency of investors to allocate their 
assets to familiar investments - for instance, the so called ‘home bias’ can be seen to result 
from such behavior.
49
 However, as we pointed out in the context of overconfidence, 
ambiguity is just one of the possible explanations offered to explain the tendency of agents to 
allocate their assets to familiar investments. 
Framing: Procrastination and Mental Accounting 
According to normative theories, framing of a problem should not impact agents’ behavior as 
choices should be independent of the problem description. However, large body of evidence 
suggests that the way a problem is presented affects agents’ behavior (e.g., Tversky and 
Thaler, 1990; Starmer, 2000). For instance, psychologists have documented that doctors make 
different recommendations when presented with survival probabilities instead of mortality 
rates, even though the latter is the complement of the former (Ritter, 2003).
50
  
An important feature of framing is the concept of narrow framing. In narrow framing, agents 
limit the scope of the problem, presumably in an attempt to optimize deliberation costs under 
limited cognitive capabilities (e.g., Thaler, 1980; Read et al., 1999). The variable limited can 
differ from situation to situation, for instance, limiting the time frame of the problem is a 
common example of narrow framing coined procrastination.
51
 Under procrastination, agents 
make rational choices at intervals that are irrationally short. Quitting smoking is a typical 
example of procrastination. Agents limit the time frame of the problem to one day, weighing 
the torment of withdrawal symptoms, with other cons, against the pros: needless to say that 
under one day time frame the choice is clear, and continuing smoking maximizes the agents’ 
utility. However, after running through the same maximization on a daily basis for ten years, 
with the same ‘rational’ choice, agents have continued smoking for ten years: obviously such 
behavior can have calamitous consequences for agents’ health. Consequently, under 
procrastination, agents exhibit a strong tendency to overweight short-term utility at the 
expense of mid- to long-term utility resulting in sub-optimal choices under longer time 
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horizon. Still, such behavior can be rational under expected utility maximization in the case of 
extreme constant discount rates. However, the constant discount rate axiom of expected utility 
maximization has been found faulty in several occasions (e.g., Frederick, Lowenstein and 
O’Donoghue, 2002). In fact, a time inconsistent model of discounting: ‘hyperbolic 
discounting’, has been linked with procrastination. Under hyperbolic discounting, agents’ 
impatience is steeper for near-term trade-offs than for long-term trade-offs. For instance, 
when asked whether or not an agent would like to have 100€ a year from now, or 50€ now, 
most agents will choose 50€ now. However, when asked whether or not an agent would prefer 
to have 100€ after six years, or 50€ after five years, most agents will choose 100€. Hence, 
agents exhibit diminishing sensitivity to time.
52
   
Another common occurrence of narrow framing is mental accounting. In mental accounting, 
agents divide a problem into smaller pieces and then evaluate them in isolation from the 
larger - original - problem (e.g., Thaler, 2000; Barberis and Thaler, 2003). For instance, when 
agents are confronted with the problem of optimizing their asset portfolio, they segregate 
asset classes into separate mental accounts: for example, one account is for retirement money, 
one is of liquid assets and one is for risky investments. Once segregated, agents evaluate each 
mental account in isolation from the other accounts; hence, ignoring covariance between 
accounts - irrational behavior from the standpoint of modern portfolio theory
53,54
.  
Limited attention 
As we have previously briefly discussed, agents are constrained by limited cognitive 
capabilities and are therefore distracted by irrelevant stimuli. For instance, the famous Stroop 
task (1935) asks subjects to name the color in which a word is printed. When the word does 
not match its print color (i.e., word ‘blue’ is printed in red), subjects take more time to name 
the color. Another example is the phenomenon coined ‘selective attention’ where subjects 
focus on a set of stimuli leading them to ignore other important stimuli. Examples of selective 
attention are dichotic listening
55
 (e.g., Cherry, 1953; Broadbent, 1958; Moray, 1959) and 
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inattentional blindness
56
 (Simons and Levin, 1997). Also, divided attention in multiple tasks 
has been demonstrated to deteriorate subjects’ performance on tasks (e.g., McLeod, 1977; 
Pashler and Johnston, 1998). Finally, the phenomenon dubbed ‘cue competition’ shows that 
when subjects are asked to forecast stochastic variables based on multiple cues, the presence 
of irrelevant cues causes subjects to use less relevant cues (e.g., Baker et al., 1993; Busemeyer 
et al., 1993; Kruschke and Johansen, 1999).  
Indeed, depending on the quality and quantity of information, it can take considerable time for 
agents to process information. Therefore, agents attempt to optimize the decision outcomes 
with the deliberation costs. However, in doing so, agents demonstrate a tendency to focus on 
salient information at the cost of more abstract information. Furthermore, agents take 
information as given without attempting to adjust it (e.g., Hirshleifer and Hong, 2002; 
Stracca, 2004; Arruñada, 2008; Barber and Odean, 2008). Consequently, agents are 
particularly vulnerable to manipulation and fads (e.g., Daniel et al., 2002, Stracca, 2004; 
Shiller, 2000b). In fact, companies can take advantage of agents’ credulity by disclosing 
positive events in a salient manner and masking negative events with abstract disclosure (e.g., 
Skinner, 1994; Klibanoff et al., 1999). Furthermore, companies can overwhelm agents by 
disclosing more information in an attempt to make the disclosure even more opaque to agents. 
In other words, agents are in risk of losing the forest for the trees, when the quantity of 
information to be processed increases rapidly (Stracca, 2004).  
In summary, limited attention predicts that in financial context, multiple sources of new 
information appearing simultaneously force agents to divide their attention resulting in 
gradual diffusion of information. Therefore, financial metrics exhibit underreaction to new 
information (e.g., Hirsleifer and Teoh, 2003, 2005; Hirsleifer, 2009).Opposing arguments do 
exist. For one, an argument can be made that agents can adjust rationally to the cognitive 
constraints they face by focusing on the important signals. Nevertheless, as described above, 
agents tend to focus on salient signals that are not necessarily the most vital ones. Indeed, 
Hirsleifer (2009) refutes the aforementioned argument on the basis that agents cannot 
determine ex-ante the importance of signals. He continues by arguing that even if agents were 
able to segregate important signals from less important ones, irrelevant stimuli would still 
affect information processing (e.g., Stroop task evidence). In fact, even the processing speed 
                                                 
56
 Subjects fail to perceive even the most extreme task-unrelated stimuli such as a woman in gorilla suit beating 
her chest in a supermarket (Simons and Chabris, 1999). 
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of sentiment-detecting algorithm that we describe in this study would be negatively impacted 
if more information was added. 
2.2.2 Prospect theory 
To settle the discrepancy between empirical evidence and the expected utility framework, a 
group of theories, labeled the non-expected utility theories, have risen to the challenge. 
Prospect theory, argued by many to be the most promising alternative (e.g., Camerer, 1998; 
Barberis and Thaler, 2003; Stracca, 2004, will be described next.
57
 
The prospect theory is a truly descriptive theory with no ambitions in predicting agents’ 
behavior. Indeed, prospect theory simply aims at capturing agents’ attitudes towards risky 
gambles as parsimoniously as possible while striving to be analytically tractable (Barberis and 
Thaler, 2003).In contrast to expected utility theory, prospect theory evaluates gains and losses 
instead of the absolute level of wealth, an idea first proposed by Markowitz (1952). To 
motivate the focus on gains and losses, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) offer a compelling 
example of expected utility violation.  
During a study, subjects were asked: 
In addition to whatever you own, you have been given 1,000. Now choose between: 
A = (1,000; 50% probability) 
B = (500; 100% probability) 
The majority of subjects chose B over A. Subjects were then asked: 
In addition to whatever you own, you have been given 2,000. Now choose between: 
C = (-1,000; 50% probability) 
D = (-500; 100% probability) 
One would expect consistent behavior from agents, as the two situations have similar final 
absolute wealth positions. However, on the second question, subjects chose C over D. Hence, 
subjects demonstrated seemingly irrational behavior under the expected utility theory. As a 
result, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) assert that in addition to focusing on gains and losses 
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over absolute wealth positions, agents are risk averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking 
in the domain of losses. In fact, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) assert that agents’ value 
function is concave in the domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses. Also, the 
value function has a kink in the origin, illustrating loss aversion: a greater sensitivity to losses 
than to gains - a characteristic the reader might have observed when reading through the 
various cognitive biases influencing agents’ behavior. Figure 1 demonstrates the hypothetical 
value function. 
 
Figure 1: A hypothetical value function (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) 
The final key element underlining the prospect theory is nonlinear probability transformation. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) demonstrate that extreme probabilities are overweighed: in 
other words, agents’ weighing coefficient does not behave in a linear manner consistent with 
the expected utility theory. 
An important feature of prospect theory is that it can incorporate framing; particularly of 
interest is narrow framing, especially mental accounting. Due to the fact that the value 
function is non-linear, if agents segregate events that should be rationally pooled, the value of 
the pooled events can differ from the value of the segregated events. For instance, Shefrin and 
Statman (1984) present an interesting example in the context of corporate dividend policy that 
can be argued to be explained by prospect theory and mental accounting. Consider 
corporation A that plans on returning capital of 10€ to its shareholders. If A pays no 
dividends, the return will be in the form of a capital gain interpreted by agents as v(10). 
However, if A decides to return, for instance, 2€ as a dividend, the return can be coded by 
agents as: v(2) + v(8), or v(10), depending on whether or not agents are influenced by narrow 
framing bias known as mental accounting. What is interesting is, that under prospect theory, 
in the concave domain of gains, v(2) + v(8) > v(10), hence agents will prefer dividend and 
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capital gain combination vis-à-vis a pure play capital gain - a crucial difference in preference 
when compared to the expected utility. 
In their influential paper of 1992, Tversky and Kahneman generalize prospect theory to 
accommodate more than two non-zero outcomes. The successor has been christened the 
cumulative prospect theory (Starmer and Sugden, 1989; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and 
holds great promise as an alternative to the expected utility framework with much stronger 
psychological footing, yet maintaining analytical tractability.  
While the list of empirical evidence contradicting the modern finance paradigm continues to 
grow, behavioral finance is still far from replacing the mainstream approach in its current 
form (e.g., Ritter, 2003; Stracca, 2004). For example, Shleifer (2000) maintains that 
behavioral finance has not yet reached the level of maturity which would allow it to provide a 
coherent unified theory of human behavior in the market context the same way expected 
utility and mainstream economics and finance have done. Nonetheless, several scholars (e.g., 
Thaler, 1999; Barberis and Thaler, 2003; Stracca, 2004) argue that behavioral finance will do 
so in the future.  
Not all behavioral finance scholars share the rosy view concerning the future of behavioral 
finance. Some feel that behavioral finance will increasingly become part of modern finance 
(e.g., Ritter, 2003; Frankfurter and McGoun, 2002). Indeed, Frankfurter and McGoun (2002) 
suggest that the failure of behavioral finance to emerge as the new paradigm for finance is in 
fact paradoxically vindicating the teachings of behavioral finance. To elaborate, Frankfurter 
and McGoun (2002) argue that the same cognitive biases documented by psychologists, and 
advocated by behavioral scholars, are preventing behavioral finance paradigm from replacing 
the mainstream paradigm. In Frankfurter and McGoun’s view, the only hope for behavioral 
finance is the saturation of research that will force the academic society to seek new theories 
in an attempt to justify its own existence. Frankfurter and McGoun state that such 
development has already taken place as is demonstrated by the recent behavioral finance 
studies published in respectable publications, as well as the inspiring milestone of Daniel 
Kahneman’s 2002 Nobel Prize on the development of prospect theory.  
In conclusion, the altercation between modern finance supporters and behavioral finance 
advocates is on-going, and unresolved. Empirical evidence exists on both sides to support the 
claims of both parties. Future research will determine the direction the debate will take, and 
seminal methodological articles such as Petersen (2009) can potentially shed more light on 
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the results of the past. We remain hopeful for a resolution, and to paraphrase Richard Roll, for 
a theory and model that can better our understanding of asset prices. 
2.3 Content analysis 
Content analysis
58
 in the field of finance is a relatively new branch of research. The 
underlying idea is to quantify investor sentiment from qualitative texts in order to be able to 
better, and quicker, analyze the information available in the markets. The motivation behind 
the studies has been to better explain the variation in several key financial metrics. For 
instance, content analysis seeks to enhance our limited understanding of variations in equity 
returns. 
The prior literature in the nascent field has focused on identifying different methodologies for 
the estimation of investor sentiment, and from there on to study the impact of the sentiment 
on financial metrics. The key financial metrics used in previous studies have included: raw 
returns, abnormal returns, trading volume, return volatility and earnings. With promising new 
findings, content analysis has been gaining momentum in recent influential publications, and 
interest toward the field has increased. Furthermore, according to Demers and Vega (2010), 
there has been a surge in demand for firms selling data processed by linguistic algorithms 
(e.g. Ravenpack) implying that investment firms are waking up to the possibility of exploiting 
content analysis techniques in an attempt to reap returns.
59
 
We aim to introduce the reader to the most influential findings in the field while giving 
insight to the theory behind the hypothesized relationship between investor sentiment and 
financial metrics. Furthermore, we offer a brief introduction to the content analysis process 
and methodology in general.
60
  
The section will proceed as follow: first, we will briefly acquaint the reader with content 
analysis methodology; second, we will discuss the theory behind the hypothesized 
relationship between investor sentiment and financial metrics that will set the ground for our 
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coming hypotheses in Section 3; third, we will discuss the key findings of content analysis 
studies in the domain of finance, their importance and the used methodologies. 
2.3.1 Content analysis methodologies  
Recent literature has used various approaches when turning text to quantified metrics. The 
idea is typically to transform qualitative information into a sentiment score – usually authors 
wish to distinguish positive vs. negative sentiment, and possibly measure the magnitude. As a 
criterion to compare whether the estimated sentiment correctly reflects the quantified, Mitra 
and Mitra (2010) suggest comparing a computer’s annotations to how a human, or a human 
group (in particular a group of experts), interpret the text. Alternatively, one could also use 
market based measures, defining the sentiment after a market reaction (sentiment = market 
reaction). The aforesaid approach inherently assumes that the market reacts to a news story. 
Therefore, changes in a correctly constructed sentiment should correlate with stock 
performance metrics, such as returns, volatility or volume. 
Sentiment analysis process 
To analyze sentiment, one must first collect texts to process and to analyze them in order to 
construct a sentiment score. Mitra and Mitra (2010) split the information flow into 
information gathering (mainstream news, pre-news and web2.0/social media), pre-analysis, 
classification and assignment of sentiment scores, and analysis (vs. financial market data). 
Once completed, the analysis results can be fed into various quant models for return 
prediction, trading decisions or to assess risk. This approach is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Information flow and computational architecture (Mitra and Mitra, 2010) 
Various sources of information have been used in previous literature. Many authors (e.g. 
Engelberg, 2008; Li, 2006; Loughran and McDonald, 2011 have focused on 10-K reports that 
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are easy to access and analyze as they follow a certain structure and relate by definition to a 
certain company. Examples of other media varies from general news (e.g. Antweiler and 
Frank, 2006; Tetlock, 2008) to analyzing message board posts (Antweiler and Frank, 2002). 
Pre-analysis of information starts with the decisions on how media will be filtered from a 
database. For 10-K reports, the decision of which report relates to which company is 
straightforward. For news and social media, this needs to be carefully defined. News can also 
mention multiple companies and do not always relate to one company. Today’s news 
databases usually include some search functionality for a company ticker which is often the 
result of a machine learning algorithm by the database company. While Tetlock et al. (2008) 
choose to search news by the official company name and filter their results then further to 
ensure the news are highly relevant to the company, Engelberg (2008) relies on Factiva’s 
automatic classification of news by company code.  
After sorting out the right companies, most authors also perform some pre-processing of the 
texts. This is necessary to, for example, include the heading to be a part of the text, or to deal 
with texts including elements not in a story-format, such as tables, pictures and disclaimers 
that could add unnecessary noise to a sentiment score.  
Mitra and Mitra (2010) also recognize that it could be beneficial to identify stories that are 
current: news that report other old news are not so relevant anymore, as the information is not 
novel, and should often be given less weight or excluded from sentiment score metrics. Also, 
adjustments depending on news flow timing could be used. News flows have seasonality in 
them: at some points of day, week, month and year more news (and new information) come to 
the market than others. Finally, analyzing links between news should be considered, as news 
items often include a number of topics (e.g. a company’s earnings announcement will bring a 
wide variety of information to the table on different topics). 
After preprocessing, news are classified to construct a sentiment score. Das (2010), also cited 
by Mitra and Mitra (2010), has identified six methods for classifying sentences: the naïve 
classifier and variations of the naïve classifier: the discriminant based classifier and the 
adjective-adverb phrase classifier; algorithms that determine the class based on the 
composition of lexicon items in a sentence: vector distance classifier and Bayesian classifier; 
and support vector machine (SVM). Das (2010) also proposes to use a voting scheme after 
using the number of classifiers, so that a message is given the category to which most 
classifiers would rank it. 
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Sentiment classifiers 
The Naïve classifier (also known as “word count” and “bag of words method”) works by 
counting the number of word occurrences, and assigns a label to the text based on what 
category of words are most common (e.g. positive or negative, or neural if no majority exists). 
To work, this method requires a lexicon, i.e. list of words that have been categorized as 
“positive”, “negative”, etc. Due to the ease of implementation, this is the most commonly 
used classifier and has been used in most studies in the finance domain (e.g. by Tetlock, 2008; 
with some additions by Engelberg, 2008; and Loughran and McDonald, 2011). As a 
modification of the naïve classifier, Das proposes a discriminant based classifier that assigns 
different weights to different words (e.g. 0.5 negative weight for a slightly negative word, and 
2 for a highly negative word). The Adjective-adverb phrase classifier works also similarly to 
the naïve classifier, but considers only noun phrases that include adjectives or adverbs: e.g. “a 
strong profit” would be considered for classification, but “a profit” would not be included 
even if the word profit would exist in the lexicon.In addition, Engelberg (2008) experiments 
by adding the impact of simple negations that change the meaning of expressions (for 
example “not bad” vs. “bad”).  
The vector distance classifier assigns all words in lexicon as dimensions in vector space, and 
then describing each message as a vector. A training set of messages are pre-classified, and 
new messages are assigned polarity with vectors that have the smallest angle. Bayesian 
classifier, on the other hand, determines the count of each lexical item (e.g. a word) in a 
message. From a training set, it is possible to know with what likelihood each lexical item 
appears in a certain category. From word based frequencies, it is possible to calculate the 
probability that a message falls into a certain category, and assign the category with the 
highest probability to the message. For example O’Hare et al. (2009) uses multinomial naïve 
Bayesian classifiers to recognize sentiment in financial blogs.  
Support Vector Machines (SVMs) are a classifier technique that is similar to cluster analysis 
but can be used in very high-dimensional spaces. Given a large number of texts and a training 
corpus, the SVM can classify texts, for example all words in the lexicon dimensions, and then 
clustering the texts based on information in the training corpus
61
. For example, this could be 
used to first identify which words are typically present in a positive sentence, and then to 
classify further sentences based on this. The advantage of SVMs would be their flexibility in 
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being able to learn features also in highly sophisticated environments. SVMs are used by e.g. 
O’Hare et al. (2009) to classify financial text.  
Going further in sophistication with sentiment detection, Moilanen et al. (2010) have 
developed a method called “quasi-compositional sentiment sequencing” that we also use as 
the basis for our methodology. Compared to a base case word count, this method assumes that 
having polarities in different sequences can create a different outcome for the polarity of the 
whole sentence. For example, having a sentence with three words – “positive-negative-
positive” – could be labeled as positive by majority vote with a word count algorithm. The 
logic of quasi-compositional sentiment sequencing, on the other hand, would be to ask “what 
kind of polarities have human annotators given to sentences that have words in the sequence 
‘positive-negative-positive’”. To simplify sentences, the method compresses similar polarities 
together in the sequence (e.g. sentences with “positive-neutral-neutral-positive-positive” and 
“positive-neutral-neutral-neutral-positive” would be compressed to “positive-neutral-
positive”). With this compression, the training sets required reduces significantly. For 
implementing the actual classification, the authors use a standard SVM approach and a readily 
annotated corpus (MPQA). Looking at the results of quasi-compositional sequencing, 
especially sentences with many different polarities (the authors use positive, negative, neutral 
and reversal) yield better results than simpler methods.   
Considerations on classifiers 
To work, classifiers often need supplementary databases: a dictionary includes the 
information of word categories (is a word an adverb, an adjective, a noun, etc.), a lexicon 
assigns words to various polarities (e.g. a list of positive words), and a training corpus of base 
messages shows examples of how different sentences should be classified. The contents of 
these databases can also vary significantly between studies, and e.g. changing from a general 
lexicon to a domain specific lexicon can make a large difference (see e.g. Loughran and 
McDonald, 2011). The most commonly used lexicon in the financial literature has been so far 
the General Inquirer’s Harvard-IV-4 psychological dictionary (e.g. Tetlock et al., 2008; 
Engelberg, 2008).  
In addition to sentiments, a sentiment algorithm can consider the window where the sentiment 
is detected, and also the magnitude of the sentiment. While most papers either consider 
sentiment on a document level or always categorize sentences, there are also other options for 
labeling a text with a certain polarity. O’Hare et al. (2009) introduce a concept of word (and 
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sentence and paragraph) windows: they consider for the sentiment on a certain topic only text 
that has a distance of n to a topic word (e.g. only 5 words before and 5 words after a certain 
topic word).  
For a human reader, it is also evident that the context of an expression impacts how strong the 
polarity should be. For example, Engelberg (2008) relates the negative sentiment on a 
sentence level further to one of six themes (positive fundamentals, negative fundamentals, 
future, outlook, environment, operations, and other) and identifies that they can be used to 
refine the perceived impact of sentiment. 
Once classified, detected polarized words and sentences need to be combined to arrive at an 
aggregate sentiment score; in other words, “sentiment of the day”. Authors have adopted 
various approaches for aggregation: e.g. Tetlock et al. (2008) combines all news of a 
particular day into one article and calculates the proportion of negative words in this article. 
On the other hand, Das (2010) labels each message as a “buy” or a “sell” signal, and then 
calculated the number of total buys and sells per day. The chosen approach has an impact: for 
example, a long article would typically have a larger weight with Tetlock’s approach, whereas 
with Das’s approach the weight of each article would be the same. 
2.3.2 Stock metrics and investor sentiment: proposed link 
During the 1980’s, interest towards qualitative information began to surge. Empirical 
evidence that seemed to explain movement in financial metrics without any apparent change 
in quantitative information was growing (e.g., Shiller, 1981).
62
 Confronted with the growing 
amount of apparent anomalies, scholars started to seek answers in qualitative texts leading 
some researchers to suggest that qualitative information could have incremental value above 
and beyond quantitative information in relation with financial metrics: e.g., equity returns 
(e.g., Roll, 1988; Cutler et al., 1989).
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Information content in financial texts 
Concurrently with the increasing interest in the informational content of qualitative text, 
research was documenting managers’ tendency to voluntary disclose information to investors 
in order to align investors’ expectations of future performance with management’s own 
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assessment (e.g., Ajinkya and Gift, 1984; Hassel and Jennings, 1986; King et al., 1990).
64
 In 
1994, in his seminal article using a sample of voluntary earnings disclosures for 93 NASDAQ 
firms, Skinner (1994) showed that managers tended to disclose good news in point estimates 
and bad news in qualitative text. In fact, according to Skinner, previous literature had forgone 
an important source of information when neglecting to take into account the impact of 
qualitative information on financial metrics. Sloan (1996) agrees with Skinner by positing that 
the power of market efficiency tests can be improved if the strategic nature of published 
disclosures can be exploited. Later on, researchers have agreed with Sloan, suggesting that 
qualitative information provides an interesting opportunity to improve tests on market 
efficiency (e.g., Antweiler and Frank, 2006; Li, 2006; Davis et al., 2008). 
In line with the forthcoming findings of Skinner, Subramanian et al. (1993) shows that annual 
reports of profitable firms are significantly easier to read than those of poor performers  
implying that poor performers disclose information in a more complex manner using lengthier 
and more difficult qualitative texts. Later on, Li (2008) demonstrates with a sample of 10-ks 
that managers attempt to hide adverse information through less transparent disclosure via 
qualitative text. Li (2008) employs a fog index in combination with the length of a document 
to measure annual report readability.
65
 The evidence supports Skinner’s (1994) findings and is 
in line with Subramanian et al. (1993), showing that annual reports of firms with lower 
earnings are harder to read. Moreover, increase from last year’s earnings will decrease the 
complexity of the annual report corresponding to the increased earnings period.  
Besides containing information on past and contemporary negative fundamentals, qualitative 
text has been linked to forward looking estimates vis-à-vis the backward looking focus of 
quantitative point-estimates (e.g., Li, 2006, 2008). The rationale is that managers have more 
freedom in writing qualitative texts which are loosely regulated vis-à-vis quantitative 
information which is strictly regulated (e.g., Li, 2006; Davis et al., 2008).
66
 Therefore, 
managers are more inclined to disclose future estimates using qualitative information. As a 
result, information extracted from qualitative texts can in fact have incremental value above 
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and beyond quantitative information when predicting financial metrics. Dye and Sridhar 
(2004) posit that hard and soft information should be taken into account in tandem. Also in 
Engelberg’s (2008) view, finance scholars should focus their attention in analyzing the 
heterogeneity of information: soft vs. hard, as some corporate finance scholars have done 
(e.g., Stein, 2002; Petersen, 2004).
67
  
Tetlock et al. (2008) offer two significant rationales for using qualitative texts: first, by 
analyzing all relevant news, researchers can analyze and judge the directional impact of a 
limitless number of events simultaneously through a proxy of investor sentiment. 
Furthermore, while examining all newsworthy events, researchers effectively limit their 
possibility for data dredging on a specific anomaly. Second, most investors receive their 
information secondhand Therefore qualitative texts can have incremental value over first hand 
quantitative information concerning a firm’s fundamentals as they are better proxies for the 
information set that investors use.  
Li (2006) goes even further by suggesting that the documented anomalies can in fact be 
proxies for a same undocumented omitted variable and as such the anomalies are not in fact 
independent of each other. Fama and French’s (2006) findings lend some support for Li’s 
proposed hypothesis: Fama and French find a strong correlation between the different 
variables associated with known anomalies. To study the hypothesis, Li regresses Fama and 
French’s (2006) variables on his risk sentiment, and finds that several of the variables are 
significant and explain risk sentiment. Furthermore, Li suggests that the variables that are 
insignificant are insignificant due to multicollinearity issues arising from the strong 
correlations between the variables. In conclusion, Li suggests that sentiment based on 
qualitative texts can potentially offer a more accurate and independent test of market 
efficiency.
68
 
Market impact of financial texts 
Besides the informational content of qualitative text, the linguistic style of the text can have 
an impact on financial metrics even in the absence of new information (e.g., Davis et al., 
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there is no link between sentiment and returns in the existing literature. In fact, sentiment is most likely a proxy 
for other contemporaneous information such as accounting numbers. However, Loughran admits that even 
though sentiment might not be a true driver for returns, it might still be an efficient way to capture other sources 
of returns. 
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2008; Henry, 2008). As framing is documented to have an impact on agents’ behavior,69 the 
linguistic style can impact agents’ decisions even in the absence of new information. Indeed, 
several studies have found that recipient of messages are attentive to both content and style 
(e.g., Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Chaiken, 1987; Kruglanski and Thompson, 1999; Chung and 
Pennebaker, 2007). For example, the way the stock market commentators describe price 
movements influences investors’ expectations of future prices even in the absence of any 
fundamental reason for price movements (Morris et al., 2005).  
If qualitative text has an impact on financial metrics, the question remains whether or not that 
impact is disseminated by the markets instantaneously as suggested by the EMH. As we have 
previously established, managers seem to be inclined to disclose negative news through 
qualitative text implying that qualitative text offers a better medium to communicate negative 
events for some reason. One such reason might be that qualitative text is harder for agents to 
process (e.g., Petersen, 2004; Li, 2006, 2008; Davis et al., 2008; Engelberg, 2008); therefore, 
managers disclose negative events through qualitative text to mask the event’s full impact 
from agents (e.g., Bloomfield, 2002). Grossman and Stiglitz’s (1980) ‘incomplete revelation 
hypothesis’ supports such assertion, stating that information that is more costly to process is 
less completely reflected in market prices.  
Also the limited attention theory
70
 supports the slow incorporation of information from 
qualitative texts into financial metrics. The theory posits that agents have limited cognitive 
resources and hence possess limited capacity to allocate to information processing. As a 
result, when agents are forced to divide their attention among several information cues, 
information is incorporated into financial metrics with delay resulting in underreaction to new 
information. Indeed, there is a large corpus of studies documenting underreaction to different 
events across different firms (e.g., Hong et al., 2007; Hou, 2007; Cohen and Frazzini, 2008).
71
 
Limited attention offers an explanation to underreaction in the context of both quantitative 
and qualitative information.
72
 However, in the case that qualitative information is more costly 
to processes, limited attention would predict that information based on qualitative text 
experiences greater underreaction as agents focus on the more salient information 
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 See Section 2.2.1. for discussion on framing bias. 
70
 For more discussion on limited attention, see Section 2.2.1 
71
 For more evidence, see Section 2.1. 
72
 Li (2006) takes a more negative stance towards limited attention’s ability to explain quantitative information 
anomalies, stating that they are well documented and easily exploitable. Therefore, require minimal processing 
and attention. However, Li agrees that limited attention should play a major role in the dissemination of 
qualitative information. 
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(quantitative information) at the cost of the more abstract information (qualitative 
information).
73
 Indeed there is evidence that supports the claim: for example, prior literature 
has found that stock markets react to previously published news implying that relevant 
information is neglect at the time of the release (e.g., Ho and Michaely, 1988; Huberman and 
Regev, 2001). 
Another potential explanation for underreaction to information contained in qualitative texts 
is the leniency in qualitative text regulation that can cause agents to discount information in 
qualitative texts (Davis et al., 2008). Mercer (2004) posits that as there are no third party 
auditors for qualitative text  as there are for quantitative numbers  agents will discount 
information from qualitative sources and therefore underreact to such information
74
.  
2.3.3 Sentiment and financial metrics: findings and methodologies 
With the increasing interest towards informational content of qualitative texts, scholars have 
attempted to estimate investor sentiment (information content and tone) from different 
sources of qualitative texts in order to study the relationship between sentiment and important 
financial metrics. Major sources for qualitative texts include: news articles (e.g., Chan, 2003; 
Antweiler and Frank, 2006; Tetlock, 2007; Kothari et al., 2008; Tetlock et al., 2008; Bushee 
et al., 2010), company press releases
75
 (e.g., Davis et al., 2008; Engelberg, 2008; Henry, 
2008; Bhattacharya et al., 2009; Demers and Vega, 2010), 10-ks (e.g., Li, 2006, 2008; Kothari 
et al., 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 2011) and Internet message boards (Antweiler and 
Frank, 2004; Das and Chen, 2006). Recently, social media (e.g. Twitter) has also sparked the 
interest of researchers. Also, the impact of aggregate market news volume on financial 
metrics has been studied (e.g., Mitchell and Mulherin, 1994; Hirsleifer, 2009) as well as the 
impact of firm specific media coverage (e.g., Barber and Odean, 2008; Fang and Peress, 
2009; Loukusa, 2011).  Majority of the studies has tried to link investor sentiment with one of 
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 As shown in Section 2.2., with representativeness bias, the saliency of the model is the vital component in 
determining which information source agents overweight at the cost of the other. In financial context, point-
estimates are often more salient due to valuation models utilizing point-estimates as their inputs. Therefore, 
qualitative text is often more abstract to agent, and is therefore underweighted in many cases. 
74
 In connection with the aforementioned, Krishna and Morgan (2004) with Demers and Vega (2010) show that 
multiple experts (sources of information: i.e., news and analyst press releases) improve information credibility 
and the subsequent reaction to the information in qualitative text. As a result, it is possible that agents underreact 
to news as they discount the informational value of qualitative text due to loose regulation. 
75
 Including various forms of corporate press releases and disclosures such as: earnings announcements, IPO 
prospectuses, voluntary disclosures, etc. 
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the following financial metrics: raw returns
76
, abnormal returns
77
, trading volume
78
, return 
volatility
79
 or earnings
80
. 
Sentiment and returns 
Majority of studies
81
 has found a significant reaction between investor sentiment changes and 
returns. The type of reaction found has been underreaction. 
Chan (2003) finds underreaction to news with a comprehensive list of news publications 
including Dow Jones Newswire service, which Tetlock et al. (2008) find to have novel 
information content resulting in an underreaction to sentiment changes. Furthermore, studies 
on other qualitative text sources have found results consistent with underreaction (e.g., Li, 
2006; Engelberg, 2008; Demers and Vega, 2010; Loughran and McDonald, 2011). Also, prior 
literature has found that simultaneously released information sources distract investors 
resulting in stronger underreaction to information (Hirsleifer et al., 2009). Hirsleifer et al., 
name this phenomenon as ‘the distraction hypothesis’ which is based on limited attention 
theory. Tetlock et al. (2008) study offers some support for Hirsleifer et al.’s findings 
demonstrating evidence that earnings related news cluster around earnings announcements, 
while earnings announcements occur almost always during the same time period, and that 
news that have the word stem ‘earn’ predict stronger underreaction. Tetlock et al. interpret 
that such news articles deal with fundamentals and therefore qualitative texts concerning 
fundamentals have more information content and subsequently more impact.
82
 However, an 
alternative conclusion might be drawn to support Hirsleifer et al.’s later study, suggesting that 
news with the stem ‘earn’ are news dealing with earnings announcements and as such are 
released in close proximity to earnings announcements. If this is the case, such news are 
released during a time when qualitative information, with quantitative information, floods the 
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 E.g., Chan, 2003; Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008. 
77
 E.g., Chan, 2003; Li, 2006; Engelberg, 2008; Tetlock et al., 2008; Hirsleifer et al., 2009; Demers and Vega, 
2010; Loughran and McDonald, 2011. 
78
 E.g., Antweiler and Frank, 2004, 2006; Tetlock, 2007; Hirsleifer et al., 2009; Loughran and McDonald, 2011. 
79
 E.g., Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Demers and Vega, 2010; Loughran and McDonald, 2011. 
80
 E.g., Li, 2006, 2008; Tetlock et al., 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 2011   
81
 Exceptions include of Antweiler and Frank (2004) and Das and Chen (2006). However, the aforementioned 
authors study internet message board data that does not seem to have incremental value over quantitative 
information. Furthermore, both studies have had fairly limited sample sizes. Also, their methods rely on more 
sophisticated - and complex - methodologies for estimating investor sentiment that have not yet yielded good 
results. 
82
 Tetlock et al. (2008) do not discuss any alternative interpretations for their result, but conclude that the finding 
is in line with their initial hypothesis. Therefore, one might present the argument that the psychological bias of 
‘belief perseverance’ is clouding their interpretation. 
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market causing greater distraction with more severe underreaction in line with the distraction 
hypothesis suggested by Hirsleifer et al., and the limited attention theory. 
Some studies document also overreaction to sentiment changes: Tetlock (2007) finds that 
Down Jones Index raw returns overreact to Wall Street Journal [WSJ] articles within one day 
of the event and reverse back to fundamentals within the next 5 trading days. Tetlock infers 
that the news articles carry no additional information content, and the reversal is consistent 
with the EMH. However, Tetlock (2007) studies WSJ articles which are later found to have 
no significance in relation to financial metrics in a study by Tetlock et al. (2008). In fact, 
Tetlock et al. (2008) hypothesizes that WSJ articles simply recapitulate previous news and 
therefore have no new information content, and as such should have no reaction. However, in 
light of the framing bias discussed in previous sections, one can argue that the tone of WSJ 
articles affects agents’ decisions resulting in overreaction to sentiment documented by 
Tetlock (2007), and the subsequent gradual reversal back to fundamentals. Therefore, 
depending on the information content of qualitative text, underreaction and overreaction are 
both possibilities.
83
 Indeed, Antweiler and Frank (2006) also find initial overreaction to 
sentiment changes from WSJ articles that reverses later on. The findings of Antweiler and 
Frank give support to our reasoning on overreaction with sentiment changes based on WSJ 
articles. 
In terms of event windows used in the prior literature, most of the studies have focused on 
short-term reactions with event windows equal to, or shorter than, 4-days (e.g., Tetlock, 2007; 
Davis et al., 2008; Tetlock et al., 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 2011).
84
 As a result, the 
intermediate- and long-term effects of sentiment changes, and the impact of such results on 
the efficiency of the market, have been neglected  to some extent  by prior literature. 
Some recent studies have employed longer event windows (e.g., Engelberg, 2008; Demers 
and Vega, 2010)
85
 in addition to short-term windows with findings that suggest that 
underreaction continues long after the opening of the event window in violation with the 
proposition of the EMH. 
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 Tetlock (2007) dubs the alternative theories as: sentiment hypothesis (reversal) and information hypothesis 
(underreaction). 
84
 Potentially due to the critique that has been directed towards longer event windows and the consequent 
increase in the severity of ‘bad model’ problems associated with them (e.g., Fama, 1991, 1998; Malkiel, 2003)  – 
more on Section 2.1. 
85
 Engelberg (2008) states that his study is the first to show content of financial media can predict asset prices in 
a longer time horizon. 
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Besides studying the link between returns and sentiment, scholars have attempted to build 
trading strategies to test the economic significance of the relationship between sentiment and 
returns (e.g., Li, 2006; Tetlock, 2007; Engelberg, 2008; Tetlock et al., 2008; Loughran and 
McDonald, 2011). As some EMH proponents have argued, an economically more feasible 
form of the EMH (e.g., Jensen, 1978) is not against market efficiency but in fact in line with 
it. Therefore, for an anomaly to be against all the definitions of market efficiency, it must 
stand and survive the test of economic significance.  
To study economic significance, trading strategies are constructed. Most of the trading 
strategies are based on prior year’s distribution of sentiment. By utilizing prior year’s 
distribution, the strategies take both long- and short-positions based on the magnitude of the 
sentiment change vis-à-vis prior year’s sentiment distribution (e.g., Li, 2006; Tetlock, 2007; 
Tetlock et al., 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 2011). At the moment, it seems that the 
economically feasible form of the EMH stands unwavering against the results. In other words, 
the link between sentiment change and abnormal profits is not strong enough to survive 
transaction costs (e.g., Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 2011).
86
 
However, as Tetlock et al. (2008) point out, the methodologies used for estimating investor 
sentiment are rudimentary as of now and as such the estimates are biased downwards due to 
measurement error. Therefore, the magnitudes of the sentiment coefficients are in reality more 
significant, as would the subsequent results be with more accurate sentiment estimates. Also, 
Tetlock et al. (2008) suggests that by creating more elaborate trading strategies, the economic 
significance might turn out to be different, and could be in violation with the economically 
more feasible form of the EMH. 
Sentiment and trading volume 
Depending on the information content of qualitative texts, sentiment level changes can impact 
trading volume in differing ways. As Tetlock (2007) notes, sentiment changes with no new 
information content will result in overreaction and therefore a volume increase. However, in 
Tetlock’s view, the hypothesis with sentiment change in the case of new information is 
unclear.
87
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Some studies have been able to establish trading strategies that have been able to stand the test of transaction 
costs, and emerge as victors (e.g., Li, 2006; Engelberg, 2008) 
87
 In line with his hypotheses, Tetlock (2007) finds that sentiment changes in WSJ articles are matched with 
overreaction leading to increase in trading volume. 
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Hirsleifer et al. (2009), state that in the presence of greater distraction, as measured by larger 
level of simultaneous earnings announcements, investors will underreact to new information 
and therefore volume will not be impacted, or it will be lower, in the short-term. Hirsleifer et 
al. interpretation suggests that underreaction is not accompanied by increase in volume in 
short-term. As we have demonstrated in the previous section, in the context of returns, most 
studies have found that qualitative texts have new information, and that information is 
incorporated into prices with delay: underreaction. Therefore, one might infer that in the case 
that information content dominates over style and tone of the text, underreaction dominates. 
Subsequent short-term volume changes would therefore not be abnormal, as suggested by 
Hirsleifer et al. findings regarding aggregate market earnings announcements and volume 
levels. 
On the other hand, Loughran and McDonald (2011) find that abnormal trading volume 
increases with sentiment changes. Loughran and McDonald’s results are more consistent with 
the interpretation that their qualitative information contains new content, and therefore the 
finding should not be attributed to the disagreement hypothesis
88
 suggested by Tetlock 
(2007). However, Loughran and McDonald’s event window differs from that of Tetlock’s 
(2007) potentially casting some light to the difference. Indeed, Loughran and McDonald’s 
event window is longer than that of Tetlock (2007); 4-days vis-à-vis 1-day event window. 
Therefore, Loughran and McDonald’s results might be driven by the fact that volume levels 
reacts to new information with a lag.  
We propose that the relationship between trading volume and sentiment seems to be related to 
information content vis-à-vis style and tone of qualitative texts as well as the event window 
length under review. Antweiler and Frank (2006) findings support our proposition: they find 
that initial overreaction is accompanied by increase in volume followed by declines in volume 
 such would be the reaction with texts dominated by tone over content. In cases where 
investors react more to new information content (over tone of text), sentiment changes should 
have either no reaction  or slightly positive reaction  with trading volume in the short-
term followed by slight increase in volume in the long run.  
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 For details on the hypothesis, we refer the reader to Tetlock (2007). 
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Sentiment and volatility 
The impact of sentiment on return volatility has not been studied extensively in prior 
literature. To our knowledge, only the recent studies of Demers and Vega (2010) and 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) have studied the relationship. If we go back further in time, 
we find that Antweiler and Frank (2004) have also studied the impact of sentiment on return 
volatility with a limited sample of internet message board posts. 
All of the aforementioned studies find a relationship between return volatility and a change in 
investor sentiment. The relationship seems clear: changes in sentiment (both towards more 
positive and towards more negative sentiment) predict increases in future return volatility. 
Sentiment methodologies used in finance research 
Crucial part of the research concerning the impact of qualitative text on financial metrics is 
the process of quantifying that text into a sentiment score (e.g., Loughran and McDonald, 
2011). As content analysis is a rather new field in the domain of finance, the methodologies 
used so far in the extraction of investor sentiment have been relatively simple and 
rudimentary. In fact, Tetlock et al. (2008) argues that more complex methods of content 
analysis face two significant drawbacks: first, the need for human judgment; second, the 
difficulty to replicate the study by later research. Instead, Tetlock et al. advocate the use of 
established dictionaries (i.e., Harvard Psychology Dictionary) with word counting (i.e., ‘bag-
of-words’ vector word counts) that give results four crucial attributes: parsimonious, 
objective, replicable and transparent. Tetlock et al. continue by arguing that the 
aforementioned attributes are crucial in the early stage of research in content analysis in the 
domain of finance. However, in slight contradiction with their own proposition, Tetlock et al. 
also urge researchers to develop less noisy measures of investor sentiment - effectively urging 
the use of more complex methodologies in estimating sentiment.
89
  
Li (2009) rejects Tetlock et al. (2008) notion of using established dictionaries as there are no 
readily available dictionaries for the setting of business, and advocates also the use of 
statistical methods in word categorization. Such methods run head-on to the critique presented 
by Tetlock et al. (2008). Loughran and McDonald (2011) offer a potential solution to the 
dilemma by developing their own dictionaries for the domain of finance in the context of 10-k 
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 By arguing the following, we link more complex methods with better estimates of sentiment. However, that is 
not necessarily the case. Nevertheless, we do argue that at some point it is necessary to move towards more 
complex methods in estimating sentiment if we are to improve the accuracy of sentiment estimates as sentiment 
is extremely complex variable that requires a complex model to take into account all the required nuances. 
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reports.
90
 In fact, Loughran and McDonald show that Harvard Psychology Dictionary 
misclassifies words more than 70% of the time in finance context. On top of adding noise to 
the estimate, Loughran and McDonald assert that the misclassifications can in fact result in 
spurious correlations and type I errors. Loughran and McDonald conclude that future research 
should use their dictionaries in finance context. 
As can be inferred from above, word counts (i.e., ‘bag-of-words’ vectors) with established 
dictionaries have been the most prominent method for quantifying qualitative texts in finance 
context (e.g., Tetlock et al., 2008). Yet, exceptions such as Antweiler and Frank (2004, 2006) 
and Das and Chen (2006) do exist that have used more complex methodology
91
. Also, more 
recently, Engelberg (2008) employs a typed dependency parsing method to extract sentiment 
using sentence structures. Engelberg states that his study is the first study in the domain of 
finance to employ content analysis methodology that utilizes sentence structures instead of 
words. 
In order to employ word counts, researchers need to either choose dictionaries, or create their 
own. The early studies of sentiment in finance used only few specific words instead of full 
dictionaries. For instance, Li (2006) uses words ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ to measure risk 
sentiment. Later on, since the seminal study of Tetlock (2007), academia moved on to use 
Harvard Psychology Dictionary, and to be more specific, the negative word category of the 
dictionary.
92
 As Tetlock (2007) shows in his study, the fraction of negative words to total 
words is a good proxy for sentiment that performs equally well with a variable created from 
all the 77 different Harvard Psychology Dictionary categories.
93
 However, with the recent 
influential paper of Loughran and McDonald (2011), the choice of dictionary for future 
research in the domain of finance is uncertain. 
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 One can argue that Loughran and McDonald (2011) also fall prey to the critique of subjectivity. However, the 
authors construct their dictionaries to be as holistic as possible to avoid such critique. 
91
Antweiler and Frank (2004) and Das and Chen (2006) fail to find significant results with their main variable of 
interest: returns. However, their failure can be also be a function of their sample: internet message boards, or 
sample size, rather than the methodology of choice. 
92
 Tetlock (2007) suspects that negation increases noise with positive words and causes them to lose significance. 
However, Engelberg (2008) tests the amount of negation present in DJNS articles and finds that there is no 
substantial negation. Therefore, he rejects Tetlock (2007) explanation and suggests that misclassifications are 
responsible. Yet, when Loughran and McDonald (2011) create their own positive word list, they are unable to 
increase the significance of their results. Loughran and McDonald conclude that truly positive words are hard to 
isolate. 
93
 The latter variable is created based on past year’s data using principal component analysis which combines the 
77 categories into a linear combination variable that captures maximum amount of variance out of the 77x77 
covariance matrix. 
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2.4 Unexplored areas in literature 
As content analysis is a relatively young field of study in the domain of finance, there are 
several different areas of interest left unexplored requiring research. We aim to quickly 
introduce the reader to the most significant areas of interest requiring future development and 
research. 
As discussed in Section 2.3., used methodology for the estimation of investor sentiment 
stands in the center of all research in the area. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that there is 
plenty of work to be done in the area. As discussed in Section 2.3.2., there are differing views 
on the required complexity of methodology for sentiment estimation. However, as research 
progresses in the domain of finance, researchers must utilize more up-to-date methods from 
computer-science in order to build a more realistic model to better capture sentiment. 
Therefore, future research should focus on trying to leverage content analysis techniques 
developed by different disciplines in order to build a better methodology for estimating 
investor sentiment in financial context. The aforementioned is advocated by Tetlock et al. 
(2008) and Li (2009), among others. 
Besides developing and leveraging new methodologies, existing methodologies require work. 
To paraphrase Berelson (1952): content analysis stands or falls by its categories. Therefore, 
while research continues to employ word counts based on dictionaries, the used dictionaries 
are in the center of the credibility and reliability of results. With the influential paper of 
Loughran and McDonald (2011), the status-quo position of Harvard Psychology Dictionary 
has come under scrutiny.
94
 Indeed, Loughran and McDonald advocate the use of their 
dictionaries in the context of finance. However, Loughran and McDonald’s dictionaries were 
created in the context of 10-k reports, and so far no other published study has tested Lougran 
and McDonald’s dictionaries  to our knowledge. In fact, Loughran and McDonald posit that 
future research should test their dictionary using different qualitative text sources from 10-ks. 
Also, before scholars convert from using Harvard Psychology Dictionary into using finance 
specific dictionaries, the results of Loughran and McDonald (2011) should be replicated using 
a different sample to ensure that the results are accurate  even in the context of 10-ks. 
In addition to methodological areas of interest, current studies have focused on studying 
short-term event windows without focus in the intermediate and long-term effects of 
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 To be fair, Loughran and McDonald (2011) do show that if employing a term weighting scheme, the 
introduced bias by Harvard Psychology Dictionary attenuates.  
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sentiment. Antweiler and Frank (2006) urge future research to include longer event windows 
in their studies to account for long-term effects of sentiment changes. Indeed, Engelberg 
(2008) and Demers and Vega (2010) have included such windows. However, there is yet 
much work to be done in analyzing sentiment change impact in different event windows. 
Intertwined with the issue of event window lengths, is the impact of investor sentiment on 
market efficiency, and the current debate between behavioral finance and efficient market 
proponents discussed in sections 2.1. and 2.2. Indeed, several content analysis papers have 
urged future research to focus on the impact of sentiment on market efficiency (e.g., 
Antweiler and Frank, 2006; Li, 2006; Davis et al,. 2008; Engelberg, 2008; Tetlock et al., 
2008). Therefore, studying the reaction of financial metrics on sentiment changes, and the 
subsequent theory development is crucial in the future. 
In addition to the above, consolidating media research into a comprehensive model of media 
effect on financial metrics offers great potential. Firm specific media coverage effects (e.g., 
Fang and Peress, 2009), aggregate market wide news activity (e.g., Hirsleifer et al., 2009) and 
firm specific extracted investor sentiment scores (e.g., Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al. 2008; 
Loughran and McDonald, 2011), have all been linked with future performance of financial 
metrics. Therefore, future research should attempt to analyze the relationship of all the 
aforementioned variables on financial metrics simultaneously to create a holistic picture of the 
impact of media on financial metrics. Indeed, there is no evidence to suggest that the effects 
are mutually exclusive as of now.  
Also, future research should attempt to incorporate all qualitative texts to truly analyze all the 
prevailing sources of sentiment simultaneously (as opposed to studying e.g. only the impact 
of an individual newspaper column). Indeed, some studies have used wide sources of 
qualitative texts at once when estimating sentiment (e.g., Chan, 2003; Kothari et al., 2008). 
Yet, the area offers great potential and should be of interest to future research.  
Finally, employing proven techniques to different data sets from different countries can also 
prove to be interesting. The subsequent findings on the potential difference can also shed light 
to studies relating to the different informational efficiency of different markets (i.e., fringe 
markets). Furthermore, developing new dictionaries for different languages, and testing the 
differences between information dissemination between different language sources can be 
extremely interesting. However, these topics are most likely not yet topical, but offer potential 
in the future once the nascent field has matured. 
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3 HYPOTHESES AND CONTRIBUTION 
In this section, we aim to highlight our place in the literature while describing the hypotheses 
we are studying. We will first describe the contribution our study makes to the field, and then 
move on to the hypotheses that underline our research. 
3.1 Contribution 
In section 2.4., we mapped out the various interesting areas requiring further research in the 
field of content analysis in finance. To contribute to the existing literature, we aim to study 
some of these areas. As a result, we contribute to the existing literature by:  
 Introducing new categories to the used finance lexicon. Recent models have typically 
used word lists of positive and negative words, focusing especially on negative words. 
However, as pointed out by Loughran and McDonald (2011), there are also many 
other word categories that can be helpful in detecting semantic orientations in 
financial and economic texts. To complement these, we add to the finance lexicon 
directional verbs and financial entities - words that require a directional verb to receive 
a polarity.  
 Testing the prior literature’s principal methodology for estimating investor sentiment: 
the vector word count, with the two most prevalent dictionaries utilized: the Loughran 
and McDonald (2011) dictionary, and the Harvard Psychology dictionary, in order to 
clarify the efficacy of the extant methodology, and the preferred dictionary for the 
methodology. 
 Testing Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) dictionary in an out-of-sample test with 
qualitative texts other than 10-k reports. 
 Developing a novel and a superior methodology, the Linear Phrase-Structure -model 
(LPS), for detecting semantic orientations in financial text Our methodology extends 
the categories used for determining sentiment and works beyond the level of detecting 
word lists
95
. 
                                                 
95
 To benefit from the domain-specific knowledge, which we add into the finance lexicons, one needs to have a 
model that is not restricted to frequencies of positive or negative words but is able to take the entire phrase-
structure into account. We extend the polarity-sequence framework of Moilanen et al. (2010) by accommodating 
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 Testing the three documented major media variables on financial metrics 
simultaneously in an attempt to create a holistic media model, and to isolate the 
significant media factors that drive variations in financial metrics. 
 Analyzing the impact different media factors have on financial metrics in a robust 
study employing a comprehensive cross-section of different qualitative texts with 
multiple event windows in order to attenuate concerns over data dredging. 
 Drawing conclusions on how limited attention (and related behavioral finance 
theories) could underlie the link between link between financial metrics and media 
factors. 
 Putting forward evidence concerning the efficiency of the market and the 
informational content of qualitative texts. 
3.2 Hypotheses 
We will now describe our hypotheses for the study that are based on prior literature 
introduced in Section 2. We begin by describing our hypothesis for the performance of our 
novel sentiment estimation methodology (Linearized Phrase-Structure -model) vis-à-vis a 
word count method that employs the two most prominent existing dictionaries. We will then 
describe our hypotheses for the impact of our main variables on abnormal returns. From there 
on, we will describe the hypotheses relating to trading volume and our main variables. 
Finally, we will explain the hypotheses concerning abnormal volatility and our main 
variables. For each of the subsections, we describe first the hypothesis to link the variable to 
sentiment, then to market news volume, and finally to firm-specific news volume. After 
describing each hypothesis, we also outline what alternative explanations be possibly exist in 
the market in the case that our hypothesis would not hold. 
3.2.1 Sentiment methodology hypotheses 
At the core of our study, we have developed a new methodology for better measuring 
sentiment. Compared to ‘bag-of-words methods’, we expect Linearized Phrase-Structure -
model to lead to more accurate estimates of sentiment. Therefore, our first hypothesis is: 
                                                                                                                                                        
elements which are particularly relevant for the financial domain. The most important differences to this method 
that we use to enhance the method include: (1) the inclusion of finance-specific entities into the polarity 
sequence model; and (2) the inclusion of interactions between financial concepts and verbs or other direction-
giving expressions 
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H1: Linearized Phrase-Structure -model outperforms the existing prevalent 
methodologies used for sentiment estimation in financial context. 
Alternatively, in the case that the bag-of-words method with prevalent dictionaries 
outperforms Linearized Phrase-Structure -model, we suggest that the outcome is because 
Linearized Phrase-Structure -model limitations lead to a significant measurement error. 
3.2.2 Abnormal return hypotheses 
In terms of returns, we aim to find a connection to sentiment. Our hypothesis stems from the 
limited attention theory, and states as follows: 
H2a: Investor sentiment forecasts future abnormal returns in all event 
windows through underreaction to sentiment changes. 
This also implies that we expect information content to dominate over tone and style effects. 
On the other hand, we recognize the fact that tone and style effects could also dominate over 
information content. Also, if sentiment has no impact on abnormal returns, this could be due 
to the fact that markets efficiently incorporate new information to prices, and that at an 
aggregate market level markets are efficient, or that there is no new information in news. 
In addition to sentiment, we expect aggregate market news volume to have an impact on 
returns. More precisely, we expect news volume to distract investors in line with limited 
attention theory, increasing the underreaction. Hence the hypothesis: 
H2b: Aggregate market news volume has a positive relationship with 
abnormal returns in longer event windows, while having a neutral, or 
negative, relationship with the 1-day event window. 
In the case that there is no relationship between aggregate market news volume and abnormal 
returns, we hypothesize that this is due to the fact that on an aggregate level, markets are not 
affected by information processing constraints. In other words, limited attention is not 
impacting the aggregate market, and the market disseminates information efficiently. 
In terms of firm-specific news volume, several news items can attract more investor attention 
that results in a faster dissemination of information, and therefore no long-term abnormal 
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returns.
96
 In other words, the relationship is the opposite compared to aggregate market news 
volume. Our hypothesis for firm news volume states as follows: 
H2c: Firm news volume is negatively related to abnormal returns. 
In the case that there is a clear positive relationship between firm specific news and abnormal 
returns, we hypothesize that this is due to the fact that noise traders are attracted towards 
attention grabbing stocks, and their trades cause prices to deviate from fundamentals resulting 
in abnormal returns. In the case that there is no reaction, markets are efficient and firm 
specific news volume bears no correlation to returns. 
 
3.2.3 Abnormal volume hypotheses 
In terms of the link between trading volume and investor sentiment, there may be two 
scenarios. Either investors react more to the tone of the text, or alternatively to the 
information content within the text. Based on prior literature, we hypothesize that the latter 
effect dominates. Therefore the hypothesis: 
H3a: Investor sentiment is related to a small increase, or no reaction, in 
abnormal trading volume over short time-periods, and with no-reaction or 
positive reaction in the long-term 
However, tone of text could also dominate over content. In such instance, we would expect 
sentiment changes to still have a very similar relationship to abnormal volumes as suggested 
in primary hypothesis. Investors would first trade based on tone, and then trade again to 
reverse their prior trades as the true nature of fundamental information is revealed. 
Linking market news volume to trading volume is another interesting research question. We 
hypothesize that aggregate market news volume distracts investors, resulting in underreaction 
to information. We expect that this leads to a market where: 
H3b: Market news volume has a negative relationship, or no relationship, 
with abnormal trading volume in the succeeding day, and a positive 
relationship with abnormal trading volume on the longer event windows. 
                                                 
96
 Also, multiple ‘experts’ effect can be argued to take place when more news are present. The information 
credibility increased; therefore, decreasing the discounting of qualitative texts, and subsequently increasing the 
dissemination of information. 
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Alternatively, in the case of no relationship at all, the aggregate market may not be distracted 
by the amount of news flooding the market. In this case, the aggregate market would 
disseminate information efficiently, and not be affected by limited attention. 
Next, we aim to link the firm specific news volume variable to trading volume. For this, we 
hypothesize that firm specific coverage increases attention towards a firm, resulting in faster 
information dissemination. This leads to the hypothesis: 
H3c: Firm specific news volume has a positive initial relationship with 
abnormal volume followed by a declining, or neutral, relationship with the 
longer event windows. 
Alternatively, attention grabbing stocks could have a positive relationship with abnormal 
volume across all event windows as investors are more prone to buy attention stocks. Prior 
empirical evidence on the topic is mixed and we recognize that such hypothesis could be a 
viable alternative. 
3.2.4 Abnormal volatility hypotheses 
Researchers have also been interested in the link between volatility and sentiment. We expect 
sentiment changes to increase future idiosyncratic volatility according to the findings of 
previous literature. In line with prior literature, we hypothesize that noise traders exist in the 
market, and react to sentiment changes with exaggerated action: 
H4a: Sentiment changes lead to increased abnormal volatility. 
In the case that sentiment changes do not explain idiosyncratic volatility variations, an 
alternative explanation could lie in our sentiment estimation methodology. In other words, our 
sentiment estimate would not be accurate enough, and would therefore introduce too large 
measurement errors that mask the true relationship. 
In terms of linking volatility with market news volume, literature has not documented a clear 
relationship between market news volume and abnormal volatility. Therefore, we hypothesize 
that: 
H4b: There is no significant relationship between market news volume and 
firm-specific abnormal volatility. 
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In the case that we find a pattern linking aggregate market news volume to firm specific 
idiosyncratic volatility, we offer a preliminary hypothesis that such a relationship might proxy 
for market wide volatility that impacts firm specific volatility. 
Finally, we are interested in firm specific news volume and volatility. For this, we expect that 
attention grabbing stocks attract more noise traders to trade on the stock:  
H4c: Firm specific news volume increases abnormal volatility. 
In the case that there is no significant relationship between firm specific news volume and 
idiosyncratic volatility, we hypothesize that this is due to the fact that the market is 
sufficiently efficient to correct the trades of noise traders in a manner that attenuates 
idiosyncratic volatility. Therefore, no significant increases in idiosyncratic volatility would be 
detected. 
In total, we proceed with ten hypotheses: one regarding the performance of our sentiment 
estimate, and nine regarding the link of media variables and stock performance. To 
summarize our expectations, we have gathered our hypotheses in the table below. 
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Table 1: Hypotheses of the study 
Hypotheses from previous subsection are collected and briefly summarized in this table. 
 
Sentiment estimation 
H1 Linearized Phrase-Structure -model outperforms the existing word-count based methodologies 
used for sentiment estimation in financial context. 
Abnormal returns 
H2a Investor sentiment forecasts future abnormal returns in all event windows through underreaction 
to sentiment changes. 
H2b Aggregate market news volume has a positive relationship with abnormal returns in longer event 
windows, while having a neutral, or negative, relationship with the 1-day event window. 
H2c Firm news volume is negatively related to abnormal returns. 
Abnormal volume 
H3a Investor sentiment is related to a small increase, or no reaction, in abnormal trading volume over 
short-term, and with no reaction, or positive reaction, in long-term 
H3b Market news volume has a negative relationship, or no relationship, with abnormal trading 
volume in the succeeding day, and a positive relationship with abnormal trading volume on the 
longer event windows. 
H3c Firm specific news volume has a positive initial relationship with abnormal volume followed by a 
declining, or neutral, relationship with the longer event windows. 
Abnormal volatility 
H4a Sentiment changes lead to increased abnormal volatility. 
H4b There is no significant relationship between market news volume and firm-specific abnormal 
volatility. 
H4c Firm specific news volume increases abnormal volatility. 
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4 DATA  
In this section we describe our data. We start by describing our time period and the firm 
sample for which we have downloaded our variables. Next, we explain how we have chosen 
our main and control variables, and how we define them. Finally, we describe the process of 
collecting financial and media data for our sample as well as the sources we have used. 
4.1 Time period and selected sample 
We have selected to download our media sample between January 1
st
 2006 and March 31
st
  
2011. We have chosen the period as it covers a full business cycle, including both sides of the 
crisis period of 2007-2009. As a result, our sample should resemble a full economic cycle, 
and therefore be unbiased from cycle dependent patterns. 
During our sample period, the largest significant event in magnitude has been the financial 
crisis: starting with a housing boom fueled by innovative financial instruments, the credit 
market spiraled out of control and finally burst. Consequently, the stock market experienced a 
tremendous decline followed by several infamous bankruptcies from well-established and 
influential companies such as: Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. Especially the financial 
sector was shaken by the aforementioned collapses. Furthermore, as the credit crunch 
escalated, the financial crisis quickly developed into a full-blown economic crisis that struck a 
strong backlash to the entire real economy of the United States. For instance, car 
manufacturers were hit hard by the bankruptcies of Chrysler and General Motors. As a result, 
volatility and risk premiums hit record levels in late 2008 and early 2009. Moreover, with the 
intertwined banking systems, the U.S. crisis quickly spread across borders resulting in a 
global recession. The aftermath of the financial crisis continues even at the time of the writing 
when Europe struggles against the lack of confidence the markets has towards the Euro 
currency, and the sovereign government debt issues of European countries. The 
aforementioned has been dubbed as the Euro crisis. 
In addition to the financial crisis, other significant global events include: the collapse of 
Iceland's economy, the anti-China protectionist movement in the U.S. fueled by China’s 
artificially low renminbi levels, highly volatile commodity markets and the largest Ponzi-
scheme in the history: the Madoff scandal. Also, in terms of natural calamities: Iceland's 
volcanoes have restricted European flight traffic heavily, and Japan's earthquake and tsunami 
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in March 2011 have also shaken the markets. At the end of our sample period, the Mideast 
uprising has been another dominating theme in the top news. The chart below illustrates how 
the stock market has performed during our selected time period. As can be seen from the 
chart, the time horizon covers fairly well a full economic cycle. 
 
Figure 3: Development of S&P100 during sample period. Index=100 on 1 Jan 2006 
For our sample, we have selected the S&P100 firms for their large coverage in news due to 
their strong status in the economy. Furthermore, with S&P 100 firms, the data on the stocks is 
easily obtainable, accurate, and the majority of the news are in English. The aforementioned 
is important as the majority of natural language processing technologies have been developed 
for English, and doing a study for another language would significantly complicate the 
detection of sentiment. Also, English is a fairly straightforward language for the purpose of 
analysis whereas other languages, such as Finnish, can be remarkably more burdensome to 
analyze due to postpositions in language.  In Finnish, for instance: ‘a language’ translates as 
‘kieli’, while the expression ‘in a language’ translates into ‘kielessä’, making the simple task 
of a word count much harder in Finnish vis-à-vis English. With English, the aforesaid 
challenge can be avoided. 
We downloaded the list of S&P100 constituents and their tickers from Standard and Poor’s 
website on the 15
th
 June 2011. All S&P100 constituents are large cap (market capitalization 
over one billion euros). The largest companies in the list, by market cap, on the 31
st
 March 
2011 are: Exxon Mobil, Apple and Chevron. The industry with the most companies is 
transportation.  
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Table 2: S&P100 summary statistics 
Industry # of companies  Market capitalization, USDbn 
Transportation 10  Average 79 
Retail 8  Median 51 
Banking 8  Maximum 414 
Petroleum and Gas 8  Minimum 12 
Pramaceutcal Products 7    
Computers 6    
Telecommunications 5    
Business Services 5    
Utilities 5    
Insurance 4    
Other (17 industries) 34    
 
4.2 Study variables 
In order to study the effects of investor sentiment on financial metrics, we need to establish 
what financial metrics we wish to study as well as how we will estimate investor sentiment.
97
 
Furthermore, we need to establish a proper set of control variables for our study so that our 
main study variables are not simply acting as a proxy for an omitted variable. 
We will start by specifying the main variables of interest to our study: the dependent variables 
that capture a specific financial metric of interest and the key independent variables that we 
believe will explain variations in the dependent variables. After defining the main variables, 
we will move on to describe the set of control variables that we will include in our study to 
take into account the variables that are documented to have a relationship with our dependent 
variables. Finally, we also describe a set of additional control variables that we use later on 
for robustness checks.  
For a summary of variables, we refer the reader to Appendix B – Main variable definitions, 
Appendix C - Main specification control variable definitions, and to Appendix D – 
Alternative specification control variable definitions. The aforementioned appendices define 
briefly our variables, and give some relevant prior literature reference examples. 
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 In Section 5.1 Estimating investor sentiment, we will discuss our definition of investor sentiment in more 
detail. 
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4.2.1 Main Variables 
Previous literature on content analysis in the domain of finance and accounting has mainly 
focused on analyzing the relationship between an estimate of investor sentiment
98
 and a 
specific financial metric. Five financial metrics that have been used most commonly include: 
raw returns
99
, abnormal returns
100
, trading volume
101
, return volatility
102
and earnings
103
. The 
most common estimates for investor sentiment have included: a market news volume count, a 
firm specific volume count and a sentiment score, developed from news article through a 
content analysis method. 
We have chosen to focus on the following financial metrics in our study: abnormal returns, 
trading volume and abnormal return volatility. Our focus is motivated by our interest in stock 
related metrics. In explanatory variables, we have chosen to include three different variables 
to capture  and dissect the effect of investor sentiment on financial metrics. The variables 
chosen are: market news volume, firm news volume and an estimate for sentiment. We will 
describe our definition of each of the variables in more detail below. For discussion on our 
specifications, we refer the reader to Section 5.2.1., and for a summary of dependent and main 
variable definitions we refer the reader to section 4.2. 
Abnormal returns 
In order for us to estimate abnormal returns for our event windows, we need to define a 
benchmark return. Barber and Lyon (1997), concurrently with Daniel and Titman (1997), 
have shown that using matching portfolios based on size and book-to-market have produced 
more accurate test statistics than factor based models (i.e., Fama and French three-factor 
model: Fama and French, 1993). Recent literature on content analysis in the domain of 
finance has often relied on matching portfolio methodology for calculating abnormal returns 
(e.g. Chan, 2003; Engelberg, 2008; Hirshleifer et al., 2009; Demers and Vega, 2010). Hence, 
we adopt Fama and French’s (1992) matching portfolio approach to calculate benchmark 
returns. The method divides the market into a number of portfolios according to company size 
(market equity) and book-to-market ratio. The idea is that companies with the same size and 
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 Also referred to as linguistic ‘tone’ or ‘style’ (e.g., Davis et a., 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 2011) 
99
 E.g., Chan, 2003; Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008 
100
E.g., Chan, 2003; Li, 2006; Engelberg, 2008; Tetlock et al., 2008; Hirsleifer et al., 2009; Demers and Vega, 
2010; Loughran and McDonald, 2011 
101
 E.g., Antweiler and Frank, 2004, 2006; Tetlock, 2007; Hirsleifer et al., 2009; Loughran and McDonald, 2011 
102
 E.g., Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Demers and Vega, 2010; Loughran and McDonald, 2011 
103
 E.g., Li, 2006, 2008; Tetlock et al., 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 2011 
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book-to-market ratios should yield same returns. As a robust check, we replicate our results 
using alternative definitions
104
 for returns.
105
  
To calculate the benchmark returns for the matching portfolios, we use daily returns that are 
retrieved from Kenneth French’s website.106 The 25 matching portfolios, which have been 
constructed at the end of each June, are the intersections of 5 portfolios based on size: market 
equity [ME], and 5 portfolios formed on the ratio of book equity [BE] to market equity 
[BE/ME]. The size breakpoints for a given year are the NYSE market equity quintiles at the 
end of June of the respective year. BE/ME -ratio for June of a given year is the book equity 
for the last fiscal year end before the respective year divided by the market equity for 
December of the preceding year. The BE/ME breakpoints are the NYSE quintiles. As a 
weighting scheme, we choose to use equal weights in line with previous literature that has 
disclosed the used weighting scheme (e.g., Chan, 2003; Demers and Vega, 2010).
107
 
To match our firms with a correct portfolio, we use the market equity [ME] and book-to-
market values [BE/ME] for each S&P100 companies. Hence, we can find the corresponding 
portfolio for each of the S&P100 companies. As we are dealing with S&P100 firms, 99.5% of 
our observations are ranked within the largest category in terms of market equity, and all the 
observations fit within the three top categories of market equity.  
To calculate event period abnormal returns, we use a buy-and-hold approach in an attempt to 
better capture the true impact for an investor vis-à-vis using cumulative abnormal returns 
[CARs], or other variants of return methodologies. Buy-and-hold approach has been used in 
recent literature by Loughran (2011) and Hirsleifer et al. (2009)
108
. 
When calculating abnormal returns, we use close-to-close prices in our event window. 
Therefore, event window [0,1] would read as: share bought at the closing price of day 0 and 
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 For more discussion on alternative methodologies for returns, see Section 5.4.2. 
105
 We test raw returns (e.g., Tetlock, 2007) and alternative abnormal return benchmarks: value weighted S&P 
100 returns (e.g., Loughran and McDonald, 2011) and the Fama and French three-factor model (e.g., Tetlock et 
al,. 2008). Our results are qualitatively similar with marginal changes in coefficients’ statistical significance. 
106
 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html - retrieved on the 25
th
 July 2012. 
107
 Our results are robust for using value weight returns, and do not disappear with the change of weighting 
scheme as suggested by Fama (1998). However, the magnitude of our results diminishes to some extent when 
using value weights. 
108
 To take into account the critique directed towards results from buy-and-hold strategies (e.g.,; Mitchell and 
Stafford, 1997; Fama, 1998), we replicate our results using cumulative abnormal returns [CARs] as in Engelberg 
(2008) and Demers and Vega (2010). In line with the critique of Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (1997), 
we find that our coefficient estimates decrease in magnitude when using CARs instead of buy-and-hold returns. 
However, our results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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sold at the closing price of day 1
109
. To study the relationship between abnormal returns and 
our main variables, we define several different event windows: first, we will study the 
abnormal performance of a firm on the following day after the event day [0,1] (e.g., Tetlock, 
2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; Hirsleifer et al., 2009); second, we will expand our event window 
slightly to 4 days [1,5] to examine whether or not a prolonged short-term effect is in play 
(e.g., Griffin, 2003; Engelberg, 2008; Demers and Vega, 2010; Loughran and McDonald, 
2011); third, we will move on to analyze intermediate effect by modifying our event window 
into a 30-day window [2,32]; finally, we will examine the potential long-term impact by 
broadening our event window into 60 days [2,62] (e.g., Engelberg, 2008; Hirsleifer et al, 
2009; Demers and Vega, 2010).  
All of our windows exclude the event date returns as we cannot be certain when the event 
occurs during the day. For example, let us illustrate our point through trading strategy 
example: if we know that the sentiment for the event day [0] is significantly negative, we 
would want to short the stock in question. However, in the absence of accurate time stamps on 
news, and intraday stock price data, we cannot open a position based on the opening price of 
the event date, as that would imply that we would “see into the future”. We do not know when 
the sentiment turned negative during the day or after market close: all we know that the 
sentiment for the day was negative. Hence, for example, the sentiment might have turned 
negative before midnight with the release of few influential articles in Asia. As a result, we 
begin all of our event windows after day 0 in all windows to be certain that we are comparing 
returns that take place after the sentiment change, and the causality of events is correct.
110
 
Previous literature has used a multitude of event windows to study the potential relationship 
with sentiment and returns. All of the above example references do not per se use the 
same exact event windows. However, they all study a similar time horizon: short, 
intermediate or long. In order to avoid data dredging concerns expressed by the proponents of 
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 When comparing results with different studies, the reader should be aware that some studies report event 
windows using opening and closing prices. Therefore [0,1] would read as: share bought at the opening price of 
day 0 and sold at the closing price of day 1 that would equal - in our definition - an event window of [-1,1]. 
110
 As we do not have access to intraday data like Tetlock (2007) and Tetlock et al. (2008), we cannot judge 
market efficiency with the short-term window of [0,1] as it is possible that markets have reacted instantaneously 
to new information. Furthermore, for majority of the news, LexisNexis stores only the date of the news. Thus, 
we do not have information on the actual release time of the news or even the time zone of the date. This makes 
it impossible to study precisely the immediate stock reaction to the release of a news item. In other words, we 
cannot separate when the actual sentiment change has taken place during day 0. Therefore, sentiment change 
might have taken place after the closing price of day 0, and the new information would then be immediately 
reflected in the opening price of day 1. As a result, event window [0,1] is aimed at establishing a link between 
sentiment and financial metrics, not to draw inference on the speed of information dissemination. 
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EMH with subjective event windows (e.g., Fama, 1991), we employ several different event 
windows that have been designed to be as objective as possible. As discussed, we employ 
event windows [0,1], [1,5], [2,32] and [2,62] for abnormal returns. 
Abnormal volume 
In line with the recent literature in content analysis (e.g. Tetlock, 2007; Hirsleifer et al., 2009; 
Loughran and McDonald, 2011) we are examining the effects of investor sentiment on trading 
volume. Consistent with the previous research, we define trading volume in terms of 
abnormal trading volume. In the absence of a consistent definition in previous literature for 
measuring abnormal trading volume, we rely on the definition used by the most recent 
publication of interest: Loughran and McDonald (2011). Therefore, we define abnormal 
trading volume for an event as the sum of the daily abnormal volumes for the event window. 
In other words, for event window [2,5] the abnormal volume would be the sum of the event 
day abnormal volumes during the time period (sum of abnormal volumes for days [2],[3],[4] 
and [5]. Abnormal volume for a day is defined as the difference of the event day trading 
volume and the mean trading volume for [-62, -2] divided by the standard deviation of trading 
volumes for [-62, -2].  To summarize, we calculate abnormal volume for day  t as: 
Standardized abnormal volume for      = 
      
  
=   
    
∑       
  
          
 
where Vn represents the absolute trading volume at time n. 
As we do not foresee any specific reason as to why we should employ different event 
windows with volume vis-à-vis returns, we run our specification with the same four event 
windows discussed in the previous section in order to maintain consistency within the study. 
We calculate abnormal volume for the same event windows as for returns: [1], [2,5], [3,32], 
[3,62]. Note that the notation changes slightly with volume vis-à-vis returns even though the 
event window remains the same. The reason is that with returns we are using closing prices 
and with volume we are reporting the actual days that volume is counted in the event window. 
Therefore, [0,1] in returns would report a return for 1-day period utilizing closing prices 
whereas volume notation [1] reports the same thing: volume for 1-day period. 
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Abnormal volatility 
Following the studies of Demers and Vega (2010) and Loughran and McDonald (2011), we 
study the impact of investor sentiment on the subsequent volatility of abnormal returns.
111
 As 
we are not interested in systematic volatility, we use abnormal returns to isolate the 
idiosyncratic volatility related to a given firm. We define the volatility of abnormal returns as 
the standard deviation of daily abnormal returns for the event window in question.  
Demers and Vega (2010) define abnormal return volatility as the logarithm of the sum of 
squared abnormal daily returns during the event window while Loughran and McDonald 
(2011) define abnormal return volatility as the root-mean square error from a Fama-French 
(1993) three-factor model. Our results are not sensitive to changes in the definition of 
abnormal return volatility.  
To assess abnormal idiosyncratic volatility, we rely on two of the same event windows we 
have used before: 30-day window [2,32] and 60 day window [2,62]. The shorter event 
windows have been excluded for the lack of observations in which to base the volatility 
calculations.
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Market news volume 
Hirsleifer et al. (2009) find that simultaneous earnings press releases distract investors, 
resulting in stronger post-announcement drifts on days when there are large quantities of news 
released vis-à-vis days when there are low quantities of news released. Therefore, we include 
a market news volume variable to capture the distraction effect demonstrated by Hirsleifer et 
al. (2009). 
We define the market news volume as the number of all the different media items for the 
given firms for a given day. To elaborate further, if there are three firms in the market [A, B, 
and C], and firm A has 3 different news articles on day 1, and firms B and C have 1 news 
items each on day 1, then the market news volume would equal 5 for day 1 [= 3+1+1].  
Also, we run an alternative specification with standardized market news volume to see if 
seasonality is driving our results with the variable. Furthermore, we test for the impact of 
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 Abnormal returns are defined against the benchmark of 25 size and book-to-market matched portfolios 
112
We believe that the 4-day event period would provide too much noise in the estimate of volatility to provide 
any useful insight into the relationship with our main variables. Our approach differs in this stance from that 
used by Demers and Vega (2010) who employ a short-term event window in addition to the long-term window. 
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abnormal market news volume using previous year’s average volume. We define the 
standardized form of the variable for day 0 as: 
(                                  )
                                 
 
Firm news volume 
Some recent studies have suggested that firm-specific media coverage can affect a firm’s 
returns (e.g., Fang and Peress, 2009; Loukusa, P, 2011). Hypotheses for the suggested link 
vary. For instance, Demers and Vega (2010) suggest that the presence of multiple experts: 
different sources of same information, can affect the impact that investor sentiment has on 
abnormal returns. Therefore, the presence of multiple news articles on a given day could 
impact abnormal returns. Also, firm specific news coverage could potentially represent the 
attention directed towards a company. Therefore, in line with limited attention, it could signal 
that the company has more attention directed towards it and therefore experiences less 
underreaction. In spite of mixed evidence, we include a proxy for firm-specific media 
coverage to study the potential effect. We define the firm news volume for a given day as the 
number of the different news items for a given firm on a given day. In example, if a firm has 3 
different news items on a given day, the firm news volume variable would take the value of 3 
for that day. 
As with market news volume, we run an alternative specification
113
 with standardized firm 
specific news volume to test the impact of abnormal news volume with seasonal adjustment. 
We define the standardized form of the variable for day 0 as: 
(                                  )
                                 
 
Sentiment estimate 
We discuss our primary sentiment estimation methodology in more detail in: Section 5.1. 
However, here we will briefly discuss the two different approaches we use for estimating 
investor sentiment: ‘bag-of-words’ vector words counts, and the idea of Linearized Phrase-
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 More on this in Section 6.3.2 
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Structure -model
114
. Linearized Phrase-Structure -model is our novel method for estimating 
investor sentiment that will be the primary method used in our study. 
To capture the sentiment of a news article, several studies have attempted to use various 
content analysis methods with the most common used method being a word count (i.e., ‘bag-
of-words’ vector word count) based on a predefined dictionary.115 Word count method relies 
on an intuitive assumption that a positive text includes more positive words, and a negative 
text includes more negative ones. Thus, by counting the positive and negative words in a 
news article, an article with many positive words should be positive, and vice versa.  
Counting words is a relatively straight forward task: an algorithm is given a list of words from 
a dictionary, and it calculates the frequency of each word in an article. To ensure that we 
count all the correct occurrences, we either need to take into account all inflection forms (e.g. 
‘bull’ and ‘bullish’), or alternatively convert all words to their lemma form (e.g., ‘bull’). 
Furthermore, in the case of inflections, it is critical to make sure that only exact matches are 
compared against the list to avoid double counting. For instance, searching with ‘bull’ could 
find both ‘bull’ and ‘bullish’, and ‘bullish’ could find ‘bullish’ again. Therefore, double 
counting would occur in this instance. 
The most established used dictionary so far has been the Harvard Psychology Dictionary 
(H4N).
116
 In fact, since the seminal study of Tetlock (2007), in which Tetlock shows that 
negative word counts using the Harvard Psychology negative word category divided by the 
total number of words for a news article explain most of the variation in returns, the majority 
of studies has focused on the fraction of negative words as defined by the H4N.
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However, the caveat with using word lists is the domain-specificity of dictionaries: the 
meaning of a word is domain specific in many instances. In fact, Loughran and McDonald 
(2011) show that in financial context the H4N dictionary misclassifies approximately 73% of 
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 When testing for efficiency of our categorization algorithm, we benchmark this also against quasi-
compositional sequencing. As this method has not been used in previous finance literature and is clearly 
outperformed by the LPS, we do not use the method when testing for sentiment and stock performance. 
115
 e.g., Li, 2006; Tetlock, 2007; Bligh and Hess, 2007; Engelberg, 2008; Davis et al., 2008; Tetlock et al., 2008;  
Demers and Vega, 2010; Loughran and McDonald, 2011. 
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2011. 
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 Tetlock (2007) constructs a 77x77 covariance matrix from all the categories in the Harvard dictionary in order 
to construct a linear combination variable that captures most of the variation in the matrix based on the 77 
Harvard dictionary categories. However, after constructing the variable, and studying its impact, Tetlock 
concludes that simply using the negative word category is a fair proxy for sentiment that captures the variation in 
an equivalent manner vis-à-vis the linear combination variable. 
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the words as being negative when in fact they are not. For example, ‘tax’ is regarded as a 
negative expression in Harvard dictionary. However, when reading a financial statement, the 
word ‘tax’ does not have a negative meaning but simply describes a firm’s tax position. In 
fact, Loughran and McDonald point out that misclassifications can induce spurious 
correlations, and therefore transcend the status of simply adding noise to the estimate. 
Therefore, researchers should use domain specific dictionaries when employing word counts. 
For that purpose, Loughran and McDonald develop a dictionary with six different word lists 
to be used in financial context. 
The idea that dictionaries are crucial for the success of content analysis is not a novel one. In 
fact, to paraphrase Berelson (1952): content analysis stands or falls by its categories. Hence, 
we will test both of the aforementioned dictionaries in our study in an attempt to evaluate the 
efficacy of the dictionaries as well as to compare them with our primary methodology.
118
 For 
a description of how we aggregate sentiment of multiple news items on a day, we refer the 
reader to Section 5.2. 
Our primary method for estimating investor sentiment: Linearized Phrase-Structure -model, is 
a novel method developed for this study. We employ a natural language programming 
algorithm that captures sentiment on a sentence level, and then analyzes the sentiment of the 
article by looking at the aggregation of sentence sentiments inside the article. We refer the 
reader to Section 5.1 for more information on investor sentiment estimation with the various 
methods. 
4.2.2 Control Variables 
In Section 2.1.3, we described several known anomalies that have been shown to explain 
abnormal returns in contradiction to the efficient market hypothesis [EMH]. In order for us to 
study the effect of investor sentiment on financial metrics, we must control for the impact that 
other known variables have with our dependent variables. Therefore, we include a set of 
control variables into our study.  
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 We will use the negative fraction of words for the sake of consistency with prior studies even though 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) compellingly argue for the use of term weighting functions. Furthermore, we 
refrain from standardizing the negative fraction as we believe that our sample might exhibit systematic increase 
in negativity due to the financial crisis that should not be smoothened out. Furthermore, Engelberg (2008) finds 
similar results with and without standardization; therefore, we do not foresee a problem with our choice of 
methodology. 
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Our underlying goal for selecting controls is to be consistent with previous literature and to 
create a comprehensive set of controls in order to mitigate the risk of an omitted variable 
driving our results. Our controls include both dummy (binomial) and continuous number 
variables. 
We begin by discussing controls used in our main specifications. From there on, we move on 
to describe the additional controls we employ in our alternative specifications as robustness 
checks. Once again, we refer the reader to Section 5.2.1. for more discussion on our study 
specifications.  
Main specification controls 
Most of our control variables are designed to control for the different documented anomalies 
relating to abnormal returns.
119
 However, prior literature has commonly used the same 
controls with other dependent variables as well. Therefore, we employ a similar set of 
controls to all our main specifications with the exception of abnormal volume specification 
where we add abnormal market trading volume to the set of controls. More information on the 
main specifications of our study can be found in Section 5.4.1., and for a summary of the 
variables discussed in this section we refer the reader to Appendix C - Main specification 
control variable definitions. 
Size 
In order to control for the size effect discovered in previous studies on cross-sections of 
returns, we include a control variable for firm size. We define firm size as the log of market 
equity. Market equity is taken as reported on Datastream. Our definition of size follows that 
of Tetlock et al. (2008), Hirsleifer et al. (2009) and Loughran and McDonald (2011), among 
others. By controlling for size we follow the mainstream approach of modern finance 
research. 
Book-to-market 
In line with modern finance research and the most recent influential content analysis papers, 
we control for book-to-market in our specifications. We define book-to-market as the log of: 
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implicitly controlled by the benchmark returns. Nevertheless, we include such controls in order to be as robust as 
possible. 
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one plus market equity divided by the last reported book value of equity. This is in line with, 
for instance: Tetlock et al. (2008) and Hirsleifer et al. (2009). 
Momentum 
Since the seminal articles by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), 
research has documented a relationship between past returns and future abnormal returns.
120
 
The two different effects have been named reversal effect and momentum effect. To 
investigate the impact of past returns on future abnormal returns we include three different 
controls of past abnormal returns: 
 Short-term abnormal returns [-4,-1] 
 Intermediate-term abnormal returns [-34, -4] 
 Long-term abnormal returns [-255, -34] 
Our event windows for the momentum variables are similar to those of Tetlock et al. (2008). 
Other influential content analysis papers have mainly relied on one momentum variable that 
captures the past returns of a year (e.g., Loughran and McDonald, 2011) but we choose to 
dissect the one year variable into several different variables to study the impact of past returns 
in more detail. Abnormal returns are defined as described in Section 4.2.1.  
Share turnover 
In line with the previous mainstream finance literature, and recent content analysis papers 
(e.g., Tetlock et al., 2008; Hirsleifer et al., 2009; Demers and Vega, 2010; Loughran and 
McDonald, 2011), we include share turnover to our controls in order to control for the 
liquidity of the stock and belief dispersion concerning the stock (e.g., Hong and Stein, 2003), 
and the subsequent impact on returns. We define share turnover as the log of: 1 + sum of the 
volumes for [-252, -2], divided by shares outstanding at event date. Our definition is similar to 
that used by Loughran and McDonald (2011). 
Standard unexpected earnings [SUE] 
In order to control for the well-known post-earnings announcement drift [PEAD], we include 
standard unexpected earnings variable. Previous literature on content analysis in finance 
domain has consistently included SUE in their controls, or as the dependent variable in their 
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specifications (e.g., Li, 2006; Tetlock et al., 2008; Davis et al,. 2008; Hirsleifer et al., 2009; 
Demers and Vega, 2010; Loughran and McDonald, 2011). However, previous research has 
defined SUE in myriad ways. The significant difference between definitions culminates in the 
scaling / standardization procedure used for SUE. Tetlock et al. (2008) and Demers and Vega 
(2010) use the time series method of Bernard and Thomas (1989) to standardize unexpected 
earnings with the standard deviation of the previous 20 quarters of unexpected earnings. 
Davis et al. (2008), Hirsleifer et al. (2009) and Loughran and McDonald (2011), on the other 
hand, standardize unexpected earnings using the stock price of the firm. We rely on the latter 
methodology as it has gained more exposure on recent influential studies, and is more 
pragmatic to implement. 
We define SUE as the difference between the last reported quarter’s EPS and the 
corresponding last median analyst forecast for that EPS divided by the closing share price on 
the day of the respective earnings announcement. 
Abnormal volatility 
If investor sentiment has predictive power over abnormal returns in contradiction with the 
prediction of the efficient market hypothesis, we must establish whether or not this is due to 
limits to arbitrage.
121
 As pointed out by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), agents may not trade on 
information they have if they face constraints.
122
  In order to evaluate whether agents face 
constraints, we include a control for idiosyncratic volatility: the most common proxy for 
arbitrage risk used in main stream finance literature (e.g., Engelberg, 2008). We define 
abnormal volatility as the standard deviation of daily abnormal returns for the time period of 
[-252, -2]. 
Institutional ownership 
Some researchers (e.g., Frazzini, 2006) have suggested that irrational trading by institutions is 
a source of post-earnings announcement drift [PEAD]. Hence, institutional ownership could 
be a determinant of abnormal returns. Also, according to the limited attention theory
123
, 
institutional ownership can have an impact on abnormal returns. As investors’ attention is 
limited, they face information processing costs. Therefore, investors with more processing 
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 Also, prior literature has shown that uncertain firms: measured by volatility or the nature of their 
environment, face more severe underreaction, and hence are impacted more heavily by investor sentiment (e.g., 
Brav and Heaton, 2002; Dye and Sridhar, 2004; Engelberg, 2008) 
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capacity should be ahead of the curve and capture abnormal returns. Previous literature (e.g., 
Engelberg, 2008) assumes that institutions have more processing capacity than individuals. 
Therefore, in light of limited attention theory, institutions should earn abnormal returns. 
Moreover, in light of our study, investor sentiment should have less predictive power over 
financial metrics with firms that have high institutional ownership. We define institutional 
ownership as shares held by government, pension funds and investment companies divided by 
the total shares outstanding
124
.  
Abnormal market volume 
In order to study the effect of investor sentiment on abnormal trading volume, we must isolate 
systematic jumps in trading volume. In line with Antweiler and Frank (2006) and Hirsleifer et 
al. (2009), we include a control for abnormal market volume in the abnormal trading volume 
specification. We define abnormal market volume in the same way we defined abnormal 
volume in Section 4.2.1: the sum of daily abnormal volumes for a given event period. Daily 
abnormal volume is defined as the difference of daily trading volume and mean volume, 
divided by the standard deviation of volume. Mean volume and standard deviation of volume 
are defined based on days [-62,-2]. The aforementioned methodology is consistent with 
Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) methodology for calculating abnormal trading volume.  
To establish a proxy for market trading volume, we take the sum of trading volumes of all our 
firms in a given data set (i.e., S&P 100 firms). From there on, we employ the aforementioned 
definition of abnormal trading volume to calculate abnormal market trading volume. 
Alternative specification controls 
In order to make sure that our results are robust, we include several additional controls that 
have been used in some of the studies of prior literature. However, most of the additional 
controls have had little impact in prior studies, and for the most part have been insignificant. 
Therefore, we do not expect to see a significant impact from the additional controls. 
Nevertheless, for the sake of robustness, we include the additional controls in our alternative 
specifications to study their potential impact on our results. Discussion on our alternative 
specifications can be found in Section 5.4.2., and for a summary of the variables in this 
section we refer the reader to Appendix D – Alternative specification control variable 
definitions. 
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Industry dummies 
To control for the industry specific risk factors we employ the 48 different industry 
classifications suggested by Fama and French (1997) in their seminal article. Recent content 
analysis papers in the domain of finance have also employed similar methodology to classify 
firms into different industry segments (e.g., Engelberg, 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 
2011). Using the 48 distinct Fama and French categories, we classify our firms into different 
industries based on their primary industry classification codes (SIC), as retrieved from 
Datastream. After categorizing our firms, our sample is divided into 28 different Fama and 
French industry categories (S&P100 does not have firms for the 20 remaining industries).  
# of analysts following 
Analyst coverage is often used as a proxy for media coverage and informational efficiency 
(e.g., Demers and Vega, 2010). The underlying notion is that firms with higher levels of 
analyst following have simply more information available, and hence exhibit lower abnormal 
returns. 
In line with Engelberg (2008), Hirsleifer et al. (2009) and Demers and Vega (2010), we 
include a control for analyst coverage. We define the # of analyst following in line with the 
aforementioned authors as the log of: the sum of 1 and the number of analysts following a 
given firm.  
Analyst dispersion 
We include analyst dispersion to control for the prevalent belief dispersion that can impact 
financial metrics according to previous evidence. Recent content analysis research has also 
included analyst dispersion in controls (e.g., Tetlock et al., 2008; Demers and Vega, 2010; 
Loughran and McDonald, 2011). We define analyst dispersion as the standard deviation in 
analysts’ prior EPS estimates for the most recent reported EPS, divided by the share price on 
the respective earnings announcement date. This maintains consistency with SUE estimate, 
and our definition is similar to that of, for example: Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) 
definition.  
Calendar dummies 
To control for the well-documented January, Monday and end-of-the-month effects, we 
include control variables for the aforementioned. In the context of calendar dummies, the 
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dummy will take the value of 1 if the variable in question is located within the event period. 
For instance, in the case that the day Monday is present in an event window; the dummy will 
assume a value of 1.
125
 Calendar dummies have been used in recent content analysis papers in 
the domain of finance by Tetlock (2007), Li (2008) and Hirsleifer et al. (2009). 
Last twelve months [LTM] dividends 
In order to capture the documented dividend effect on a firm’s performance, we include the 
announced dividends for the last twelve months [LTM] divided by the last reported book 
value of equity (e.g., Fama and French, 2006; Li, 2006). 
No paid dividends during last twelve months [LTM] dummy 
In order to capture the potentially significant constant impact of no dividends vis-à-vis small 
dividends, we include a control variable for firms that have paid no dividends during the last 
twelve months (e.g., Fama and French, 2006; Li, 2006). The variable will take the value of 1 
if firms have paid no dividends during the last twelve months.  
4.3 Financial dataset 
For assessing stock performance, we retrieve stock prices and other necessary quantitative 
factors, and calculate all financial variables described in section 4.2. In this chapter, we 
explain how we retrieve the data and detail out calculation of these different metrics.  
We retrieve data using Datastream Excel add-in that finds the data in question based on a 
company’s ticker identifier.  As the tickers Datastream uses are different from S&P 100 
tickers, we manually match Datastream tickers with their corresponding S&P tickers. From 
there on, we download the data for the firms. Once downloaded, we remove all the data for 
non-trading days as non-trading days are not included in our analysis, as there are no relevant 
changes in financial metrics for non-trading days. 
To make sure our price data obtained from Datastream is reliable, we conduct a number of 
sanity checks. To see large jumps in the data, we look at daily returns that are out of the range 
of -50% … +50% as such jumps are unexceptional. The method yields us two huge price 
changes with Citigroup and Morgan Stanley. Looking into the two extreme observations (see 
Appendix E – Outlier values in financial data) reveals that the jumps are in fact correct, and 
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there is no error in data. We also check that market capitalizations and P/B variables are 
reliable: i.e., that the largest companies according to common knowledge have also the largest 
market caps, and that P/B figures are not extreme. Furthermore, we perform a check on 
market capitalization that is similar to the one we did with share price to see if there are errors 
in data. At first, share price and market cap checks may sound interchangeable. However, 
M&A and capital structure changes (changes in number of shares) create differences between 
the two. Therefore the list of changes (see Appendix E – Outlier values in financial data) is 
not identical to the changes in share price. 
Based on our analysis of key changes in market capitalization, we correct for Lowe’s 3-week 
doubling of capitalization and Visa’s doubling of value one week after its listing. After the 
aforementioned corrections, we remain assured that there are no huge unexplained jumps in 
the data: either there has been a major event, or a more technical change has been adjusted by 
Datastream in the stock price. Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for our main specification 
variables for the entire sample. 
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Table 3: Main specification descriptive statistics
126
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Average Min Median Max
Interquartile 
range
Standard 
Deviation
Dependent Variables
Abnormal returns
[0,1] 0,01 % -37,50 % -0,04 % 75,78 % 1,56 % 1,91 %
[1,5] 0,02 % -47,83 % -0,07 % 98,62 % 3,24 % 3,73 %
[2,32] 0,06 % -62,73 % -0,15 % 215,09 % 9,46 % 9,38 %
[2,62] 0,07 % -77,44 % -0,41 % 229,18 % 13,56 % 13,19 %
Abnormal volume
[1] 0,08 -4,11 -0,20 79,52 1,16 1,44
[2,5] 0,30 -10,91 -0,52 145,04 3,92 4,23
[3,32] 2,14 -38,02 -0,07 166,32 21,25 16,60
[3,62] 4,18 -64,99 2,64 165,01 29,10 22,55
Abnormal volatility
[2,32] 1,58 % 0,32 % 1,27 % 17,50 % 0,91 % 1,08 %
[2,62] 1,60 % 0,44 % 1,30 % 13,26 % 0,88 % 1,03 %
Sentiment
Windowed SVM* 17,54 % 0,00 % 16,69 % 100,00 % 17,79 % 13,48 %
Wordcounts
Finance dictionary 1,17 % 0,00 % 1,02 % 15,09 % 0,98 % 0,87 %
H4N dictionary 2,41 % 0,00 % 2,38 % 19,92 % 1,15 % 1,00 %
Main Independent Variables
Market news volume 359 108 306 1053 120 161
Firm news volume 4 0 1 235 4 7
Control Variables
Size 4,70 3,48 4,66 5,72 0,50 0,36
Book-to-market 0,15 -2,00 0,14 1,41 0,11 0,10
Momentum
[-4,-1] 0,02 % -49,83 % -0,06 % 93,21 % 2,78 % 3,26 %
[-34,-4] 0,07 % -67,93 % -0,22 % 163,51 % 9,40 % 9,41 %
[-255,-34] 0,21 % -88,91 % -2,02 % 367,30 % 24,45 % 24,57 %
Share turnover 0,50 0,00 0,47 1,43 0,22 0,19
SUE 0,00 -0,47 0,00 0,28 0,00 0,02
Abnormal volatility 1,67 % 0,55 % 1,41 % 8,47 % 0,93 % 0,93 %
Institutional ownership 6,96 % 0,00 % 6,00 % 64,00 % 11,00 % 7,96 %
Abnormal market volume
[1] 0,06 -4,18 -0,06 6,00 1,41 1,22
[2,5] 15,42 1,54 14,83 38,88 6,51 5,43
[3,32] 149,88 72,92 145,88 356,43 59,54 44,56
[3,62] 306,78 153,70 303,51 704,46 129,75 89,30
* The maximum value of Windowed SVM is 100% due to a few biased news items that include a large
number of special characters and only one sentence. While we have removed short messages and 
messages with only tables, detecting patterns of various special characters would be significantly more
diffcult. As the volume of such news items appears  small, we leave these news into our sample.
 
LPS* 
 
the LPS-model 
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4.4 Media dataset 
In this section we explain how we have collected our media sample that we use in the 
estimation of sentiment. We describe the sample we have chosen, and how we have 
downloaded the data. Also, we describe the preprocessing steps that we need to take before 
using the data texts in sentiment calculations. Finally, we summarize our news with 
descriptive statistics and figures. 
4.4.1 Media sample selection 
When collecting the media sample, one must first make a choice on what sources of 
qualitative texts to include. Using a single source of qualitative text as a sentiment proxy is 
the simplest way in terms of conducting the study. For instance, Tetlock (2007) uses only one 
source of qualitative text: the Wall Street Journal Abreast of market column, as a proxy for 
investor sentiment in his seminal study. However, aggregating multiple media items per day 
when estimating investor sentiment is the next step forward as investors do not rely on a 
single source of information when forming their opinions. For example, Tetlock et al., (2008) 
use multiple media sources in their study forcing them to pool different extracted sentiment 
scores from different media items to come up with one sentiment score for the day. Indeed, 
using multiple sources of qualitative text does reduce noise and improve accuracy vis-à-vis a 
naïve sentiment estimate from only one source (Das, 2010). Therefore, we also adopt this 
approach when collecting our media sample.  
We aim to create as comprehensive media sample as is possible with our accessibility to data. 
To do so, we collect all the news feeds and earnings announcements accessible to us. Our 
media sample is not a comprehensive representation of all media, as it excludes such sources 
of sentiment as: twitter feeds and other forms of social media, TV-broadcasts, and internet 
message boards. Nevertheless, these sources have yielded weak results in prior literature (e.g., 
Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Das and Chen, 2006), or have been left unexplored to this date 
due to the large noise inherent in the sentiment data extracted from these sources.
127
 To 
summarize, we create our sentiment from a feed of news and earnings announcements for 
three main reasons: 
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 Extracting accurate estimates of sentiment from social media is very demanding as the language used is less 
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mentioning ‘Apple’ in their messages. 
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 News and earnings announcements form the most significant portion of a sentiment. 
They are the key sources of information that an investor following a stock would 
study, and they represent the largest volume of up-to-date information on a company. 
 News and earnings announcements can be retrieved from databases, covering 
thousands of sources. Collecting twitter feeds, TV-broadcasts, analyst reports etc., 
could add even further information to the sentiment, but these sources are difficult to 
retrieve. Furthermore, the critical information in the aforementioned sources is likely 
to be reflected in written news – at least after a lag.  
 The format of public official written qualitative texts is an important advantage when 
analyzing texts. Public texts are often written in a format which avoids colloquial 
language. Hence, analysis of news is easier as we can use a standard established 
dictionary. 
For these reasons, we choose to focus on news and earnings announcements. While it would 
be interesting to combine our sentiment to additional sources of different media, we leave this 
area for future researchers to explore. 
4.4.2 S&P100 News and earnings announcements 
Our dataset covers news and earnings announcements for all S&P100 companies. For these 
companies, we have gathered the news in major sources written during our sample period: 
between January 2006 and March 2011. 
The news stories and earnings announcements for S&P100 companies were gathered from the 
LexisNexis database, with the source setting being ‘Major World Publication’ 128 These 
sources include a comprehensive set of 624 different world publications from ABIX - 
Australasian Business Intelligence to Zimbabwe Standard (Harare). While it would be 
possible to extend the dataset even further with the selection of: ‘All News (English)’ by 3 000 
more news sources, the data set that we are retrieving with the Major World Publications is 
vast, and we consider it to be sufficiently representative of news publications that have an 
impact on investor sentiment. 
LexisNexis allows searching for different functionalities, such as the options to look for 
keywords, to specify different time periods, select sources etc. A sample interface for 
LexisNexis search is included in Appendix F – Details on gathered media data, in section 
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LexisNexis search interface. The easiest way for a user to download all relevant news would 
be to simply type company name in the search bar, select the relevant time period and 
sources, download the news, and repeat this for each of the companies. Unfortunately the web 
service does not work as easily as this, and we face two challenges: the difficulty in searching 
for news of a particular company, and limits on news download volume.  
First, finding relevant news for a particular company is not a straight-forward task: searching 
for a company name results in a wide range of data. In example: searching for the company 
Apple with word ‘apple’ yields the results that are related to the company. However, it also 
extracts unrelated news items on apples in juices etc. While some company names are rather 
unique, counter examples are numerous. The perfect solution would be to search for a 
company's known name in the news to include all relevant news, and afterwards sort out the 
irrelevant news. However, the approach results in excessive data that would need to be 
reclassified. The alternative to searching by names is provided by existing classifications in 
the databases: LexisNexis provides an option to search news by company ticker
129
. Using 
only news categorized by the ticker may exclude some relevant news items that are not 
recognized by the database's classifier. However this approach allows for significant reduction 
in the search results volume. In example, searching news for one week for Apple with the 
word ‘apple’ in major world publications returns 1 171 news items that are mostly unrelated 
to the company. However, when using Apple’s ticker, the news amount is reduced to 222 
news items that are all related to the company. Hence, we choose to use this ticker 
information in our extraction process. We also restrict the sample by relevance score to 
exclude news that are not strongly linked to the company
130
. 
Second, when searching for a company, LexisNexis Academic provides the possibility to 
download the news in HTML format. The search is; however, limited to 500 news items per 
download. Due to this restriction, it is impossible to download all the news that we are 
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 SmartIndexing is a rule-based automated classification system that analyzes and tags online documents for 
relevant subjects, industries, companies, organizations, people and places.  Researchers build searches using 
index terms to efficiently and accurately pinpoint results. 
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 The relevance score excludes news that refer to the company only few times. These weak stories may 
typically include a market, or an industry, overview where multiple companies are briefly mentioned. Such 
information may be relevant for the company; however, when reading the news item with a machine, a sentiment 
scoring system may not be able to pick the relevant message. Therefore, we exclude such news. LexisNexis 
categorizes the relevancy as follows: 90% to 99% is a major reference; 80% to 89% is a strong passing 
Reference; and 50% to 79% is a weak passing reference. We remove all messages under the threshold of 80%. 
By using relevance score, our filtering is similar to that of Tetlock et al., (2008) who examine each story’s 
relevance to a company by checking whether the official and unofficial name of the company appear in the news 
item sufficiently many times. 
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interested in at once. Rather a search query has to be split into smaller pieces: each 
downloading less than 500 news items at a time. The LexisNexis service has only a web user 
interface: i.e., it is not possible to download news items without going through the website, 
manually navigating the web page. As downloading all of the >500 000 news would require 
more than thousand manual downloads, we develop a web scraper
131
 that downloads the news 
from a list of tickers for a chosen time period. The scraper is also limited by the same 500 
news item restriction as a human user. Therefore, we need to estimate a time-interval for each 
company that does not yield over 500 results for a query, so that the scraper is able to retrieve 
all relevant news, and is not missing out on news due to the maximum download restriction 
(e.g. for a search result yielding 600 results, we would miss the items 501-600 from our 
download). Therefore, we manually download a small number of news for each company to 
estimate a correct time-interval for each company that results in a suitable news item 
download amount. From there on, we let the scraper download the news for us. The details of 
how our scraper functions and navigates across the LexisNexis website can be found in 
Appendix F – Details on gathered media data, in sub-section: ‘Details of the web scraper’. 
4.4.3 Data pre-processing 
As an output of our scraper's downloads, we receive multiple firm-specific HTML-files, with 
1 to 500 news items in each. Next, we need to convert the dataset into an easily usable format 
in a database; identifying each message, the corresponding date, company, publication and 
other similar metadata. The format in which LexisNexis provides the data does not follow 
standard formatting. Thus, sorting the messages appropriately requires an algorithm of its 
own. The technicalities of this processing can be found in Appendix F – Details on gathered 
media data, in section Details of processing LexisNexis data.  
Next, we preprocess the text data. We sort the texts and remove irrelevant parts so that we 
will be able to easily analyze the texts data later. We perform the following actions on the 
data:  
1) We remove all tables as they are typically financial figures, or other numerical or 
otherwise descriptive data that typically contain very little information on sentiment 
(e.g., Loughran and McDonald, 2011).  
2) We check whether any sources provided by LexisNexis need to be excluded for our 
study. We manually go through the 25 news sources with the highest news volume to 
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see the kind of information provide. We would exclude e.g. machine generated news, 
and news that only present numerical data. However, such sources are not present in 
the 25 sources we check that collectively represent 56% of the news volume for the 
total of 482 sources.  
3) In some cases, the message and other metadata (e.g. date, publication, etc.) cannot 
easily be distinguished from each other: often the data is highly amorphous in 
LexisNexis. In such cases, the news items in question are ignored from the dataset.  
4) Similarly to Tetlock et al., (2008), we decide to exclude news where the length is 
below a specific threshold. Tetlock et al., exclude news with less than 50 words, while 
we choose to ignore all news with less than 100 words. We estimate that a news item 
with less than 100 words will have only few sentences, and insignificant value to the 
sentiment. Moreover, only one negative sentence could turn a short news item into 
drastically negative, and hence add considerable noise to our daily sentiment 
aggregation. 
5) We also remove all media items one week post a firm’s index inclusion, or listing, to 
avoid the well documented index inclusion phenomena (e.g., Shleifer, 1986; Tetlock 
et al., 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 2011). Following web research on listing dates, 
we exclude MasterCard first on 5 June 2006 (listed on 25 May), Philip Morris on 26 
Mar 2008 (spin-off from Atria on 17 Mar), and Visa on 28 Mar 2008 (listed on 18 
Mar). 
6) We remove duplicate messages: messages that have the same date, ticker, publication, 
heading and length. 
7) We manually scan the data to ensure that companies have a news volume 
approximately corresponding to their size, and that the news volume is approximately 
equally distributed across time. 
Out of the downloaded 552 578 news items, we end up with a subset of 474 030 items after 
preprocessing. For summary on the screening process, see Table 4. 
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Table 4: Number of documents during preprocessing 
 # messages % original 
Downloaded messages 552 578 100% 
Metadata in difficult format -14 501 97% 
Message <100 words -41 082 90% 
Messages before listing -1 931 90% 
Duplicates -21 034 86% 
After preprocessing 474 030 86% 
 
While our preprocessing may remove some relevant stories, we believe that the reduction in 
noise outweighs the loss in relevance considerably. Descriptive statistics of the final media 
dataset can be found in the tables and figures below. 
At first, we review at the publications that our sample consists of (Table 5). We recognize that 
some of the top publications may be missing, such as the Wall Street Journal. This may be for 
example due to copyright issues, but we don’t consider this a critical flaw132: the wide 
coverage of other newspapers should covey the same information content in most cases. 
Table 5: News volume by publication  
Publication type # of news % of total  Publication # of news % of total 
Newspaper 282 493 60%  Financial Times 39 616 8% 
Newsletter 52 362 11%  Daily Deal / The Deal 23 958 5% 
Magazine 43 963 9%  The New York Times 18 905 4% 
Web Publication 28 048 6%  The Globe and Mail 15 958 3% 
N/A 27 900 6%  The International Herald Tribune 14 869 3% 
Newswire 24 558 5%  National Posts Financial Post 13 816 3% 
Papers 3 118 1%  Biotech Business Week 12 943 3% 
Transcript 2 178 0%  Drug Week 12 613 3% 
Journal 1 607 0%  The Washington Post 11 678 2% 
Abstract 66 0%  TECHWEB 11 233 2% 
Other 6 737 1%  Other (472 publications) 298 441 63% 
 
Next, we review the sample for news volume by company (Table 6). We notice that the 
sample may deviate slightly from the long-term average: banks have received significant 
                                                 
132
 Moreover, Tetlock et al., (2008) find that Wall Street Journal articles do not have a significant impact on 
sentiment. Other studies have found similar results, as discussed in Section 2.3. 
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coverage during the financial crisis. On the other hand, banks also represent 10-20% of 
market capitalization
133
 of S&P100 constituents, so one would expect financial institutions to 
have a relatively strong representation in terms of news volume. 
Table 6: News volume by company 
Company # of news % of total  Industry # of news % of total 
Citi 33 444 7%  Banking 78 545 17% 
Goldman Sachs 32 870 7%  Business Services 56 696 12% 
Google 30 602 6%  Computers 44 766 9% 
Ford 28 911 6%  Trading 40 436 9% 
Apple 26 581 6%  Pharmaceutical Products 34 641 7% 
Boeing 20 513 4%  Automobiles and Trucks 29 531 6% 
Microsoft 18 115 4%  Telecommunications 28 911 6% 
J.P.Morgan 13 859 3%  Aircraft 28 055 6% 
Bank of America 12 781 3%  Petroleum and Gas 21 756 5% 
AT&T 9 908 2%  Electronic Equipment 18 809 4% 
Other (90 companies) 246 446 52%  Other (17 industries) 91 884 19% 
 
Finally, we examine the timing of our news. We notice that the number of news decreases 
towards the end of our time period. This is likely due to the fact that news items are not 
updated or indexed immediately in the LexisNexis database, and thus some news or ticker 
metadata may not be saved to the database yet. We examine this trend for common patterns, 
but do not find systematic tendencies of missing data. 
134
 
                                                 
133
 Fraction of market capitalization 17% on 1 Jan 2006, 12% on 31 Mar 2011. 
134
 We study news volume per company but do not find systematic discrepancies between companies. Also, we 
test whether or not the data has a systematic change in terms of news publications by having a look at the 
number of different publications and the news volume of top publications over time. The number of daily 
publications remains relatively constant, though some individual publications have less news towards today’s 
date. In conclusion, we do not find a systematic bias. 
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Figure 4: News volume by date 
 
Figure 5: News volume by month
135
 
 
Figure 6: News volume by weekday 
 
                                                 
135
 News volume by month excludes 2011 data where we would have only Q1 available. 
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We conclude from the summary measures that our sample is sufficiently representative of 
common understanding on how news volume is distributed. With samples of financial and 
qualitative data, we move on to describe our research methodology. 
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5 METHODOLOGY 
This section will discuss in detail the choices we have made when selecting methodology, and 
the potential drawbacks as well as the corresponding robust checks we have made to ensure 
that our choice of methodology is reliable.  
First, we will describe in detail how we estimate investor sentiment. Second, we explain how 
we aggregate sentence and word scores into a firm specific daily sentiment score. Third, we 
introduce a number of alternative specifications for sentiment. Finally, we will move on to 
discuss how we study the relationship between our main independent variables and our 
dependent variables. The reader should refer to section 4.2 for a detailed discussion on the 
variables used in the study.  
5.1 Estimating investor sentiment 
Comprehending a text, understanding in what kind of a tone it is written (positive or a 
negative) is not an easy task. Different readers may interpret texts in different ways: this may 
depend on the context, the person’s previous knowledge on the subject, and so on. In this 
section we describe the advanced methods for understanding the tone of a text. In our study, 
we calculate multiple scores for company sentiment, with the purpose that we can compare 
the effectiveness of different investor sentiment estimates as predictors of financial metrics. 
First, we describe Quasi-compositional Sentiment Sequencing and Compression used by 
Moilanen et al., (2010) that has been shown to estimate sentence level sentiment more 
accurately than bag-of-words method. Similarly, Engelberg (2008) has used a methodology 
that analyses sentiment in sentence level in financial context called: typed dependency 
parsing.  
Next, we describe our primary method for estimating investor sentiment in this study: the 
Linearized Phrase-Structure -model. Finally, we explain how we compile a set of new word-
lists, and a training set, that are necessary for making the Linearized Phrase-Structure -model 
operational. 
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5.1.1 Quasi-compositional Sentiment Sequencing and Compression (MPQA) 
Quasi-compositional sentiment sequencing
136
 is a method proposed by Moilanen et al. (2010) 
for classifying sentences based on their sentiment polarity. The idea behind the method is that 
polarity in sentences typically follows similar patterns. For example, negative sentences have 
a certain pattern of negative and positive expressions in them. Once a reader has read a certain 
number of news, it is possible to use machine learning to find the patterns that make a reader 
categorize a news item as positive or negative. These patterns can then be used to categorize 
more similar news. This approach was used, among others, by Moilanen et al. (2010) to test 
classifying sentiment in sentence databases (e.g. with news headlines and financial text 
snippets). 
For example, we can have a look at two following sentences (wordlist categories below).  
 
 The company Is doing well.  
(neutral) (neutral) (neutral) (positive)  
 
 
 The company Is not doing well. 
(neutral) (neutral) (reversal) (neutral) (positive) 
 
 
A simple word count would notice in both sentences the word ‘well’ and would likely 
annotate both sentences as positive. Quasi compositional sequencing, on the other hand, 
would notice the patterns ‘neutral-positive’ and ‘neutral-reversal-neutral-positive’, and hence, 
ignoring neutral expressions, could annotate the first sentence as positive and the second as 
negative. 
5.1.2 Linearized Phrase-Structure -model  
In this section, we present the Linearized Phrase-Structure (LPS) model for predicting 
semantic orientations of short economic texts. The Linearized Phrase-Structure -model is 
based on the Quasi-compositional Sentiment Sequencing method. However, we have 
improved and modified the method for financial context 
                                                 
136
 WE refer occasionally to Quasi-compositional Sentiment Sequencing with “MPQA”. MPQA refers to the 
dictionary used by Moilanen et al. (2010) 
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In order to operate in financial and economic domains, a method should be able to recognize 
financial domain concepts and identify their semantic orientation based on sentence structure 
and domain knowledge. In addition to the domain specific aspects, a model should also have 
an ability to resolve conflicting cases where a sentence contains several semantic orientations, 
and be easy to retrain based on the feedback given by the users. To accommodate these 
requirements, the LPS-model is constructed in three stages: (i) identification of entities with 
semantic orientation; (ii) phrase-structure projection step; and (iii) multi-label classification 
step. In a nutshell, the model works as follows (for details and more formal definition of LPS, 
we refer the reader to Malo et al., 2013b). 
Identification of entities with semantic orientation 
Our model starts by identifying entities in a text stream. For example, this could mean that our 
algorithm detects the word “good” in a sentence with otherwise neutral words. To support 
recognizing which parts relate to each other in a sentence, we detect the phrase-structure
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information to support us in understanding which parts in the sentence relate to each other. 
Once the phrase structure has been detected, we use entity recognizers to locate various 
lexicon entries (see section 5.1.3 for categories of lexicon entries) in the sentence. Finding the 
phrase structure and detecting the lexicon entries is illustrated as “Step 1” in Figure 8. 
Once the initial set of entities has been recognized, heuristic rules are applied to merge neutral 
entities and to take into account the effects of polarity influencers (increase / decrease verbs) 
on the semantic orientations of other entities. The clear benefit of using such heuristics at this 
stage is that the number of entities is significantly reduced and the information value of the 
retained entities is higher. The following rules for entity-pruning are considered: 
(i) Merge-neutrals-rule: If several neutral entities occur in a sequence, they can be 
combined into a single neutral entity which spans a large part of the given phrase. 
For example, when taken out of its context, the sentence “Net profit in the period 
in 2009 was EUR 29 million" can be considered to be a single neutral entity, since 
the default prior-polarity of "Net profit" is neutral and there are no polarity 
influencers in the sentence. 
                                                 
137
 Identifying phrase structures is a commonly used technique in natural language processing. Showing a 
sentence according to its phrase structures splits sentences according to parts such as noun phrases (NP), verb 
phrases (VP), prepositional phrases (PP), etc. 
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(ii) Polarity-influence-rule: When a phrase contains both a polarity influencer138 and 
another entity whose polarity is modified by the influencer, we apply the 
influencer directly and retain only the main entity with modified polarity. For 
example, consider the two phrases in Figure 7, where in both cases we find a 
directionality which modifies the polarity of a financial concept. For sentence (a), 
we have “EBIT" as a financial entity whose polarity is modified by verb “increase" 
which leads to a positive overall orientation. 
Instead of retaining both entities, we combine the entities by retaining EBIT and 
adjusting its prior-polarity from “neutral" to a modified polarity “positive-up" 
reflecting the fact that positiveness depends on the up-direction of events. The 
impacts of other influencers are accounted in similar manner. For instance, if a 
negator is attached to an entity with “negative" prior-polarity, we modify the 
polarity into “negative-reverse" to signal the fact that the entity has been merged 
with a polarity influencer. 
 
 
Figure 7: Finding polarities with Financial entities and Polarity influencers 
 
To apply heuristics in a sensible manner, we use the detected phrase structure and only 
combine words within a restricted window around each entity. This process is illustrated as 
“Step 2” in Figure 8. 
                                                 
138
 Polarity influencers are described in the next section 
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Figure 8: Identification of entities with semantic orientation with LPS 
 
Our learning algorithm would be able to separately process sentences without these 
simplification (considering e.g. a sequence “neutral”-“positive-if-up”-“positive” and 
“neutral”-“positive” as different sequences). Thus, this merging may lead to a minor loss of 
accuracy
139
. However, this loss is likely significantly offset by the corresponding gain in 
computational speed and a smaller sample of training set required after merging. 
 
                                                 
139
 When applying the pruning rules, we do not fully hide the impact of polarity influencer. Instead of using the 
main semantic orientations “positive, neutral, negative", we distinguish the impact of pruning by using a “prior-
polarity” information (e.g. “positive-up" instead of “positive"). This distinction is primarily motivated by added 
flexibility in the learning stage. Given the fact that heuristics are always bound to introduce some added 
uncertainty, we want to provide the model this way an opportunity to correct for mistakes and give the modified 
entities a differential treatment while making judgments on the overall polarity of the phrases. 
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Phrase-structure projection  
In the second step we create a phrase-structure projection. The purpose of this step is to 
convert a sequence, e.g. “positive-negative-neutral-positive” into a formal presentation that 
can be used by our learning algorithm in the following Multi-label classification . Each 
projected sequence has an interpretation as a representative of an equivalence class of phrases 
with similar features, and the lengths vary depending on the complexity of the underlying 
phrase-structure. 
To illustrate how this step works, assume that we had only three entity-types: positive, 
neutral, and negative. Then we can choose a coding where ẽ+ = (1; 0; 0) indicates that entity is 
positive, ẽn = (0; 1; 0) indicates that entity is neutral, and finally ẽ- = (0; 0; 1) implies that 
entity is negative. According to this system, if a phrase s has an entity-sequence with 
categories positive-positive-neutral-positive, i.e. ẽ+ ẽ+ ẽn ẽ+, we can write 
Sequence = (1; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0; 0; 1; 0; 1; 0; 0; …) 
as a bit-sequence representation of the given equivalence class, where components beyond 
12
th
 are all zeros. A presentation of this kind can then be presented to a linear multi-label 
classifier, which learns to associate the sequences with corresponding semantic orientations 
indicated by the annotators. 
As the phrase-structure projection step is in essence a technical step to convert data into a 
form that can be used in the following classification step, we have left further details out of 
this paper. For more formal definitions of this step, we refer the reader to Malo et al., 2013b. 
Multi-label classification  
The final step, multi-label classification, aims to classify the sentences into different polarity 
classes based on the entities recognized. For this, we require a learning mechanism that is able 
to form rules from a sample of annotated sentences. This learning mechanism should (i) be 
able to handle large-dimensional feature spaces in an effective manner; and (ii) be able to 
perform multi-label classification. After a few preliminary experiments, we decided to choose 
the a multi-class SVM
140
 approach with "one-against-one" strategy, which has shown good 
performance in comparison to alternatives based on "all-together" methods or "one-against-
all" and DAGSVM strategies. The choice is also well supported by the study of Hsu and Lin 
                                                 
140
 For use of SVMs in previous literature, refer to section 2.3.1 
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(2002), who evaluated a number of alternative multi-class SVM models with different 
estimation strategies in the light of large-scale problems. 
5.1.3 Lexicon entries for Linearized Phrase-Structure -model 
When detecting sentiment in text, not all words are equal. For example, adjectives often are in 
a more significant role than prepositions. Looking only at a certain number of words is not 
always enough to detect the correct sentiment, but limiting our analysis to certain words can 
significantly reduce the requirements for detecting sentiment, as analysis of the meaning of 
the sentence on multiple levels is not be required. The purpose of a lexicon is to define the 
categories of words that we consider when analyzing text. Our lexicon has multiple 
categories, and any word in a certain category is considered with equivalent weight. Our 
lexicon consist of categories for words that are Positive, Negative, Negation words, Financial 
entities that turn into positive or negative if combined with certain words, and words that can 
impact the polarity of financial entities. 
Using the more general  MPQA lexicon by Wiebe et al.(2005) and the financial polarity-
lexicon by Loughran and McDonald (2011) as a starting point, we propose the following 
modifications that infuse further domain-specific knowledge into the sentiment models: (1) 
addition of domain-specific concepts which can influence the overall semantic orientation of a 
sentence; (2) addition of verbs and expressions which help to detect the direction of events 
(e.g. whether the profit is expected to increase or decrease); (3) addition of information on 
how the polarity of different concepts depends on the expected direction of events (e.g. result 
is positive when it is expected to increase, but neutral or negative when declining). The used 
wordlists are described below. 
Positive and negative words 
Most typically sentiment has been detected from lists of positives, negatives and negation 
words. To create such word lists, we build on top of the lexicon derived from Multi-
perspective Question Answering (MPQA) corpus of opinion annotations; Wilson (2008). The 
lexicon consists of only single-word clues, and each entry of the lexicon is equipped with 
information on degree of polarity (positive, negative, neutral), subjectivity, the word’s lemma 
form and the default part-of-speech the word has. 
By utilizing these general entries as a seed for our lexicon, we obtain a good coverage of the 
most commonly encountered subjective expressions. However, as mentioned earlier, the 
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general polarity lexicons are not directly applicable to the financial domain, since many 
commonly used expressions may take a different meaning in the financial and economic 
context. To accommodate the domain specific requirements, we have augmented the MPQA-
based dictionary with the finance-specific lists compiled by Loughran and McDonald (2011). 
When overlaps were encountered while merging the lists, the financial domain sentiment was 
preferred over general prior-polarities specified by MPQA. 
Financial entities 
On top of the traditional dictionary categories, we add words that, combined with a verb 
indicating movement up or down, will have an impact on sentiment. For example, ‘sales 
grew’ has a positive sentiment, while the word ‘sales’ by itself has no sentiment. To establish 
such a word list in the financial context, we download the financial online dictionary 
Investopedia.
141
 Through Investopedia dictionary, we find a list of 16,178 different financial 
concepts. From the list, we remove all words that have only one or two characters. To zero in 
on the most important terms, we take a random sample of 100,000 news articles from our 
sample, and count the occurrences of all financial terms in the news. We find occurrences of 
4,389 of the different dictionary terms in the news sample, and order the terms according to 
frequency. We go manually through all the terms that have more than 200 occurrences in our 
sample, which includes 684 terms. Next, we remove words that are not only financial 
concepts but also common English words such as: “SPAN” abbreviation for ‘standardized 
portfolio analysis of risk’ in the financial context. After that, we start removing words that 
have no meaning, or the meaning is unclear to the sentiment of a company: e.g. ‘shares’, 
‘EUR’, ‘plc.’, etc.  While the words that have over 200 occurrences in the sample represent 
only a fraction of all the words (~16%), their volume represents approximately 94% of all 
financial terms in the text. Thus looking through the remaining 84% of the terms would only 
increase the recognized terms by 6%, and thus we ignore the 84% of terms from our list. A 
list of the selected words can be found in Appendix H – Financial entities. 
Out of the sample of 684 terms that we manually went through, 51 terms have in our view a 
very clear effect on sentiment, and 177 have an effect on sentiment in most cases when 
combined with a verb representing movement up or down. As most of the time the aforesaid 
terms will yield correct interpretation of true meaning, we merge the terms in order to create 
two word lists:  
                                                 
141
 While Investopedia may not be the most prestigious dictionary, we select it due to ease of access: a free 
dictionary in electronic format, and a very wide coverage of concepts 
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 ‘Positive-if-up’: e.g. “EBIT”  
 ‘Negative-if-up’: e.g. “taxes” 
Polarity influencers 
In addition to words that have a polarity directly attached to them, there are a number of other 
factors which can influence the overall semantic orientation of a phrase. This broad class of 
operators, which can modify the contextual semantic orientation, is generally referred to as 
polarity influencers. The most commonly encountered polarity influencers tend to fall into 
one of the following categories: 
 Negation words. After going through movement linking words and corresponding 
movement verbs, we download words that can reverse the meaning of a sentimental 
word: for example: ‘It is going well.’ vis-à-vis ‘It is not going well.’ To do this, we 
download the General Inquirer category: negate. Similarly to the verbs before, we 
remove words with different financial meaning. Removed words from negate-list 
include: ‘account’, ‘uncertain’, and ‘uncertainty’, ‘unemployment’ and ‘vice’. 
 Boosters and diminishers. Another important class of polarity influencers consists of 
words which can intensify or reduce the degree of positiveness or negativeness of an 
expression; e.g. “paying off the national debt will be ‘extremely painful’" or “little 
threat". 
 Modal operators. A modal operator is a verb which modifies another verb and 
describes the “mode of operating" by setting up a context of possibility or necessity; 
e.g. “we have to revise the policy" or “we can revise the policy". 
Furthermore, to accompany the financial entities -word lists, we must identify words that 
describe movement up or down. Directionalities, described below, are an additional category 
of polarity influencers that we have used. 
Directionalities 
Directionalities refer to words that describe movement, e.g. “increase”. Harvard’s 
psychological dictionaries have been commonly used in sentence tagging, and we download 
Harvard IV word lists from the General Inquirer. We create two wordlists from the following 
General Inquirer categories:  
 ‘Increase’ - Harvard dictionary categories: increase and rise  
 ‘Decrease’- Harvard dictionary categories: decrease and fall 
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Additionally, we go through the categories to see if they include words that would have a 
different meaning in a financial context. We find, and remove, the following words that tend 
to have a different meaning in a financial context: ‘inflation’, ‘people’: removed from 
increase-list, ‘discount’, ‘recession’: removed from decrease-list.  
Finally, we combine our word lists mentioned above to end up with a final set of 11 word 
lists. As Linearized Phrase-Structure -model identifies lemmas for words, we included each 
word in the list only in their lemma form. The lists are described in Table 7: Wordlists for 
Linearized Phrase-Structure -model. 
Table 7: Wordlists for Linearized Phrase-Structure -model 
Wordlist Number of words in list 
Positive 264 
Negative 1202 
Negate 202 
Increase 117 
Decrease 111 
Positive if up 121 
Negative if up 56 
Boosters 85 
Diminishers 92 
Modal Words – Strong 12 
Modal Words – Weak 15 
 
5.1.4 Training set for Linearized Phrase-Structure -model  
The goal of a financial sentiment training set is to train an algorithm to take as input all 
available media items and to create an estimate of investor sentiment score that is equivalent 
to a sentiment score given by an analyst after reading the same data. In fact, if the algorithm is 
sufficiently developed, it could yield even better results than the analysis of one analyst. 
Indeed, it should, in theory, be able to match the aggregate sentiment score of several 
qualified analysts with access to the same data.  
In order to correctly identify polarity on the sentence-level, a computer would need to know 
both the sentiment of words (word lists), and the sentiment of sentences: how do polarized 
words interact when combined on the most elemental levels. While it is clear that a sentence 
with 3 positive words and 1 neutral word is likely a positive sentence, it is much harder to 
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identify what the sentiment is in a sentence with 2 positive and 2 negative words. Our training 
set aims to create a sample of different patterns and their outcomes that can be used for 
classifier training. 
Training set sample 
As discussed by Loughran and McDonald (2011), it is well understood that the vocabulary 
and expressions used to describe economic events and company related news are not identical 
across media. To build and evaluate models which are dedicated for capturing semantic 
orientations in economic texts, it is important that the training material provides a good 
coverage of the commonly used domain-specific expressions. 
Until now, very limited efforts have been taken to build corpora which cover economic or 
financial domains, and to the best of our knowledge, none of the existing datasets provides 
phrase-level annotations for news documents. Furthermore, many of the data-banks 
mentioned in the literature are known to be reserved for proprietary use only; e.g. O'Hare et 
al. (2009). Therefore, to alleviate the data gap, we will now briefly outline our financial news-
phrase dataset, which can be used as a gold standard for evaluating the performance of 
sentiment models dedicated for economic texts.  
The sample for the training classifier is picked from full sample of articles that we have 
downloaded. Out of these articles, we select a random subset of 10,000 articles, with weighted 
probability of including each sentence into the sample so that we even the distribution of:  
 Small and large companies 
 Companies in different industries  
 News sources 
As described earlier on preprocessing of our media sample, we remove also in this case items 
such as html-code and tables from the selected articles. For the training sample of 10,000 
articles, we look for words in our polarity lexicon in each sentence, and select only sentences 
that include words with polarity (see e.g. Maks and Vossen (2010)). This reduces our sample 
to 53,400 sentences: each having at least one recognized word from our word list, or a 
combination of recognized words.  
Ideally a sentiment-recognizing algorithm should be able to take any recognized word 
combination and assign a sentiment score for it. However, the number of different 
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combinations that we find in our sample is 13,184, and we would need a large sample of 
annotated sentences for each combination to reach a good confidence level for the algorithm. 
Furthermore, most of the combinations appear only once or twice in our sample of 10,000 
articles, and would add negligible value for the algorithm. Thus, we choose to rank the 
different combinations according to frequency distribution so that we can focus on the most 
salient patterns. For example, the most common patterns cover 9% of all of our sentences. 
After ranking, we start choosing samples of approximately 30 sentences from each pattern 
combination, starting from the most frequent combinations. We iterate our sample during the 
annotation process: depending on the results, we may increase the frequency of sentences in a 
category, or stay with 30 sentences. For example, if a vast majority of the sentences in the 
same category receives the same annotation - for instance, 29/30 sentences are positive for a 
given sequence - we conclude that the category is correctly processed. On the other hand, if 
there is large deviations in the classified sentiment for a certain combination: e.g., 50-50 split 
etc., we increase the number of unique sentences annotated for the category at hand to ensure 
we get a better understanding of how the sequence should be annotated. 
Annotation labels 
The most evident polarity to detect is positive or negative. For example, Maks & Vossen 
(2010) use tags ‘pos’ and ‘neg’ to denote this. Other commonly used metrics include: 
 Subjectivity vs. objectivity: objective truth vis-à-vis an opinion of the writer (e.g. 
Maks & Vossen, 2010) 
 Whose opinion is it in the sentence: authors or someone else’s (e.g. Maks & Vossen, 
2010) 
 Relevance: is a sentence relevant for the topic, or not.142  
Differences in sentiment arise depending on the interpreter’s background, purpose and own 
views. In common language: ‘Company made a loss of 10 EURm’, would be negative. A 
financial analyst on the other hand, would need more information: What did the company 
make last year? What did the market expect? Was the loss just a reflection of a ramp-up cost 
of a long-term investment?  
                                                 
142
 For example, Hsueh et al. (2009) start the annotation process by tagging sentences that are irrelevant to the 
political candidate that they are studying  
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The question we wish to answer in financial context is whether or not a sentence is positive, 
neutral, or negative. To illustrate: 
(1) The headquarters of this company looked beautiful in my opinion. 
(2) The company doubled its profits this year. 
 
To make sure we will tag sentences like (2) as positive, and preferably ignore sentences like 
(1)
143
, we instruct our annotator to categorize sentences based on the impact on company’s 
share price. We also provided a set of example sentences that we annotate ourselves for 
reference to the annotator. After the aforementioned, we ask her to use a 9-step scale of labels 
to annotate where she expects the share price would move following the publication of the 
news item. For a description of our instructions and the used labels, see Appendix G – 
Annotation instructions. 
The above demonstrates the two goals we have: first, we aim to define if a sentence is positive 
or negative for the company - from an investor point of view; second, we wish to take into 
account that there may be difference in the level of polarity of a sentence. Similarly to Wiebe 
et al. (2005), we follow three principles with the guidelines we have established for our 
annotation process: 
 There are no fixed rules about how particular words should be annotated. The 
instructions describe the annotations of specific examples, but do not state that 
specific words should always be annotated a certain way. 
 Sentences should be interpreted with respect to the context. The annotators should not 
take sentences out of context, start speculating on their prior knowledge on the 
company, or think what the sentences could mean, but rather should judge them as 
they can be interpreted in isolation. 
 The annotators should be as consistent as they can be with respect to their own 
annotations, and the sample annotations given to them for training. 
We do not annotate for the following: the opinion holder, or relevance of the sentence, as we 
assume that the aforementioned will play a smaller role in the sentiment. Furthermore, we 
assume that most sentences should be relevant for the company for two reasons: first, they are 
                                                 
143
 We recognize that sentence (1) may also have some value, and it may also be good to annotate this as 
positive. For more on this, refer to our training set B at the end of this section. 
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parts of articles that we classified previously as relevant to the company, second: they are 
mainly texts from financial press that should be concise and up to the point.
144
 
Annotators and their training 
In order to tag the sentences easily, we create an excel template where an annotator can easily 
select a number between 1 to 9 in order to select a tag with up or down arrow keys. This 
approach is chosen both for convenience, and to make annotating as fast as possible. 
Our annotator is hired through an online service Elance.com where it is possible to hire 
freelance low-cost workers. Contrary to some other annotation studies, the approach was 
chosen over other alternatives such as crowd sourcing services (e.g. Hsueh et al., 2009 on 
using Mechanical Turk). We wanted to select an annotator with appropriate background and 
to be familiar with her to ensure that the quality of work would be consistent. Furthermore, 
we wanted to have direct lines of communication with the annotator as this can be beneficial 
when discussing complex cases. Compared to many crowdsourcing tasks, the nature of our 
task is different: requiring special expertise as people with no financial background may have 
misconceptions such as: ‘lay-offs are always bad news for a company’, ‘making (any kinds of) 
profits is always positive’, etc.  
We screened the service for low-cost workers who have a business background and strong 
English skills. Next, we asked a few promising candidates to annotate a small piece of 
sentences, and compared their work to annotations that we had done. The annotator applicant 
who was able to give sufficient quality (>85% correct answers for a set of 75 sentences) was 
chosen for the task. Our annotator is from the Philippines, had studied business 
administration, and had 5 years of experience in rewriting financial texts as a senior editor for 
different newspapers. 
We start by annotating a small number of sentences ourselves in order to give the annotator a 
small set of readily annotated sentences that she could use as a benchmark for future 
annotations. Also, the annotator received the annotation instructions (Appendix G – 
Annotation instructions) explaining how the sentences should be tagged. 
In addition to the initial instructions, the annotator asked us several questions in uncertain 
cases to ensure that she was tagging sentences in the expected way.  Some necessary 
clarifications included:  
                                                 
144
 For the biases that result from this simplification, please refer to results in section 6.1.2. 
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 When does a stock go up/down a lot vs. a little: the difference between categories 7 
and 9. While some linguistic expressions give clear indication of this, numerical 
expressions are more difficult. We arbitrarily defined that changes in key metrics (e.g. 
sales, profit/loss etc.) are small if <5%, and large if >10%
145
 
 Situations where there are two contradicting statements in the same sentence, for 
example: ‘Operating profit decreased while net turnover increased.’. We agreed that 
these kinds of sentences would require a very high level of judgment to make correct 
conclusions, thus we instructed the annotator to annotate the sentences as ‘Either way’ 
To make sure that all of the sentences were tagged with good quality, we sent the sentences in 
batches to the annotator - 75 sentences; followed by: 1,000, 2,500 and finally 1,500. After 
each larger batch was completed, we would manually annotate a randomly selected 10% of 
the tagged sentences, and compare this with the annotation results. We used the previously 
said method to verify that the annotation quality stayed above 85%
146
, we sent the annotator 
our own views of the control annotations with explanations, and the next batch. Thus, out of 
the set of ~5,000 sentences, we had checked ~500, and could verify that the quality had 
consistently stayed above 85% compared to our own annotations. 
Furthermore, most of the errors in tagging were only 1 step away from the correct tag (see 
Table 8); for instance, positive had been tagged as neutral or vice versa, or negative as neutral 
or vice versa. More severe cases, such as tagging positive sentences as negative,  were 
extremely rare. 
Interannotator agreement 
After the annotation process, we compared the annotations that had been annotated by both 
the annotator and in our control annotation. In Table 8 we show the annotation results, and 
similarly to other authors (e.g. Somasundaran et al., 2006), we calculate Cohen’s (1960) 
Kappa measure
147
. 
                                                 
145
 Later on in our study we merge all positive categories into one, and all negative categories into one. Thus, this 
has no impact ultimately on our results. 
146
 When comparing positive, negative and neutral findings – not the degree of positivity as this would be often a 
more subjective view 
147
 Cohen’s Kappa measures how much annotators agree compared to how much they would agree by chance. 
This is a measure that gives us a value of κ = 1 if annotators were in complete agreement, and κ = 0 if there is no 
agreement other than chance. 
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Table 8: Interannotator agreement (Training set A) 
 
     +++ = Up a lot, --- Down a lot, n = neutral 
       κ=0.90 
In total, we reach an annotator agreement of 93% with 380 sentences. In particular when 
simplifying the categories to negative, positive and neutral, the interannotator agreement 
further improves to 94% (see Table 9). 
Table 9: Interannotator agreement with simplified categories (Training set A) 
The interannotator agreement from above is presented below, after simplifying the number of categories to three 
           
           κ=0.88 
Out of all interannotator disagreements (in Table 8), 16/30 relate to situations where the full-
time annotator considers a company reporting profits, sales etc. as a positive event (e.g. “In 
2005 the bank posted a net profit of 8.2 EURm .”). As the company may post a profit below 
expectations, these sentences should rather be annotated as neutral in our view. We instruct 
the annotator during the annotation process on this, and thus avoid the same disagreement 
towards the rest of the annotation process. Apart from aforementioned, there appears to be no 
systematic error that the main annotator is making. Some disagreement cases are sentences 
where the sentences are complex and a reader needs to read the sentence multiple times to 
ensure understanding. We also identify sentences that present a view from two angles as one 
+ + + + + + n1 n2 n3 - - - - - -
+ + + 26 - - - - - - - -
+ + 2 63 - - - 2 - - 1
+ - - 4 - - - - - -
n1 - 16 - 115 - 2 - 1 -
n2 1 - - - 144 - - - 1
n3 - - - - - - - - -
- - - - 1 - - 4 - 1
- - 1 - - - - - - 9 1
- - - - - - - - - - - 15
Full-time annotator
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23 % 0 % 0 %
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source of interannotator disagreement. Additionally, some financial expressions may also be 
difficult to interpret, and may depend on the context whether they are positive or negative. 
For example ‘dividend cuts’ may be seen as a negative signal, unless accompanied with a 
good reasoning (see also Mitra and Mitra, 2010). Finally writing styles such as cynicism, 
(Hsueh et al, 2009), and inherent variability in a word’s meaning (Maks and Vossen, 2010), 
may be sources of interannotator disagreement. 
Maks and Vossen (2010) use a third annotator to get to a ‘gold standard,’ and thus we also 
consider the possibility of using further annotators. Hsueh et al. (2009), on the other hand, 
conclude that it is possible to use only one expert annotator, finding that this gives 97.4% 
correlation to the gold standard in their case. When comparing to similar annotation studies, 
our Kappas compare relatively well (cf. e.g. Maks and Vossen, 2010, κ=0.80). As our 
algorithm will make its sentiment estimates based on probabilities, and use at least 30 labeled 
sentences for each pattern, a 100% agreement will not be necessary for the algorithm to work 
correctly. Consequently, we do not see it necessary to add more annotators
148
. However, we 
notice after further analysis (see section 6.1.2) that a somewhat different training set may be 
more ideal for the purpose of training our algorithm. 
Training set B 
After our original training set, we have an excellent set of tagged sentences that represent 
sentiment in different sentences. This training set is in our view a solid benchmark to see 
whether an algorithm is classifying sentences correctly. However, our algorithm can only 
recognize the sentiment, but is unable to recognize the credibility of the author (Appendix J - 
Error descriptions for LPS: Company talking in advertising like -tone about its' own 
operations) or the relevance of a sentence for a company’s success (Appendix J - Error 
descriptions for LPS: Inability to recognize significance of events, Positive convention of 
talking about something, Inability to understand the magnitude or value of items). A training 
set where the ‘correct answer’ includes also deductions based on this information has more 
correct annotations, but they also include more noise from the algorithm:  our approach does 
not include a model for assessing relevance or credibility, and therefore sentences where an 
annotator considers this information effectively increase noise. To adjust our training set for 
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 The same set of sentences have been further annotated by more annotators in our parallel study. For details, 
see Malo et al. (2013b). However, even after further annotations, the training set remains in line with our original 
annotator’s categorizations. 
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better results, we create a second training set (Training set B
149
) that is annotated by a 
researcher with a business background from Aalto School of Business. Thus, we have two 
different versions of the same training set: 
A. Training set with credibility and relevance assessment: a person with a 
financial background reads the sentences and uses all their knowledge, except 
for company-specific knowledge, to annotate the sentences 
B. Training set without credibility and relevance assessment: as above, but the 
person does not assess the credibility or relevance of the sentence. 
The difference between the two training sets can be characterized with the three example 
sentences below in Table 13: 
Table 10: Differences between training set A and B 
Sentence Training set A Training set B Difference 
“I think my company will beat its competitors” -CEO. Slightly positive / 
neutral 
Very positive Credibility of 
author 
The company’s 100th year celebration party was a 
great success. 
Slightly positive / 
neutral 
Very positive Relevance of 
adjustment 
“The company will likely beat its competitors” -
Financial Times. 
Very positive Very positive N/A 
 
It is clear that Training set A is closer to a ‘true’ sentiment estimate, and that the annotations 
are superior to Training set B in this sense. Credibility and relevance are; however, usually 
not assessed from the polarized sentences. Rather, they require knowledge on the credibility 
of different sources, and on the relevance of different events to companies, etc. As this would 
require us to identify a much wider variety of objects in the sentences, and represent a number 
of studies of their own, we create Training set B so that we can directly relate polarized words 
to sentiment.  
We create our training set B using the set A as a basis. However, we especially go through the 
neutral sentences in order to detect cases where a sentence has been classified as neutral due 
to lack of credibility (e.g. a biased source, such as CEO explaining how good his own 
products are) or lack of relevance (e.g. an event that is considered unimportant). For such 
cases, we annotate the sentence with the polarity even if we know that this is likely not 
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 Training set B corresponds to Dataset I by Malo et al. (2013b), Training set A to Dataset II. 
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relevant for the stock price. To further simplify the exercise, we only tag sentences on a 3-step 
scale case in Training set B. The interannotator agreement between Training set A and 
Training set B is summarized in Table 11. 
Table 11: Interannotator agreement between Training set A and Training set B 
        
                    κ=0.61 
As expected, interannotator agreement is lower in this case compared to the control 
annotation, as the used instructions have been different. In particular, many sentences that the 
first, “stricter”, annotator characterizes as neutral, are categorized often with a sentiment by 
the second annotator. For example a sentence that is written in a positive tone but is not 
relevant for the company should become annotated as neutral in Training set A, but positive 
in Training set B. 
 
5.2 Sentiment aggregation 
In this sub-section, we will deal with several considerations that arise when calculating 
sentiment scores for full articles (as opposed to individual sentences), as well as when 
aggregating several sentiment scores from multiple articles on a given day into one sentiment 
score. The sub-section will proceed by first discussing the aggregation technique we have 
employed, and then move on to discuss additional considerations we have not yet explored 
when discussing our sentiment estimation methodology. 
5.2.1 Daily sentiment aggregation 
Once we have applied our different methods of investor sentiment estimation, we need to 
aggregate the polarized results for a document. In the case that there are several articles for a 
given company, we wish to further aggregate the sentiment scores of these articles within a 
day into an aggregate sentiment score for that day for a given firm.  
Positive Neutral Negative
Positive 23 % 15 % 0 %
Neutral 2 % 46 % 0 %
Negative 0 % 5 % 9 %
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To ensure that our sample articles are relevant, we start out by filtering news based on their 
characteristics. As explained in Section 4.4.3, we have already removed news with less than 
100 words. In addition, when doing a word count, we require each news item to have a 
minimum of three negative words with two of them being unique (e.g., Tetlock et al., 2008). 
Similarly, we also require documents to have at least two sentences with negative polarity 
(our word count may still use these news items). The exclusion is done in order to eliminate 
stories that contain only tables, or lists, with mostly quantitative information. For example, a 
table might contain an individual word multiple times in the header of the table, and thus 
could add considerable noise to the sentiment if it were included in the sentiment score. The 
articles that meet the aforementioned criteria are included in our news sample and hence in 
our sentiment score. 
To consolidate polarized elements, Das (2010) suggests calculating ‘sents’, where a positive 
(‘BUY’) signal is calculated as +1, negative (‘SELL’) signal as -1, and a neutral (‘HOLD’) 
signal as 0. From the news items that are left for aggregation, we aggregate the sentiment 
score Neg
150
 for document d as  
Negd = Number of negative words (sentences) / Total words (sentences) 
As can be seen, we use the same method of aggregation for word count and the Linearized 
Phrase-Structure -model. This is done to keep the consolidated sentiments consistent, which 
will allow us to better compare the methods. 
Aggregation of the daily sentiment based on multiple articles with different scores can be 
done either by (a) using averages of the sentiment per article, or by (b) combining all articles 
within a day into a composite article. The chosen method can significantly impact the weight 
that each source gets in the sentiment score. In option a) each document can be set to have a 
weight (equal weight, or some other weight), while this is not possible if we aggregate all 
word and sentences directly into a composite article (option b). Previous studies have counted 
the aggregate daily media sentiment for a company by pooling all news items together in 
order to create a composite article. Then, negative words in all articles during respective day / 
total words in all articles during respective day (e.g., Tetlock et al., 2008; Engelberg, 2008) 
would reflect the sentiment of the day. However, we choose to differ from this approach. 
Consider a day when six articles are published: an article with 1,000 words, 100 of which are 
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 As negative news has been shown by previous literature to be most influential, we use in consolidated 
sentiment scores the negative sentiment. 
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negative; and five articles with 200 words, 0 of which are negative. With prior literature’s 
method, the aforementioned example would yield a sentiment score of: 
      
               
                           
     
The weight of an article for the daily sentiment score would thus be directly proportional to its 
length which can simply be a function of writing style. While writing in a certain style may 
impact people’s perception, we believe that multiple sources weigh more in the formation of 
an aggregate sentiment than the length, and negativity conveyed possibly by a single 
source
151
. Therefore, we aggregate daily sentiments based on equal weights between sources; 
in other words, using an average of the articles’ sentiment scores within a day: 
     ∑
                                 
                            
 
      
 
 
   
N= number of articles during day t 
The roots of our approach can be traced back to behavioral finance theory
152
. According to 
mental accounting, people do not aggregate related information rationally but consider it in 
insulation. As discussed, aggregating using composite articles overweighs lengthy articles vis-
à-vis the different number of articles. We hypothesize the following: agents do not aggregate 
different news during a day but use a 1/N style heuristic rule in forming their sentiment 
estimate for the day, leading to equal weighting of news: averaging. 
  
5.2.2 Considerations on daily sentiment aggregation 
Prior literature studies have estimated daily sentiment scores using different methods besides 
the simple fraction of negative words to total words. For instance, Tetlock (2007) uses 
standardization of negative fraction as follows: 
     
         
    
 
where µneg is the mean of Neg over the previous 365 days and σneg is the standard deviation 
over the same period. Standardization might be needed, for instance, in the case that different 
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 In fact, proxies of impact should be the prestige and number of readers of a source in a more sophisticated 
sentiment algorithm.  
152
 See Section 2.2. for more discussion on behavioral finance, and the related sources. 
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publications change their coverage style, or that some new publications have been added to a 
news database during the sample period. However we do not follow this approach as previous 
studies have not found a significant difference between standardization and the simple 
fraction (Tetlock et al, 2008; Engelberg, 2008). Also, it is possible that there is a justified shift 
in negativity during a sample period. For example, our sample reaches over the financial 
crisis. Therefore, it could be justified that the sentiment would change over time, and 
smoothing the sentiment with standardization would distort the correct sentiment. 
Besides standardization, term-weighting has been used when estimating daily investor 
sentiment (Loughran and McDonald, 2011). The method takes into account the length of a 
document, the frequency of terms, and commonality of terms within the entire corpus. 
According to Loughran and McDonald, term weighting can be especially beneficial when 
using a dictionary that is not tailored for the context it is being used in: for example using the 
Harvard psychology dictionary in financial context. However, as we are using a context-
specific dictionary, and wish to stay consistent with other studies: only Loughran and 
McDonald have used term-weighting, we refrain from using term-weighting. 
As we are using closing prices, we need to take into account the sentiment changes occurring 
during weekends to have an accurate reflection of the relationship between financial metrics 
and sentiment. Therefore, we calculate the sentiment scores for Monday’s by adding the 
sentiment of the weekend to the sentiment of Monday. By doing so, we take into account that 
the change from Friday’s closing price to Monday’s closing price includes news from 
Saturday, Sunday and Monday. We use the aforementioned method also for other days when 
the stock market has been closed. 
Once we have calculated these sentiment scores, we further check the scores for seasonality 
and industry trends to make sure that there is no systematic bias impacting the sentiment. We 
test whether there are time periods when negative news are more common, and if negative 
news are constantly reported more in a certain industry. However, as we previously noted 
when discussing the standardization possibility, there may be a good explanation why these 
trends are occurring: i.e. a certain industry could be constantly declining in value and 
therefore warrant a constant increase in negative sentiment towards it. However, we wish to 
make sure that there is a logical explanation behind such trends, and that it is not simply a 
matter of what news are being included in our sample.  
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5.2.3 Robustness checks for LPS-sentiment 
We calculate the LPS sentiment for each company. To ensure this sentiment correctly 
represents the market sentiment, we manually go through the resulting sentiment for the 
whole market: measured by S&P100, and for a few selected companies and the banking 
industry. For a summary of these sentiments and their comparison with the corresponding 
stock price, or index, see the figures below
153
. 
 
Figure 9: SP100 sentiment and stock index 
                                                 
153
 We show 30-day average sentiment, as a shorter term sentiment would be difficult to display due to 
significant volatility in the daily sentiment metric. 
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Figure 10: Citi sentiment and stock price 
 
Figure 11: Google sentiment and stock price 
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Figure 12: Ford sentiment and stock price 
 
 
Figure 13: Banks and Trading sentiment and stock index 
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As can be seen with these examples, there appears to be some inverse relationship between 
negativity and stock price as one would expect. To further ensure the correctness of the 
sentiment score, we perform some further robustness checks. 
To test whether our sentiment score could be driven by a bias in sources, we see how our 
sources differ in terms of sentiment. We study the difference between newspapers and other 
sources, and take as a case example our largest publication: The Financial Times. We plot 
negativity as calculated from each of these sources separately to see how well the sentiment 
scores in different sources correlate with each other. 
 
Figure 14: 30-day
154
 average sentiment by different sources 
As can be seen, all of the sources correlate with each other, reaching peaks and bottoms 
typically simultaneously. It is also noteworthy that newspapers: in particular The Financial 
Times, appear to be using significantly more negative language than other sources. We 
assume that the aforementioned result is impacted by companies’ own earnings releases that 
typically would describe their operations in a more positive tone, and therefore impact the 
‘Not Newspapers’ category. 
In addition, we calculate the correlation of these sentiments to verify the inference from the 
figure. We verify that the 30-day sentiments correlate relatively well with each other. Also as 
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 The sentiment score varies significantly on a day-to-day basis. To show a more stable figure, a 30-day 
window is selected for most of our analysis. While a shorter window would have too much  variation, a longer 
much longer window could already be impacted too much by multiple quarterly announcements etc.  
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we expect, if we test the correlation on a daily level, the sentiments correlate significantly 
less
155
. 
 
Figure 15: Correlation between different sentiments 
 
5.2.4 Alternative ways for aggregating sentiment 
In addition to sentiment aggregation described before, sentiment could be aggregated in 
alternative ways. For robustness, we test creating our sentiment scores with only a subset of 
the full media sample included in order to test if a certain media type could improve or bias 
our results. These variations of the sentiment score are described below. In general, these 
variations do not make a significant impact on our results. In situations where they do, we 
report also results of these variations. 
Newspapers only and Only non-newspapers 
We choose only sources that have been indicated to be newspapers. These sources are 
possibly more analytical compared to other news sources. Furthermore, this sentiment 
excludes all earnings announcements. On the other hand, we test the impact of choosing only 
the opposite: only media that is not from newspapers.  
Sentiment only with at least 5 daily news 
If there are less than five news for a company for a certain day, it is possible that a few 
articles analyzing the company from a certain perspective over a longer period of time could 
determine the sentiment. Often a reporter could e.g. spend a week writing about a company, 
and then publish an article. An article like this may not fully reflect the day’s sentiment 
anymore. To ensure that the news sentiment accurately pictures the overall media sentiment 
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 When comparing the sentiments on a company level each day, the correlations decrease naturally further as 
the number of publications each day for a particular company often varies between 0 to 10, i.e. the measure 
depends more on what publications are active on a particular day.  
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for a company on a certain date, we run some tests with the media sample so that we include 
sentiment scores only for days when at least 5 articles are available. 
Windsorized results 
To test if our results are driven by extreme values, we create a sentiment where we exclude 
the most extreme sentiment scores (windsorized at 1%). 
30-day average sentiment 
The sentiment score varies significantly on a day-to-day basis. To show a more stable figure, 
we test the sentiment of a 30-day average sentiment. While a shorter window would have too 
much variation, a longer window could already be impacted too much by multiple quarterly 
announcements etc.  
Sentiment with FT news only 
Our sample includes a significant portion of news from the Financial Times. It could be 
possible that a more credible publication would either picture the market more correctly or 
impact the market in the coming days. To test this, we run aggregate sentiment scores so that 
we include only Financial Times news to the score. 
Sentiment only when low media disagreement  
According to Das (2010), the market sentiment’s predicting power may be weaker when there 
is diversity in opinions in the market. To measure the difference in opinions, Das proposes 
measuring a metric he calls ‘Disag’ calculated as: 
        |  |
       
       
 | | 
where ‘Pos’ is the number of positives: in our case, positive sentences, and ‘Neg’ is the 
number of negatives: negative sentences. A zero value would indicate that all news would be 
in perfect agreement in terms of sentiment, while value of 1 for ‘Disag’ would indicate that 
there are equally many positive and negative opinions. Based on our SVM’s categorization of 
positive and negative sentences, we calculate ‘Disag’ for each news item. Similarly to 
calculating negativity, we aggregate ‘Disag’ for each company for each day by taking the 
average disagreement of all news. We also show the ‘Disag’ figure for the whole SP100 in 
Figure 16, where we can see the market uncertainty during the financial crisis. 
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Figure 16: DISAG for SP100 
 
SVM strong 
To test the impact of having a highly robust sentiment metric, we create a measure “SVM 
strong”.  For this, we combine the “Sentiment only when low news media disagreement” and 
“Sentiment only with at least 5 daily news”: we only include news where the disagreement is 
low (only lower 80% of sample included) and where there are at least 5 news items for the 
date. 
 
5.3 Sentiment estimation methodology limitations 
Das (2010) illustrate the inverse relationship between data volume and algorithm complexity 
in data and algorithm pyramid figure which is depicted below in Figure 17: The data and 
algorithms pyramids (Das, 2010). In general, we could categorize the 'bag-of-words’ method 
as being on the lowest level of the pyramid, whereas our methodology: Linearized Phrase-
Structure -model, would be in the content-level. However, as is evident from the figure, there 
is still work to be done to reach the context level.  
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Figure 17: The data and algorithms pyramids (Das, 2010) 
The prevalent methodology for the extant literature has been so far a naïve word count based 
on different dictionaries. While being simple and fast to use, the word count method has its 
limits. In their recent influential article, Loughran and McDonald (2011) show that 
dictionaries not related to the context of the data misclassify words. As a result, they create 
word lists for the financial context which significantly improve results for a word count 
methodology. Yet, the sentiment derived from a word count with context specific dictionaries 
remains a naïve proxy for the actual sentiment: simply counting words of a text cannot yield 
an understanding of the meaning of the text. Examples of the pitfalls of the methodology are 
multiple. For instance, word ‘bad’ counts as a negative word in both the expressions ‘bad 
result’ and ‘not a bad result’, or sarcastically written text could be downright misinterpreted. 
As an alternative way of measuring sentiment, we have proposed that Linearized Phrase-
Structure -model can yield better results: recognizing common patterns in financial text that a 
word count is not able to do. While our methodology is an improvement vis-à-vis the 
prevalent methodology, it is still far from the actual sentiment that would be derived by 
multiple human annotators. Compared to a human annotator, the Linearized Phrase-Structure 
-model cannot detect topics, the relevance of a text, and is unable to assess text credibility. 
Also, we are unable pinpoint temporal differences in information in a text. All in all, our 
methodology is a significant improvement from the naïve word count methodology; however, 
there is yet significant room for improvement. 
Our relevancy filtering is relatively limited, and we do not make a difference between topics 
and their relative importance. Ideally, we would retrieve all news that impact the sentiment of 
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a company, and then sort them based on relevancy. At the moment, we filter implicitly as we 
search for news based on the companies’ tickers. Should a news item be important but not 
mention the company: i.e. important industry news, we may miss the news item from our 
sentiment. Second, we give all news the same weight, regardless of their relative relevance. In 
reality, we might be better off by giving each news item a sentiment score, with a weight 
depending on the topic that it is written about. Possibly, we would have this kind of relevance 
assessment on two levels: first, we would assess what topics are relevant for the company, 
and by how much. Second, we could recognize on a sentence level how relevant each 
sentence is for the topic. Naturally, implementing topic recognition, and finding relative 
relevancy weights, would not be a trivial task, and could be a topic for future research. 
The Linearized Phrase-Structure -model cannot assess credibility in sentences. Therefore, the 
algorithm operates in a child-like manner: believing everything that it sees. The aforesaid can 
lead into several biases that cause sentences to become tagged differently compared to that of 
a human annotator. Ideally, we would assess credibility of different authors, adjusting the 
opinions of authors that have a tendency to write in a certain way. For example, some 
publications may be more favorable in their writing style. For instance, a case-in-point is a 
situation where a company is the author of an article discussing its own operations in a 
positive manner. 
Another caveat example relating to credibility is our aggregation method. Currently, we are 
assigning each article equal weight regardless of the publication; a naïve way of assigning 
weights to publications. For instance, an article in The Financial Times would most likely 
have more impact than a local newspaper article due to its larger circulation and higher 
perceived credibility. However, adjusting the methodology to take into account the 
aforementioned factors is an extensive undertaking; we leave the issues for future research. 
We suggest that, for example, different weights could be applied to the sentiment scores 
before aggregation, depending on the source.  
Linearized Phrase-Structure -model does not make a difference between the temporal 
placements of information a news item is describing: we consider all found news with equal 
weight, regardless of the time period of the information in question. For instance, a story 
describing a company’s history would be handled in the exact same way as a story bringing 
new information to the market, or a story speculating on the future. In reality, markets react 
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very differently to new information vis-à-vis old information.
156
 One approach to overcome 
the aforementioned limitation would be to detect topics as they appear for the first time, and 
discount secondary news: ‘news of news’. Another approach would be to keep track of the 
time aspect when estimating sentiment, and use that information in the estimation process. 
For example, Cahan et al. (2011) hypothesize that gathering speculations around future dates 
can help with the use of sentiment information. 
In addition to the aforementioned considerations, our choice to focus on the fraction of 
negative sentences and words can be questioned.
157
 It is a valid point that there may exist 
other metrics that would be more useful in the estimation of sentiment than negativity. 
However, extant literature has documented in several occasions that negativity outperforms 
other metrics (e.g., Tetlock, 2007). Therefore, we conclude that our choice to focus on the 
negativity of a given text is well-founded. 
Another consideration is the qualitative data we use to estimate sentiment. As our sample 
consists of qualitative texts from LexisNexis database, we may miss some important 
qualitative text publications that are not included in the LexisNexis database. That being said, 
LexisNexis does cover different sources of qualitative texts quite comprehensively. 
Nevertheless, we may miss some publications due to copyright and coverage issues. 
Furthermore, we are missing qualitative texts that focus on specific products of companies but 
do not mention the company by its name. Such texts, and the sentiment in them, most likely 
carry significant value, and affect financial metrics. Also, we acknowledge the fact that we are 
missing the following qualitative sources completely from our sentiment: social media, non-
written media: i.e., TV- and radio-broadcasts However, accounting for the aforesaid factors is 
not a trivial task, and therefore we suggest future research to study the matter.  
We conclude that an ideal sentiment model would mimic the key stages of an analyst’s 
thought process in assessing the impact that a news article has on a company, and would draw 
similar conclusions as a financial analyst would. In addition, such a model should incorporate 
                                                 
156
 However, we do recognize that tone can in itself have significant impact, even in the absence of new 
information (content). 
157
 Previous studies have identified that negative sentiment appears to be the most influential one. However, for 
example, Das (2010) discovers that a daily ‘disagreement-sentiment’ that proxies the disagreement in the market 
by calculating the number of both positive and negative signals, can be used to estimate how well the negative 
sentiment works. In times when there are both positive and negative information on the market, the predictive 
power of the negative sentiment tends to decrease. We have aimed to take this into account by using the negative 
fraction of all words, but it is possible that by taking into account the positive sentiment in the way Das suggests, 
could further improve our results. 
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all available information that is relevant to a firm. We find that while our sentiment estimates 
are a significant improvement from word count methodology, more work remains to be done 
on estimating sentiment more accurately. 
 
5.4 Relationship between sentiment and stock performance metrics 
In order for us to examine the relationship between our main variables and the dependent 
variables in multivariate context, we need to choose a statistical research methodology. As the 
nature of our data is panel, we need to identify the appropriate method for calculating 
standard errors to avoid biased and unreliable statistical inferences as suggested by Petersen 
(2009). Therefore, we test our data to see what the correlations between the error term 
estimates are. 
As suggested by Petersen (2009), we first estimate our standard errors
158
 without clustering in 
any dimension. We proceed from there on to estimate the standard errors using clustering by 
firms: we find no evidence of magnitude change in our standard errors. Therefore, we 
conclude that our sample is free from firm effect (time-series correlation)  temporary or 
permanent. . We continue by clustering by day and quarter.
159
 We find marginal increase in 
our standard errors for the daily clustering. However, we find a substantial increase in our 
standard errors for clustering by quarter. We continue the analysis by including calendar 
quarter dummies in our regressions while removing clustering. The increase in standard errors 
is mitigated. We conclude that our data is free from firm effect (time-series correlation; 
autocorrelation) but exhibits a permanent time effect (cross-sectional dependency) in error 
terms that is most salient in quarterly basis.
160
 Hence, according to Petersen (2009), we rely 
on the most reliable method for estimating relationships under time effect: the Fama-Macbeth 
(1973) methodology. Therefore, we run our regression specifications under Fama-Macbeth 
methodology with clustering done in quarters.  The quarters are specified as follows: Q1: 1
st
 
January to 31
st
 March; Q2: 1
st
 April to 31
st
 June; Q3: 1
st
 July to 31
st
 September; Q4: 1
st
 
                                                 
158
 White (1984) adjusted standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity.  
159
 Daily and quarterly clustering intervals have been used in majority of influential studies (e.g., Tetlock et al., 
2008; Loughran and McDonald, 2011), and they are the most intuitive intervals considering the nature of our 
data: mainly daily or quarterly based. 
160
 We reason that the quarterly vis-à-vis daily magnitude change is a function of relatively small number of 
observations per daily clusters: even as low as under 10 observations. Therefore, our coefficient estimates 
experience great noise when clustering with daily intervals. Hence, the estimates and their standard errors are not 
reliable. Therefore, we hypothesize that the firm-effect is indeed most salient on a daily basis but we are 
constrained by our sample. As a result, we rely on quarterly clustering. 
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October to 31
st
 December. For our sample this means that we split the data into 21 time 
periods. 
Our approach is similar to that of Loughran and McDonald (2011) with the exception that we 
do not discover a firm effect in our data and hence do not adjust our standard errors for 
autocorrelation using Newey-West (1987) approach.
161
 In fact, as most of the content analysis 
papers have researched investor sentiment’s impact on equity returns, most of the studies have 
not found firm effects in their data, as Petersen (2009) suggests when dealing with equity 
returns. Therefore, our finding of time effect in the data, and the corresponding choice of 
methodology, is consistent with the majority of recent papers that have relied on clustering by 
time to control for time effect (e.g., Engelberg, 2008; Tetlock et al., 2008; Hirsleifer et al., 
2009). 
We will continue this section by describing our study’s multivariate main specifications and 
the alternative specifications designed to provide additional robustness to our results. All of 
the specifications have been conducted using the aforementioned Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
methodology with quarterly clustering of data. For more discussion on variable definitions, 
we refer the reader to Section 4.2. 
5.4.1 Main specifications 
We will discuss below the main specifications we are running to examine the relationship 
between the financial metrics of our choice (dependent variables), and the main independent 
variables. We will offer brief motivation for the included variables, as well as some reference 
literature with similar specifications in the domain of content analysis in finance.  
For further information on the variable definitions, we refer the reader to section 4.2., and on 
information concerning the estimation of investor sentiment and the statistical methods used 
to study the relationship between financial metrics and the sentiment, we refer the reader to 
the previous sub-sections of this section. 
Abnormal returns 
Abnormal return (dependent variable) for the main specification is defined as a buy-and-hold 
abnormal return [BHAR] as discussed in Section 4.2. with 25 matching portfolios used as a 
                                                 
161
Loughran and McDonald (2011) do not explicitly state that they had run an analysis on their data to discover 
the different forms of dependency in their error terms. However, we infer from their choice of methodology that 
they found both firm and time effects in their data.  
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benchmark return. The event windows are: [0,1], [1,5], [2,32] and [2,62], and the returns are 
calculated based on closing prices, as discussed in Section 4.2. 
The main variables (independent variables) of the specification are as follows: first, we will 
attempt to estimate the impact of the prevailing investor sentiment by including a sentiment 
variable that will be based on two different methods: Linearized Phrase-Structure -model, and 
a bag-of-words word count using two separate dictionaries: the Harvard negative dictionary 
[H4N] and the Loughran and McDonald (2011) finance-negative dictionary; second, we will 
attempt to capture the distraction effect suggested by Hirsleifer et al. (2009) by including a 
market news volume count; third, we will include a firm specific news count to include the 
potential media coverage effect suggested by Fang and Peress (2009). The set of independent 
variables is designed to capture a holistic view of the impact of media on returns.  
After the inclusion of our main variables, we include a set of controls to mitigate the risk of 
an omitted variable driving our results. Our list of controls for the main specification stands as 
follows: first, we include controls for size and book-to-market to capture the known risk 
factors as suggested by prior literature;
162
 second, we include three different momentum 
factors to capture the effects of past returns on future returns; third, we include a control for 
share turnover to estimate liquidity and belief dispersion impacts on returns; fourth, we 
include a control for standardized earnings surprise to capture post-earnings announcement 
drift [PEAD]; fifth, we include a control for abnormal volatility to proxy for firm specific 
potential arbitrage limits; finally, we control for impact of institutions on returns with the 
hypothesis that institutions hold more information processing capacity and hence incorporate 
new information into prices more quickly. 
The main specification we employ is similar in nature to that of Tetlock et al. (2008) and 
Loughran and McDonald (2011). The equation for our abnormal return specification is given 
below: 
                                                          
 
                                                 
162
 We include these controls even though our matching portfolio is based on the same variables. However, by 
including size and B-2-M, we follow the approach of previous literature (e.g., Chan, 2003; Engelberg, 2008; 
Hirsleifer et al., 2009; Demers and Vega, 2010). 
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Abnormal volume 
As trading volume is suggested to be related to investor sentiment (e.g., Tetlock, 2007; 
Hirsleifer et al., 2009; Loughran and McDonald, 2011), we design a specification to study the 
effects of our main variables on abnormal trading volume. As we do not foresee any specific 
reason as to why we should employ different event windows with volume vis-à-vis returns, 
we run our specification with the same four event windows as with returns in order to 
maintain consistency within the study.
163
  
We define the dependent variable: abnormal volume, as explained in Section 4.2. The main 
variables for the specification are the same as in abnormal return specification. The set of 
controls is similar to that of returns with the following addition: in line with Hirsleifer et al. 
(2009), we include a control for abnormal market volume in order to isolate the idiosyncratic 
change in trading volume.  
Our specification is similar especially to that of Loughran and McDonald (2011). The 
equation for our abnormal volume specification is given below: 
                                                            
 
Abnormal volatility 
As our final financial metric of interest, we study the relationship between our main variables 
and abnormal idiosyncratic volatility.
164
 As suggested by Antweiler and Frank (2004), 
Demers and Vega (2010) and Loughran and McDonald (2011), qualitative text can have 
predictive power over future volatility of equity returns above and beyond quantitative 
information. We run abnormal volatility specification for event windows: [2,32] and [2,62], as 
discussed in Section 4.2.1. The shorter event windows are excluded as there are not enough 
data points for a meaningful estimate of volatility. 
The set of main and control variables for the specification (independent variables) are the 
same as in abnormal returns. Therefore, our specification resembles mainly that of Loughran 
                                                 
163
 As previous section was dealing in the domain of equity returns, event windows were defined based on 
closing prices. Therefore, event windows [0,1] would read  in the domain of volume  as abnormal volume 
for day 1 [1]. With the exception of this slight change in notations, the event windows are the same. For more 
discussion, see Section 4.2.1. 
164
Refer to Section 4.2., for a definition of abnormal volatility 
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and McDonald’s (2011) specification. The equation for our abnormal volatility specification 
is as follows: 
                                                            
 
5.4.2 Alternative specifications for robustness 
To ensure the reliability of our results, we employ several different specifications as 
robustness checks for our results. The goal of alternating specifications is to ensure that 
omitted variables are not driving our results, as well as to check whether or not our results 
dissipate when switching methodology in the estimation of our main variables. The section 
will continue by elaborating the different specifications we employ to ensure the robustness of 
our results. Reader should refer to Section 4.2., for more detailed descriptions on the variables 
discussed. 
Alternative abnormal return definitions 
Due to the critique towards the dependency of results on abnormal return calculation 
techniques (e.g., Fama, 1997, 1998), we run our abnormal return and volatility main 
specifications with differing return estimation techniques. First, we use raw returns (e.g., 
Tetlock, 2007) instead of abnormal returns; Second, we use two different benchmarks for 
abnormal returns: value weighted index returns based on all the market caps of the firms (e.g., 
Loughran and McDonald, 2011), and Fama and French three-factor model (e.g., Tetlock et al., 
2008). Third, we estimate our abnormal returns using CARs instead of BHARs  we 
replicate this approach with the other aforementioned benchmarks as well.  
The aforementioned alternations ensure that our results are not driven by a bad model 
problem. Due to the findings of prior literature, we expect to see changes in our results with 
different definitions of abnormal returns. At bare minimum, we expect a decrease in our 
coefficients magnitude when switching to CARs instead of BHARs. 
Alternative main variable definitions 
As we see in section 4.4.3, our news volume decreases slightly towards the end of the time 
period. To test whether or not the aforesaid impacts our tests, we run our main specifications 
with a standardized version of market and news volume variables. We standardize the volume 
by deducting the past average volume from the news volume, and dividing the resulting figure 
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standardizing with standard deviation of volume. Therefore, we control seasonal trend with 
standardization, and examine the abnormal impact of volume to our results. We define 
standardized market and firm specific news volume on day 0 as follows:  
                      
(                                  )
                                 
 
 
Additional control variables 
In order to be robust, we create several different alternative specifications that include new 
controls in addition to our main controls. Our aim is to examine whether or not some of the 
new controls have an impact on our results. However, as prior studies have not found 
significant evidence of changes in results with the inclusion of the additional controls we plan 
on including, we do not expect them to alter our main specification results. 
 Industry specific effects. We add an industry dummy: a dummy according to the 
Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification to our main specifications in order 
to account for industry specific differences in results. Due to the large number of 
dummies included, we will lose several degrees of freedom, and hence expect our 
results to decrease in statistical significance. However, qualitatively our results should 
remain the same; in other words, we do not believe that a specific industry would be 
driving our results. 
 Impact of analysts. We include the number of analysts following a company, and the 
analyst dispersion control variables into our main specifications to see whether or not 
analysts have an impact on our dependent variables. However, our main specification 
should already account for the effects that analyst coverage
165
 and analyst 
dispersion
166
 cover. Therefore, we do not expect to see significant changes in our 
results. 
 Calendar effects. We employ calendar dummies to our main specifications to be 
absolutely sure that our results are not dependent on the well-documented calendar 
effects. However, as our matching portfolio benchmark return should already cover 
calendar effects implicitly, we do not expect changes with abnormal return and 
                                                 
165
 Analyst coverage is a proxy for informational efficiency that should be covered by institutional ownership. 
Due to strong multicollinearity issues analyst coverage is not included in the main specification. 
166
 Analyst dispersion is a proxy for belief dispersion. Share turnover should also proxy for belief dispersion. 
128 
 
volatility specifications. Moreover, as we control for market wide abnormal trading in 
our abnormal volume specification,
167
 we do not expect to see changes in the volume 
specification, either. 
 Dividend effects. In line with Li (2006), we include dividend variables as suggested 
by Fama and French (2006) in order to cover their possible impact on our dependent 
variables. Hence, we include the paid dividends from the last twelve months, divided 
by book value of equity. Also, we add a dummy for companies with no last twelve 
months dividends dummy. We do not expect to see a change in our results with the 
addition of dividend variables. 
  
                                                 
167
 Abnormal market volume should implicitly cover calendar effects.  
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6 RESULTS 
In this chapter, we discuss the results we derive from our tests, and how they relate to our 
hypotheses. We begin by testing the performance of different sentiment methodologies in 
classifying articles. Afterwards, we move on to study the impact of sentiment on financial 
metrics. To do so, we begin by conducting univariate tests to determine if there is a 
relationship, and what is the nature of the relationship. After the univariate tests, we move on 
to perform multivariate tests to see how our main independent variables impact our dependent 
variables when tested simultaneously in a holistic media model. Finally, we conduct several 
additional multivariate tests with alternative specifications for the sake of robustness, and to 
further study specific areas of interest.  
We refer the reader to Section 3 for more information on our hypotheses, to Section 4 on 
descriptions of data and our variables, and to Section 5 for discussion on our methodology 
and specifications. 
6.1 Sentence-level sentiment 
In order to compare the accuracy of the LPS algorithm, a number of baseline models were 
constructed. One of the objectives in the experiments is to understand how the added layers of 
rules contribute to the overall model performance. Therefore, the benchmark algorithms 
featured below have been chosen to represent different levels of model complexity ranging 
from simple word based algorithms towards the model proposed by Moilanen et al. (2010), 
and our approach.  
We start by comparing different methodologies against the benchmark of annotated sentences. 
From there on we move to discuss the potential sources of errors in our method: Linearized 
Phrase-Structure -model. 
6.1.1 Comparison of methods 
We run several different sentiment classification methodologies for both our annotated 
datasets: Training set A and Training set B. We test the following ways of estimating 
sentiment: 
 Random: To be able to compare the improvements of different methods over random 
assigning of labels, we calculate sentiment scores for randomly labeled sentences. 
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Using a uniform distribution, we assign a random sentiment for each sentence: 
positive, neutral or negative. We simulate the random assigning 1,000 times, and 
compare the outcome: i.e., accuracy, between the random sample and our 
methodologies. 
 Weighted random: We use the distribution of data labels in the annotated data sets: 
i.e., if there are 10% of negative sentences in a training set, each sentence will have a 
10% probability of being tagged as negative. Similarly to Random, we give each 
sentence a random sentiment, and we run simulation 1,000 times. 
 Word count (Harvard): As explained in previous sections, we calculate the number 
of positive and negative words in each sentence using the Harvard dictionary positive 
and negative word lists. We then label the sentence using the following rules: no 
polarized words or ambiguous = neutral; 2/3 or more negative words = negative; 2/3 
or more positive words = positive.  
 Word count (Loughran): We use a similar method as with word count Harvard, but 
use the positive and negative word lists by Loughran and McDonald (2011). 
 MPQA: As the primary baseline in the experiments regarding sentiment classification 
accuracy, we consider the Quasi-compositional Polarity Sequencing model with 
MPQA dictionary proposed by Moilanen et al. (2010). In the paper, they compared a 
number of alternative models with varying levels of complexity, but taken as a whole 
they found that a simple polarity-sequence model outperformed their more 
complicated models relying on complete phrase-structure information. The version 
considered here is this model with MPQA dictionary as the source of polarity 
information. When evaluating performance, we always use 90% of the training 
material and run the algorithm on the remaining 10%, not to test the algorithm on the 
data that it was trained on (10-fold cross-validation). 
 LPS. Finally, we run our Linearized Phrase-Structure -model, described in section 
5.1.2, with all word lists: lists by Loughran and McDonald, augmented with the 
additional wordlists we described in section 5.1.3. As above, we always test the 
algorithm on 10% of training material (10-fold cross-validation). 
 True values. For easy comparison, we also show all metrics for sentences that have 
been labeled with the correct labels. 
For all the methods above, we calculate a set of accuracy metrics to show how well the 
methods perform on recognizing positive, neutral and negative sentences. The outcomes of 
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the metrics are defined as follows: ‘positive’ refers to a sentence belonging to the category at 
hand; ‘negative’ refers to a sentence not belonging to a category. For example, when we look 
at accuracy metrics of neutral sentences, a ‘true positive’ would be a sentence that is neutral 
and has been labeled as neutral, and a ‘false positive’ would be a sentence that is not neutral 
(i.e. is positive or negative) but has been labeled as neutral, etc. We use the classical 
confusion matrix for assessing classification accuracy as seen in Table 12: Confusion matrix 
(see also: Das, 2010). In the matrix, all cells on the diagonal are considered as being correct.  
Table 12: Confusion matrix 
Confusion matrix according to Fawcett, 2005 
          
 
From the aforementioned, we calculate the following metrics: 
 Accuracy: Estimates what fraction of items in a category has been correctly identified 
as belonging to a category, or not belonging to a category. For example, if calculated 
for the group of neutral sentences, this would refer to correctly identified neutral 
sentences, and correctly identified non-neutral sentences, as a fraction of all sentences. 
In general, accuracy of an intelligent algorithm should be above (1 / number of 
classes), the accuracy of random guessing (Das, 2010).  
 
                              
                                                                        
 
 
 Recall: Estimates what fraction of items in a category have been correctly identified. 
For example: correctly identified positive sentences / all positive sentences in the 
sample. A figure below 1 would mean that some figures have been classified falsely 
(e.g. a neutral sentence has been classified as a positive sentence). 
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 Precision: Estimates what fraction of items in a category have been correctly 
identified vs. all items that have been identified in the category: e.g. correctly 
identified positive sentences / all identified positive sentences. For example, for 
neutral sentences, a figure below 1 would in this case mean that some of the neutral 
sentences have not been recognized as being neutral. 
 
              
                                                      
 
 
 F1-score: The F1-score is a measure that combines recall and precision. 
. 
                
(                                          )
 
Furthermore, we calculate for all samples the fraction of different categories: fraction of 
positive, neutral and negative labels given, and the correlation between the assigned figure 
and the true figure
168
. The results reported for the algorithms with a machine learning 
component (i.e. MPQA and LPS) are computed using 10-fold cross-validation. The results of 
the methods can be found in Table 13: Performance of different method - Training set A 
 
                                                 
168
  In order to calculate a numerical correlation figure, we simply transform the definitions to numbers as 
follows: ‘positive’ = 3, ‘neutral’ = 2, and ‘negative’ = 1. 
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Table 13: Performance of different method - Training set A 
 
 
In addition, we calculate the same metrics for Training set B. These results are shown in 
Table 14. 
 
Random
Weighted 
random
Wordcount 
Harvard
Wordcount 
Loughran MPQA
Directional 
SVM
Windowed 
SVM True values
Positive sentences
Accuracy 0.58 0.62 0.55 0.73 0.61 0.71 0.71 1.00
Recall 0.33 0.25 0.56 0.16 0.55 0.69 0.81 1.00
Precision 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.40 0.33 0.45 0.45 1.00
F1-score 0.29 0.25 0.38 0.23 0.41 0.54 0.58 1.00
Neutral sentences
Accuracy 0.45 0.55 0.50 0.62 0.55 0.65 0.64 1.00
Recall 0.57 0.70 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.84 0.88 1.00
Precision 0.66 0.66 0.69 0.67 0.74 0.83 0.86 1.00
F1-score 0.61 0.68 0.71 0.69 0.74 0.83 0.87 1.00
Negative sentences
Accuracy 0.64 0.83 0.84 0.87 0.86 0.90 0.91 1.00
Recall 0.16 0.04 0.15 0.09 0.32 0.47 0.60 1.00
Precision 0.09 0.09 0.18 0.25 0.34 0.48 0.50 1.00
F1-score 0.12 0.06 0.16 0.13 0.33 0.47 0.54 1.00
All sentences
Correlation 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.20 0.27 0.47 0.54 1.00
% positive 34 % 25 % 48 % 10 % 41 % 39 % 45 % 25 %
% neutral 33 % 66 % 41 % 82 % 43 % 47 % 41 % 66 %
% negative 33 % 9 % 11 % 8 % 15 % 14 % 14 % 9 %
Random
Weighted 
r
Wordcount 
Harvard
Wordcount 
Loughran MPQA
Directional 
SVM
Wind wed 
SVM True values
Positive sentences
Accuracy 0.58 0.62 0.55 0.73 0.61 0.71 0.71 1.00
Recall 0.33 0.25 0. 6 0.16 0.55 0.69 0.81 1.00
Precision 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.40 0.33 0.45 0.45 1.00
F1-score 0.29 0.25 0.38 0.23 0.41 0.54 0.58 1.00
Neutral sentences
Accuracy 0.45 0. 5 0. 0 0.62 0.55 0.65 0.64 1.00
Recall 0.57 0. 0 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.84 0.88 1.00
Precision 0.66 0. 6 0. 9 0.67 0. 4 0.83 0.86 1.00
F1-score 0.61 0.68 0.71 0.69 0.74 0.83 0.87 1.00
Negative sent nces
Accuracy 0.64 0.83 0.84 0.87 0.86 0.90 0.91 1.00
Recall 0.16 0.04 0.15 0.09 0.32 0.47 0.60 1. 0
Precision 0.09 0.09 0.18 0.25 0.34 0. 8 0.50 1. 0
F1-score 0.12 0.06 0.16 0.13 0. 3 0.47 0.54 1.00
All sentences
Correlation 0.00 0. 0 0.12 0. 0 0.27 0.47 0.54 1.00
% positive 34 % 25 % 48 % 10 % 41 % 39 % 45 % 25 %
% neutral 33 % 66 % 41 % 82 % 43 % 47 % 41 % 66 %
% negative 33 % 9 % 11 % 8 % 15 % 14 % 14 % 9 %
LPS 
134 
 
Table 14: Performance of different methods - Training set B 
 
 
As expected, our results improve in general from left to the right. We can see that all metrics 
estimating sentiment are superior compared to random guessing. Loughran and McDonald 
wordlists also improve results over the word count with Harvard dictionary, even though the 
difference is not a large improvement.  
When comparing the results, it is clear that the SVM-based methods are more accurate ways 
to measure sentiment over word counts. The simplest SVM rules should effectively mimic the 
use of word count: e.g. a negative label will be assigned to sentences where the only identified 
polarized words are negative. Thus, it is not surprising that SVM performs at the same level 
as word count. As SVMs can detect also more advanced patterns in sentences, it is expected 
that SVMs perform better than word count. Also, we have been able to achieve significant 
improvement in performance by developing our SVM method from Quasi-compositional 
Polarity Sequencing to Linearized Phrase-Structure -model. These results are also in line with 
our expectations. 
Random
Weighted 
random
Wordcount 
Harvard
Wordcount 
Loughran MPQA
Directional 
SVM
Windowed 
SVM True values
Positive sentences
Accuracy 0.54 0.53 0.58 0.68 0.68 0.82 0.85 1.00
Recall 0.33 0.38 0.59 0.21 0.62 0.78 0.89 1.00
Precision 0.38 0.38 0.46 0.79 0.56 0.75 0.75 1.00
F1-score 0.35 0.38 0.52 0.34 0.59 0.77 0.81 1.00
Neutral sentences
Accuracy 0.51 0.50 0.55 0.57 0.64 0.80 0.82 1.00
Recall 0.39 0.50 0.59 0.60 0.66 0.82 0.90 1.00
Precision 0.48 0.48 0.53 0.53 0.64 0.80 0.87 1.00
F1-score 0.43 0.49 0.56 0.56 0.65 0.81 0.88 1.00
Negative sentences
Accuracy 0.62 0.75 0.81 0.86 0.85 0.93 0.95 1.00
Recall 0.16 0.08 0.18 0.13 0.35 0.57 0.74 1.00
Precision 0.14 0.14 0.31 0.53 0.49 0.77 0.82 1.00
F1-score 0.15 0.10 0.23 0.21 0.41 0.65 0.78 1.00
All sentences
Correlation 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.36 0.41 0.68 0.76 1.00
% positive 33 % 38 % 48 % 10 % 41 % 39 % 45 % 38 %
% neutral 33 % 48 % 41 % 82 % 43 % 47 % 41 % 48 %
% negative 33 % 14 % 11 % 8 % 15 % 14 % 14 % 14 %
Random
Weighted 
r
ordcount 
Harvard
r c t 
Loughran MPQA
Directional 
SVM
Windowed 
True values
Positive sentences
Accuracy 0.54 . 3 . 8 .6 . .82 . 5 1.00
Recall 0.33 . 8 .59 .21 .62 .78 .89 1.00
Precision 0.38 . .46 .79 .56 .75 . 1.00
F1-score 0.35 . 8 .52 .34 .59 .77 .81 1.00
Neutral sentences
Accuracy 0.51 . 0 . 5 . 7 .64 .80 . 2 1.00
Recall 0.39 .50 . 9 .60 . 6 .82 .90 1.0
Precision 0.48 . .53 . .64 .80 . 7 1.00
F1-score 0.43 . 9 .56 . .65 .81 . 8 1.00
Negative sentences
Accuracy 0.62 .75 .81 . 6 . 5 .93 . 5 1.00
Recall 0.16 .08 .1 . 3 .35 .57 .74 1.00
Precision 0.14 . .31 .53 .49 .77 .82 1.00
F1-score 0.15 . 0 .23 . 1 .4 .65 .78 1.00
All sentences
Correlation 0.00 . .2 .36 .41 .68 .76 1.00
% positive 33 % 8 4  10 41 39 45 38 
% neutral 33 % 48 1 82 43 7 1 8 
% negative 33 % 14 1 8 15 4   
LPS 
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Comparing results of the two training sets, we also find that the Training set B performs 
significantly better. This is influenced especially by the fact that with this training set 
sentences that are irrelevant but have a sentiment are still classified by the human annotator as 
having a sentiment. As the LPS method does not have any feature that determines relevance 
of a certain sentence, it cannot make a distinction between two sentences with same polarities. 
Thus it would classify two sentences with the same polarity structures equally, even if the 
other one was discussing something irrelevant. For a further discussion on errors performed 
by the algorithm, we continue with an analysis of errors in the following section. 
Human annotators do not always agree on how a sentence should be annotated. Even in 
instances where we give clear instructions to an annotator, the resulting accuracy of a second 
annotator, compared to the first annotator, is between 80-100%. The accuracy is impacted by: 
the sample complexity, the annotators’ background, their interpretation of different events, 
etc. As can be seen from the results, Linearized Phrase-Structure -model is close to annotator-
achieved accuracy. While some efforts can still improve the algorithm’s performance in cases 
where annotators agree, the chosen principles used to select a certain label can be as important 
when developing a more accurate sentiment – both with the algorithm and between 
annotators. Ultimately, this leads to the question of how should sentiment be aggregated and 
what would be the most beneficial interpretation of it. Options range from reporting the 
sentiment as the ‘feeling’ of the market, seeing the sentiment score as a force impacting the 
thinking of investors, trying to catch especially the sentiment around future events and 
comparing these expectations to realized performance, and so on. 
To conclude, use of better lexicons alone is sufficient to boost performance considerably, as 
indicated by the use of Loughran and McDonald's dictionary instead of Harvard's dictionary. 
However, we find the role of good learning algorithms at least equally important. Already the 
MPQA-baseline is substantially stronger than either of the lexicon-based alternatives. Finally, 
we highlight the importance of choosing the right principles for identifying sentiment for 
different purposes. 
 
6.1.2 Sources of error for Linearized Phrase-Structure -model 
For the sentences that the algorithm annotates incorrectly, we take a random sample of 300 
sentences, and ask our annotator to classify them based on the type of error that the algorithm 
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is making. Key reasons for errors appear to be: the lack of knowledge on what is relevant for 
a company’s success,169 the inability to assess the credibility in a sentence,170 and the failure 
to identify what is new information.
171
 The results of our error analysis can be seen in Table 
15: Error statistics for Linearized Phrase-Structure -model (Training set A % of errors refers 
to how many sentences were misclassified because of this reason. Often it is possible that two 
errors are simultaneously present in a sentence. Therefore, we also show how often the error 
type was the only error present. 
Table 15: Error statistics for Linearized Phrase-Structure -model (Training set A) 
Error-type
172
 % of errors % as the only error 
Need for more context 43.0 % 20.0 % 
Inability to recognize significance of events 26.7 % 19.3 % 
Company talking in advertising like -tone about its' own 
operations 
10.0 % 3.3 % 
Recognizing patterns in descriptive text 9.0 % 7.7 % 
Polysemy of words and expressions 8.7 % 0.7 % 
Positive convention of talking about something 6.3 % 2.0 % 
Words lacking from word lists 6.0 % 1.0 % 
Inability to understand magnitude and value of items 5.3 % 0.3 % 
Inability to detect changes in numbers 4.3 % 3.7 % 
Inability to detect roles in sentence 4.3 % 0.3 % 
Wrong computer patterns 4.0 % 0.3 % 
Use of longer expressions and interpreting non-words as words 4.0 % 0.0 % 
Inability to detect time expressions in the sentence 3.3 % 2.7 % 
Borderline cases: sentences that could be tagged by human as 
either/or 
2.7 % 1.0 % 
Sentences with multiple parts 1.7 % 0.3 % 
Inability to reason from text 1.3 % 0.7 % 
Wrong label in training data 1.3 % 0.3 % 
 
In addition to the above error analysis, we review the sentences with errors in order to identify 
common individual words. In particular, we look for words that exist in our word lists, and 
                                                 
169
 The errors we are referring to are: ‘inability to recognize significance of events’ and ‘need for more context.’ 
170
 The errors we are referring to are: ‘company talking in advertising like -tone about its' own operations’, 
‘positive convention of talking about something.’ 
171
 The errors we are referring to are: ‘inability to detect time expressions in the sentence.’ 
172
 For a description of error types, refer to Appendix J - Error descriptions for LPS. 
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appear to lead to more errors compared to the sentiments that they help to identify. For a list 
of these words, see Appendix I – Wordlist defects. We refine the algorithm based on the 
aforementioned by removing the words from the wordlists we use to identify sentiment, and 
hence improve the accuracy of all of our methods that are wordlist-based
173
. 
6.2 Univariate tests  
As a first step in studying the relationship between our dependent variables and our main 
independent variables, we turn to univariate tests. In order to understand whether or not our 
main independent variables have a relationship with our dependent variables, we sort our 
main independent variables into ten deciles, and calculate the median dependent variable 
value for all the deciles. After the sorts and calculations, we plot the deciles and their 
corresponding dependent variable median values on scatter plots to see the nature of the 
relationship. In the case that a clear relationship exists, the dependent variable values should 
move monotonically across the different deciles: i.e., with abnormal returns, returns should 
decrease monotonically as we move from less negative deciles towards more negative deciles. 
We begin by looking at the relationship between abnormal returns and our main independent 
variables. From there on, we move on to discuss the relationship between abnormal trading 
volume and our main independent variables. Finally, we study the relationship of abnormal 
volatility and our main independent variables. 
6.2.1 Abnormal returns 
We begin our univariate study by looking at the relationship between abnormal returns and 
our main independent variables. We will begin by plotting our primary sentiment estimation 
methodology: Linearized Phrase-Structure -model, deciles against decile median abnormal 
return values. The graphs are shown below in Figure 18. After looking at Linearized Phrase-
Structure -model performance, we will look at how our two other main independent variables 
fare in the univariate tests by plotting market news volume (Figure 19) and firm specific news 
volume (Figure 20) against abnormal returns. The graphs are shown below. 
                                                 
173
 The aforesaid modification is reflected in all shown results. 
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Figure 18: LPS model deciles vs. decile median abnormal return 
 
As is clear from Figure 18, sentiment does not seem to have a relationship with abnormal 
returns in any of the event windows. The closest to a monotonic relationship is event window 
[1,5]. However, even with the 4-day event window, the relationship is far from monotonic, 
and decile 7 values are off the chart. We can infer from the univariate tests that sentiment 
does not seem to explain future variations in abnormal returns. Therefore, our univariate tests 
are in contradiction with prior literature’s findings, and seem to support market efficiency. 
We conclude that we need to move on to multivariate tests to specify the exact nature of the 
relationship in order to draw more precise conclusions. However, based on the univariate 
tests, it seems that our findings are supporting the hypothesis that markets are efficient. In 
other words, sentiment cannot be used to forecast abnormal returns. 
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Figure 19: Market news volume deciles vs. decile median abnormal return 
 
Market news volume holds more promise than sentiment variable in forecasting abnormal 
returns based on the univariate tests. However, decile 9 exhibits a peculiar drop in all event 
windows. Studying further data behind this decile, we notice an interesting pattern: a much 
larger fraction of news from 2009 and 2010 are present in the the lowest deciles and the 9
th
 
decile. As these have been the core years of the financial crisis, it is natural that these returns 
are lower than for the other deciles. We hypothesize that during this time period on days when 
there has been a large coverage this has often been due to negative press. Indeed this appears 
to be the case. We next drill down in to returns below -10% per decile. The 9
th
 decile indeed 
has proportionately larger negative returns than the other top deciles. We conclude that the 
drop in the 9
th
 decile is thus very likely caused by the fact that our sample includes the time 
period with the financial crisis. Nevertheless, the relationship between market news volume 
and abnormal returns resembles a monotonic relationship to much greater degree than the 
pattern with sentiment variable. Furthermore, it seems that the relationship is positive, as we 
hypothesized. Therefore, univariate tests seem to support our hypothesis of underreaction 
with aggregate market news volume.  
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Figure 20: Firm specific news
174
 volume deciles vs. decile median abnormal return 
Firm specific news volume shows no clear relationship with the shorter event-windows. 
However, the longer event windows seem to exhibit an increasing relationship, yet the radical 
drop in the last deciles is puzzling. Looking further into the data, we notice that the highest 
news volume is concentrated especially to certain companies, including also several financial 
institutions where returns have been significantly more negative than for others. Thus, this 
drop appears to represent a bias in our sample during the financial crisis. All in all, the 
relationship between firm specific news volume and abnormal returns is unclear based on the 
univariate tests. We anticipate that firm specific news volume will not have a significant 
relationship with abnormal returns on the short-term event windows based on our univariate 
findings. Also, we remain skeptical towards a significant relationship in the longer event 
windows.
175
 
                                                 
174
 We use only data with news volume over 5, as otherwise too many deciles would have equal values. In other 
words, the first 4 deciles would have news volume value of 0, and the next two deciles would have a news 
volume value of 1.  
175
 Our findings with firm specific news volume and abnormal trading volume push us to hypothesize on the 
nature of the relationship that firm specific news volume has with dependent variables. We refer the reader to the 
section dealing with abnormal trading volume and firm specific news volume for this discussion. 
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6.2.2 Abnormal volume 
We continue our univariate tests by looking at the relationship between abnormal trading 
volume and our main independent variables. We will proceed in a similar manner as in the 
previous section: first, we plot Linearized Phrase-Structure -model sentiment against 
abnormal volumes; second, we plot market news volume against abnormal volumes; finally, 
we plot firm specific news volume against abnormal volume. The graphs are shown below. 
                           
                           
Figure 21: LPS model deciles vs. decile median abnormal trading volume 
 
Based on Figure 20, it seems that sentiment might have a relationship with abnormal volume. 
From the graphs we can see that the relationship is not perfectly monotonic but does show a 
clear increasing pattern - especially event window [2,5] seems to fare well. Based on the 
findings, we infer that our hypothesis of information content dominating investor reactions 
over tone seems to be correct, and sentiment has a positive relationship with abnormal 
volume.  
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Figure 22: Market news volume deciles vs. decile median abnormal trading volume 
 
Market news volume seems to exhibit a relationship with abnormal volume as well. However, 
the relationship portrayed by sentiment deciles seems to hold more promise than market news 
volume. There is considerable variation in decile median values in the event windows. Again, 
decile 9 seems to experience a significant drop that disrupts the increasing monotonic trend
176
. 
Nevertheless, an increasing pattern does emerge from the figure, and we infer that the 
univariate tests do indicate some level of support for our hypothesis of an underreaction, 
followed by abnormal volume in the longer time frame. 
 
                                                 
176
 As for our results comparing Market news volume and to abnormal returns, we suggest that this jump is likely 
caused by the fact that our sample includes the financial crisis. 
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Figure 23: Firm specific news volume
177
 deciles vs. decile median abnormal trading volume 
 
In light of the univariate tests, it seems that firm specific news volume has at least a weak 
relationship with abnormal volume. Interestingly, we see a drastic change in the last decile
178
; 
a similar change was evident with firm specific news volume with abnormal returns. To some 
surprise, the relationship seems to be positive, and hence in contradiction with our main 
hypothesis. In fact, the univariate tests seem to support our alternative hypothesis suggesting 
that attention grabbing stocks expedite abnormal trading as is evident by the positive 
relationship illustrated in Figure 23. Also, it seems that the relationship is more prominent for 
the shorter event windows while the longer event windows seem to have slightly weaker 
increasing pattern. However, all the event windows show more or less stable upward 
movement throughout the deciles, with a radical increase in the last decile. Indeed, we suggest 
                                                 
177
 We use only data with news volume over 5, as otherwise too many deciles would have equal values. In other 
words, the first 4 deciles would have news volume value of 0, and the next two deciles would have a news 
volume value of 1. 
178
 The reader should note that the last decile is not equal to the other deciles, and therefore a large change is 
natural in this case. In majority of instances, the news volume would be between 5-25 news per day. These data 
points are presented with deciles 1-9. Decile 10, on the other hand, captures all instances where news volume is 
higher than 25, in fact the highest news volume going up to 235 news items per day. (For market news volume 
and the LPS-score, the jump to the last decile is not drastic).  
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that firm specific news volume can in fact have a binomial relationship with its dependent 
variables. In other words, after crossing a certain threshold, a firm becomes ‘attention 
grabber’179, and experiences a significant increase in its abnormal trading volume, or a 
decrease in its abnormal returns. However, before crossing this threshold, the dependent 
variables are not significantly impacted by more firm specific news. In conclusion, based on 
the univariate findings, we suggest that firm specific news volume has a relationship with 
abnormal trading volume that is positive in nature.  
 
6.2.3 Abnormal volatility 
As our final univariate test, we study the impact of our main independent variables on 
abnormal volatility. We will proceed in this section in a similar manner as in the previous 
sections: first, we plot Linearized Phrase-Structure -model sentiment against abnormal 
volatility; second, we plot market news volume against abnormal volatility; finally, we plot 
firm specific news volume against abnormal volatility. The graphs are shown below. 
  
Figure 24: LPS model deciles vs. decile median abnormal volatility 
 
Based on the univariate analysis, it seems that sentiment has the ability to forecast future 
abnormal volatility. As is shown in Figure 24, abnormal volatility increases monotonically 
throughout the deciles. However, the first deciles are relatively constant. Nevertheless, the last 
deciles show a clear and monotonic increase with each decile that is a strong indication of a 
relationship. Furthermore, the relationship is positive in nature, as we hypothesized. Indeed, 
our univariate findings seem to support the findings of prior literature. We infer that 
                                                 
179
 The firm experiences more trading due to speculators, and increased attention. 
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univariate tests seem to confirm our hypothesis of sentiment changes leading to abnormal 
volatility as noise traders react to sentiment changes with exaggerated action. 
  
Figure 25: Market news volume deciles vs. decile median abnormal volatility 
 
As we expected, it seems that there is no clear relationship with market news volume and firm 
specific idiosyncratic abnormal volatility. Indeed, we did not foresee a valid hypothesis for 
such a relationship, and our univariate findings seem to confirm our initial line of thinking. 
Nevertheless, we will study market news volume as part of our holistic media model main 
specification in the multivariate context. However, it seems that market news volume is not a 
driver of abnormal volatility. 
 
  
Figure 26: Firm specific news volume
180
 deciles vs. decile median abnormal volatility 
 
                                                 
180
 We use only data with news volume over 5, as otherwise too many deciles would have equal values. In other 
words, the first 4 deciles would have news volume value of 0, and the next two deciles would have a news 
volume value of 1. 
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As with sentiment, firm specific news volume seems to have a clear monotonic relationship 
with abnormal volatility. Indeed, the relationship is positive in nature, and therefore in line 
with our hypothesis of attention grabbing stocks attracting noise trader activity. We conclude 
that the univariate results seem to support our hypothesis, and indicate that there is a 
relationship between firm specific news volume and abnormal volatility.  
In general, our tests infer that the volatility impact seems to be relatively stable throughout 
time, and lasts for a long period of time. In other words, volatility impact persists over time, 
based on the univariate results. Indeed, such an empirical finding has been documented 
previously in prior literature (e.g., Antweiler, 2004). The next step is to analyze these 
relationships in multivariate context. 
 
6.3 Multivariate tests  
After studying the univariate results, we move on to multivariate specifications to better 
capture the relationship between our dependent variables and main independent variables 
while controlling for several other known factors. We will first explore the main 
specifications we have outlined in Section 5.4.1, and then move on to discuss the alternative 
specifications discussed in Section 5.4.2.   
6.3.1 Main Specifications 
Based on the univariate results, we are not expecting to see strong evidence of a relationship 
between sentiment and our dependent variables. On the other hand, we are interested to see 
how the relationship between news volume (market volume and firm specific volume) holds 
up after adding a number of control variables to the equation. To better understand the 
different drivers of our dependent variables, and their potential link with our independent 
variables, we run multivariate analysis according to the main specifications we have outlined 
in Section 5.3.1.  
We will first explore the relationship between abnormal returns and our independent 
variables. From there on, we will continue by discussing abnormal volume. Finally, we 
conclude by looking at the impact our independent variables have on abnormal volatility. 
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Abnormal returns 
Based on the univariate results, it seems that sentiment is unable to explain variations in 
abnormal returns. However, in order to better understand the relationship, and to study the 
effect of a holistic media model, we move to multivariate analysis, and include our two other 
main independent variables in the specification with a set of controls, as described in Section 
5.3.1. The results of our main specification regressions are found below in Table 16. 
  
Table 16: Multivariate specification: Abnormal return 
 
 
Sentiment 
As we have shown in the previous sub-section: Section 6.1., our sentiment estimation 
methodology is superior to the prevalent dictionary based word counts. However, even though 
Linearized Phrase-Structure -model fares better, the results are not promising. Based on the 
multivariate analysis, in combination with the univariate analysis, we suggest that in light of 
Sentiment Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
Windowed SVM -0,03 -0,46 -0,27 -2,02 -0,42 -0,86 -1,21 -1,27
Wordcounts
Finance dictionary 0,61 0,72 -0,21 -0,15 -5,54 -0,75 -14,86 -0,99
H4N dictionary 0,14 0,20 -1,13 -0,76 -0,78 -0,13 -10,07 -0,80
Main Independent Variables*
Market news volume -0,01 -0,47 0,20 2,29 0,89 3,11 1,68 2,87
Firm news volume 0,00 -0,02 -0,46 -1,02 -2,45 -1,09 -2,89 -0,72
Control Variables*
Size 0,12 3,31 -0,11 -1,20 -0,86 -1,49 -1,73 -1,73
Book-to-market -0,85 -2,66 0,75 1,19 2,28 1,05 3,51 1,16
Momentum
[-4,-1] -2,27 -4,32 -6,25 -5,55 -13,70 -5,87 -15,06 -3,91
[-34,-4] -0,86 -6,31 -2,34 -4,69 -7,94 -2,94 -6,35 -1,50
[-255,-34] -0,10 -0,90 -0,04 -0,13 0,19 0,15 1,19 0,51
Share turnover 0,14 1,61 0,71 2,00 4,50 1,98 8,59 2,19
SUE -0,38 -0,33 -4,87 -0,96 18,05 0,68 37,79 0,73
Abnormal volatility 5,75 1,81 -14,23 -1,30 -83,22 -1,59 -109,57 -1,05
Institutional ownership 0,14 1,10 -0,34 -0,91 -2,26 -1,09 -4,28 -1,07
* Coefficients and t-stats of main Independent and control variables refer to a specification run with Windowed SVM as 
aathe sentiment measure.
Multivariate Specification: Abnormal Return
Event windows
[0,1] [1,5] [2,32] [2,62]
The variable definitions are found in Section 4. Data. Discussion on methodology specification can be found in Section 5. 
Methodology. Specification is run using Fama-MacBeth methodology to counter time-effect present in the data. The 
reported coefficients, and t-statistics, are based on 21 quarters. Statistically significant (5%) t-stats are bolded. All 
coefficient estimates are scaled with 100 except for main independent variables that are scaled with 10,000.
 
LPS 
 
* Coefficients and t-st  f M  pendent and Control variables ref r to LPS regression results. Word count r gressions have  
....been run separately from the LPS regression. 
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our empirical findings, different sentiment estimates cannot be used to forecast abnormal 
returns. In fact, even with the most promising event window: the event window of [1,5], the 
coefficient signs are not consistent within the 21 quarters. Hence, the reliability of the 
estimate is questionable, and any inference drawn from it should be judged with a grain of 
salt.  
In spite of not being able to draw exact inferences from the results, we do suggest that the 
qualitative nature of our results offers some light to the role of qualitative texts in financial 
markets. It seems that the hypothesis suggesting that qualitative texts hold informational 
content has some support from our results.
181
 As our results show, the different sentiment 
estimate coefficient signs are all negative throughout the event windows.
182
 Therefore, they 
show a pattern of underreaction to the increase in negativity concerning a company: the 
negative news are disseminated slowly into the stock price resulting in a negative abnormal 
return drift. Moreover, the coefficient signs grow monotonically with event window horizons, 
illustrating that the dissemination of information escalates as time passes on and agents are 
able to analyze all the information.
183
 The suggested qualitative link is in line with previous 
studies on content analysis in the field of finance (for more information on prior findings, we 
refer the reader to Section 2.3). 
All in all, we conclude that the magnitude of negativity in sentiment seems to have limited 
impact on abnormal returns. We cannot rule out the hypothesis suggesting that tone has an 
impact on investors through framing; however, it seems that on the aggregate level, the 
markets are not substantially affected by the framing bias. Also, we cannot take a definite 
stand on the topic of qualitative text’s informational content, but our results do suggest that 
the impact of informational content would dominate the reaction of investors over tone, when 
considering the impact of qualitative texts on abnormal returns as is evident by the 
underreaction pattern. However, neither of the effects can be reliably used to forecast 
abnormal returns. In conclusion, our results suggest that the level of sentiment negativity is 
not a factor of abnormal returns: either markets are efficient in disseminating information in 
qualitative texts, or there is no information in qualitative texts. Furthermore, our results 
                                                 
181
 The competing hypothesis would be that news have an impact on readers through tone - the theory behind this 
hypothesis is based on the effects of framing. More discussion on Section 3 and Section 2. 
182
 The exceptions are the 1-day results for the two dictionaries. However, as we simply suggest a very weak 
qualitative inference based on our results, we do not consider this discrepancy as important. 
183
 An alternative explanation is that ’bad model’ problem drives the increase in coefficients, as abnormal return 
estimation is more prone to the aforementioned problem with longer event horizons. However, the pattern exists 
with alternative abnormal return calculation methods in alternative specifications. 
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suggest that tone has no significant predictability over abnormal returns on aggregate market 
level. 
In light of our findings, we argue that the findings of prior literature are characterized by 
spurious regularities as suggested by many of the EMH proponents in the context of market 
anomalies (e.g., Fama, 1991, 1998; Schwert, 2003; Malkiel, 2003).
184
 Our study is, to our 
knowledge, the most comprehensive study in finance in the field of content analysis. Whereas 
other studies have focused on specific qualitative text sources (i.e., 10-ks, earnings 
announcements, specific news journals, etc.,), our study has analyzed a wide cross-section of 
qualitative texts. Furthermore, whereas prior studies have focused on one or two arbitrary 
event windows, we have utilized several event windows to examine the impact of sentiment 
on abnormal returns. Moreover, as we will later on describe, we have utilized several different 
methodologies in estimating abnormal returns, and sentiment, to avoid ‘bad model’ problems. 
In conclusion, our findings provide robust empirical evidence that suggests that there is no 
significant link between abnormal returns and sentiment. We conclude by suggesting that the 
findings of extant literature are mainly spurious regularities that are a result of data dredging 
with specific sources of qualitative texts, and the use of particular event windows and 
methodologies, to maximize results. 
Market news volume 
Our results for market news volume hold much more promise than the sentiment estimates. 
Indeed, in line with prior literature (e.g., Hirsleifer et al., 2009), market news volume shows 
opposite signs for short-term event windows vis-à-vis long-term event windows as 
hypothesized by limited attention theory. One day after the event, the relation with the 
variable to abnormal returns is negative, while the longer event-windows show a positive 
relationship: an indication that the variable proxies for limited attention and underreaction to 
information. Moreover, the following day relationship with abnormal returns is not 
statistically significant, as hypothesized by limited attention theory: as information is not 
compounded to the stock price immediately due to distraction caused by other news, the 
following day relationship with abnormal return should not be statistically significant. As 
information begins to disseminate later on, the relationship with abnormal returns turns to 
significant for the longer event windows. 
                                                 
184
 See Section 2.1., for more discussion on efficient market hypothesis, and Section 2.2., for discussion on 
Behavioral finance. 
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Whereas Hirsleifer et al., (2009) used only the number of earnings announcements as a proxy 
of distraction, our sample has counted also news texts as proxy for market wide distraction, 
and the results remain the same. Moreover, our study provides support for the hypothesis 
using several different event windows. We conclude that our results provide strong backing 
for Hirsleifer et al., (2009) hypothesis that simultaneous market news distract investors. This 
forces investors to divide their attention, resulting in a slow incorporation of information into 
stock prices: a drift. 
Our results are robust to several different methodologies discussed later on in alternative 
specifications in section 6.3.2. Furthermore, whereas with sentiment estimate coefficients, the 
signs of the coefficients were changing from quarter to quarter, market news volume 
coefficient signs remain monotonic throughout quarters. With statistical significance, and 
monotonic qualitative results for coefficient estimates throughout time clusters, our results 
appear robust. 
Firm specific news volume 
The results relating to our last independent variable: firm specific news volume, fall into the 
same category with sentiment estimates. The results are not statistically significant, but 
provide some insight into the qualitative nature of the relationship between firm specific news 
volume and abnormal returns. As we hypothesized, firm specific news volume has a negative 
relationship with abnormal returns. The aforementioned finding is in line with prior literature, 
and limited attention hypothesis. Indeed, as limited attention theory would suggest: the more 
news a firm has, the more attention it will attract, and therefore the more efficiently the 
information will be incorporated into its stock price. In other words, firm specific news 
volume exhibits the opposite relationship compared to market news volume with abnormal 
returns. The empirical findings support our hypothesis qualitatively. 
Majority of our control results are in line with our expectations. As we are using matching 
portfolios based on size and book-to-market as benchmark returns, we would not expect size 
and book-to-market to have significant relationship with abnormal returns.
185
 Momentum 
variables exhibit a reversal relationship with abnormal returns. The finding is not in line with 
the original anomalies discussed in Section 2.1., that state that on short-term previous winners 
should outperform previous losers, and on long-term stocks exhibit reversal. However, recent 
                                                 
185
 The exception of event window [0,1] remains a puzzle; potentially indicating that the variables capture the 
effect of an omitted variable that has an impact on the dependent variable in the event window in question. 
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empirical findings (e.g., Engelberg, 2008; Tetlock et al., 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 
2011) support our findings which seem to illustrate a reversal effect in the short-term
186
. Our 
other controls seem to lack significance but are qualitatively mainly in line with our 
expectations. 
Abnormal volume 
Based on the univariate results, it seems that different sentiment estimates might explain 
abnormal volume variations. In order to pinpoint the exact relationships, we move to 
multivariate analysis, and include all of our main independent variables in the specification 
with a set of controls, as described in Section 5.3.1. The results of our main specification 
regressions are found below in Table 17.  
Table 17: Multivariate specification: Abnormal volume 
 
Sentiment 
                                                 
186
 In addition, we recognize that it is possible that past stock returns lead to changes in sentiment. Therefore, 
correlation between these two variables is likely, and the coefficients of both may be somewhat biased. 
Sentiment Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
Windowed SVM 0,08 1,39 0,12 0,62 1,07 0,98 0,89 0,57
Wordcounts
Finance dictionary 1,58 2,51 1,44 0,49 3,59 0,27 16,15 0,76
H4N dictionary 1,04 1,99 -1,11 -0,52 -4,89 -0,48 5,59 0,34
Main Independent Variables*
Market news volume 0,06 2,14 0,31 2,76 1,31 2,26 2,04 2,44
Firm news volume 0,87 5,73 1,50 4,83 3,77 1,75 4,89 1,14
Control Variables*
Size -0,14 -5,04 -0,36 -3,54 -1,57 -1,66 -1,68 -0,88
Book-to-market 0,28 1,54 1,36 2,03 7,70 2,19 17,95 2,78
Momentum
[-4,-1] -1,20 -3,77 -2,44 -2,74 -18,11 -5,43 -26,40 -4,78
[-34,-4] -0,60 -3,92 -2,57 -4,32 -15,98 -4,29 -16,16 -4,50
[-255,-34] 0,03 0,40 0,18 0,66 2,72 1,78 4,32 2,11
Share turnover -0,22 -2,70 -0,53 -1,86 -3,94 -2,42 -8,01 -2,40
SUE 3,08 1,04 9,43 0,83 63,37 1,47 26,48 0,48
Abnormal volatility -8,76 -2,10 -45,84 -2,87 -244,46 -2,63 -366,98 -2,26
Institutional ownership 0,14 0,83 0,44 0,74 2,61 0,75 7,38 1,25
Abnormal market volume 0,50 19,87 0,39 10,70 0,19 4,30 0,10 4,13
* Coefficients and t-stats of main Independent and control variables refer to a specification run with Windowed SVM as 
aathe sentiment measure.
Multivariate Specification: Abnormal Volume
Event windows
[1] [2,5] [3,32] [3,62]
The variable definitions are found in Section 4. Data. Discussion on methodology specification can be found in Section 5. 
Methodology. Specification is run using Fama-MacBeth methodology to counter time-effect present in the data. The 
reported coefficients, and t-statistics, are based on 21 quarters. Statistically significant (5%) t-stats are bolded. Main 
independent variable coefficient estimates are scaled with 100.
 
LPS 
 
* Coeff cients and t-stats Main In ent and Control variables ref r to LPS regression res lts. Word count regressions have  
....been run separately from the LPS regression. 
152 
 
Even though univariate tests held some promise for the sentiment variables, sentiment is 
unable to forecast abnormal trading volume changes based on the multivariate results. With 
the exception of Loughran and McDonald (2011) dictionary result for event window [1], all 
the variables are statistically insignificant. Moreover, even with the result of event window 
[1], the coefficient signs are not monotonic throughout the 21 quarters; hence, casting doubt 
on the potential inferences drawn from the event window [1] result. Thus, it appears possible 
that sentiment simply mimics some of the control variables, therefore showing promising 
results in univariate tests.  
Nevertheless, our results do offer support qualitatively to the hypothesis that information 
content dominates investor reactions more than tone. As with returns, limited attention and 
underreaction hypothesis are supported by the empirical findings in abnormal volume 
specification. As we can see, coefficients are all positive throughout the event windows, and 
increase in magnitude when moving to longer event windows - as is expected by the limited 
attention hypothesis that suggests underreaction to new information.
187
 As a result, our 
empirical findings offer weak support for the branch of prior literature that has found 
underreaction to qualitative text information; in other words, our findings seem to indicate an 
increase in abnormal volume post-event (e.g., Loughran and McDonald, 2011).
188
  
Market news volume 
In light of the univariate tests, we had lower expectations for market news volume than for 
sentiment variables. However, in the multivariate specification, market news volume seems to 
explain abnormal volume variations. In fact, our results suggest that our initial hypothesis for 
the relationship between abnormal volume and market news volume was correct: market news 
volume proxies for distraction and causes markets to underreact to new information; hence, 
resulting in abnormal volume throughout all the event windows
189
. Moreover, interestingly, 
we can see that the coefficient magnitude increases with longer event periods. We infer that as 
                                                 
187
 The exception here is the Harvard negative dictionary. However, as we have established in previous sections, 
Loughran and McDonald demonstrated that Harvard Dictionary misclassifies words in financial context 
approximately 75% of time. Moreover, our own sentiment estimate benchmarking provided proof that H4N 
dictionary is inferior to the two other methods. Therefore, we assign the discrepancy as an outcome of noise in 
the H4N variable. 
188
 For more information on prior literature findings with financial metrics, see Section 2.3. 
189
 An interesting small deviation from our initial hypothesis is the positive significant relationship in the 
succeeding day. We did not exclude the possibility of a significant relationship, but the sign of the coefficient is 
a surprise. However, the magnitude of the coefficient is so low that we do not consider this finding as 
contradictory to our theory building based on our findings. 
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information disseminates with time, agents are able to act on that information, causing 
prolonged elevated levels of trading.   
Our empirical results offer strong support for Hirshleifer et al. (2009) distraction hypothesis, 
and the underlying limited attention theory. Furthermore, our findings with abnormal volume 
are in line with our findings with abnormal returns. In other words, our empirical findings 
seem to suggest that there is informational content in qualitative texts, and that text is 
incorporated into financial metrics with delay due to underreaction.
190
 
Firm specific news volume 
Based on the univariate tests, firm specific news volume seemed to have a relationship with 
abnormal volume variations. As expected, firm specific news volume seems to explain 
abnormal volume changes also in the multivariate context. However, the statistical 
significance drops dramatically when moving to the longer term event windows. Therefore, it 
seems that firm specific news volume has explanatory power over abnormal volume, but only 
in the short-term – a finding supported by the univariate tests, and in line with our hypotheses. 
To some extent, the empirical findings relating to firm specific news volume and abnormal 
volume are surprising. Contrary to our primary hypothesis, firm specific news volume 
magnitude increases as event window lengths increase. These results lack statistical 
significance for the longer event windows, so the results could be interpreted as directly 
supporting our hypotheses. Nevertheless, our findings seem to support the hypothesis that 
attention grabbing stocks get traded more actively throughout the event windows. In contrast 
to our primary hypothesis that stated that the relationship should weaken with longer event 
windows as more attention should mean quicker dissemination of information and therefore 
less abnormal trading activity in the long run, the abnormal volume persists and even 
increases with longer event windows. However, as the longer event windows are not 
statistically significant, we suggest that attention grabbing stock experience abnormal trading 
activity close to the event day, but that effect disappears as time goes on. In other words, 
attention grabbing stocks abnormal volume levels do not experience a prolonged elevated 
level ex-post the event. 
                                                 
190
 However, as our results are statistically weak, we can only provide weak qualitative results, and our 
inferences should be judged in that context. 
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Abnormal volatility 
In light of the univariate tests, it seems that different sentiment estimates hold great promise 
in explaining future idiosyncratic abnormal volatility. In order to specify the relationship, we 
move to multivariate analysis, and include all of our main independent variables in the 
specification with a set of controls, as described in Section 5.3.1. The results of our main 
specification regressions are found below in Table 18. 
Table 18: Multivariate specification: Abnormal volatility 
 
Sentiment 
As we expected, sentiment estimate changes have a positive relationship with abnormal 
volatility variations. As with our benchmarking test, Linearized Phrase-Structure -model 
outperforms the two other sentiment estimation methodologies when measured with statistical 
significance. Similarly, Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) finance dictionary outperforms 
H4N dictionary. Also, an interesting finding is that dictionary based word count coefficients 
seem to overestimate the impact of sentiment on volatility vis-à-vis Linearized Phrase-
Sentiment Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
Windowed SVM 0,15 2,75 0,14 2,61
Wordcounts
Finance dictionary 1,90 1,93 2,04 2,13
H4N dictionary 1,18 1,75 1,32 2,04
Main Independent Variables*
Market news volume 0,02 0,38 0,02 0,45
Firm news volume 0,27 2,26 0,39 2,30
Control Variables*
Size -0,06 -1,48 -0,06 -1,62
Book-to-market 0,78 2,11 0,79 2,06
Momentum
[-4,-1] -0,53 -2,94 -0,45 -3,21
[-34,-4] -0,49 -3,31 -0,39 -2,89
[-255,-34] 0,01 0,22 -0,01 -0,22
Share turnover 0,12 1,00 0,10 0,80
SUE 1,58 0,47 -2,14 -1,30
Abnormal volatility 66,35 8,38 67,23 7,47
Institutional ownership 0,30 2,47 0,33 2,71
* Coefficients and t-stats of main Independent and control variables refer to a specification run with Windowed SVM as 
aathe sentiment measure.
Multivariate Specification: Abnormal Volatility
[2,32] [2,62]
Event windows
The variable definitions are found in Section 4. Data. Discussion on methodology specification can be found in Section 5. 
Methodology. Specification is run using Fama-MacBeth methodology to counter time-effect present in the data. The 
reported coefficients, and t-statistics, are based on 21 quarters.Statistically significant (5%) t-stats are bolded. All 
coefficient estimates are scaled with 100 except for main independent variables that are scaled with 10,000.
 
LPS 
 
* Coefficients and t-st t  f M i  I ependent and Control variables refer to LPS regression results. Word count regressions have  
...been run separately from the LPS regression. 
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Structure -model. We suggest that the underlying cause is the noise present in the sentiment 
estimates derived in the less precise word count methodology. 
When looking at the two different event windows, it is noteworthy to state that the length of 
the event window seems to have little to no impact with the magnitude of the change in the 
sentiment estimate coefficient. Also, the pattern is, to some extent, visible with the other 
independent variables. Therefore, we infer that the volatility effect persists over long periods 
of time without perishing, or increasing. In conclusion, our empirical findings are in line with 
that of prior literatures
191
, linking sentiment changes with future abnormal volatility. 
Market news volume 
As we did not have a clear hypothesis for market news volume, we did not expect to find a 
significant relationship between the variable and abnormal volatility. Indeed, univariate tests 
gave the first indication that market news volume does not have a relationship with abnormal 
volatility. The multivariate tests confirm this interpretation. Besides being statistically 
insignificant, the coefficient of market news volume is marginal. Indeed, it seems that market 
news volume has no relationship with a given firm’s abnormal volatility.  
Firm specific news volume 
Contrary to market news volume, firm specific news volume seems to have a relationship 
with abnormal volatility based on the univariate tests. Indeed, multivariate tests confirm this 
observation. As we hypothesized, firm specific news volume has a positive relationship with 
abnormal volatility. We interpret this finding to confirm our hypothesis that noise traders are 
attracted to trade on a stock that has high visibility in the media. Therefore, noise traders 
elevate the volatility levels of a given firm’s stock with their trading behavior. The hypothesis 
is supported to some extent by the findings in abnormal trading volume. 
All in all, our empirical findings are in line with prior literatures findings. We infer that 
volatility is related to sentiment changes, and to firm specific news volume. Our results hold 
for both of two event windows we have employed, and for several different return 
methodologies. Therefore, we conclude that our findings provide strong evidence in support 
of the link between the aforementioned variables and abnormal volatility. 
                                                 
191
 For more discussion, see Section 2.3. 
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6.3.2 Alternative specifications 
As we discussed in Section 5.4.2, we run several alternative specifications to pinpoint the 
exact relationships underlying our main research variables, and to be as robust as possible 
with our results. Also, we conduct an additional study employing a new dependent variable: 
aggregate market index returns. We will briefly describe the results of the aforementioned in 
this sub-section.  
First, we will describe the results of our main specification with alternative abnormal return 
methodologies. Second, we will portray the impact that alternative main variable definitions 
have on our results. Third, we will discuss the impact that additional control variables have on 
our results. Finally, we will study the impact of our main specification for abnormal returns, 
but with aggregate market index return acting as the dependent variable. 
Alternative abnormal return definitions 
To counter any critique towards ‘bad model’ problems, and to make our study robust in terms 
of methodology, we run several different abnormal return specifications as discussed in 
Section 5.4.2. 
First, we use raw returns instead of abnormal returns in line with Tetlock (2007). We find an 
increase in coefficient estimates and statistical significance in all our main variables: 
sentiment, market news volume and firm specific news volume. Therefore, we conclude that 
linking raw returns to our variables is less demanding than to establish the link between 
abnormal returns. However, the economic significance of such findings has limited value.  
Second, we use two different abnormal return benchmarks: value weighted index returns and 
Fama and French three-factor model returns. For value weighted index returns, our results 
improve marginally. However, for Fama and French three-factor model returns our results 
decrease substantially. However, market news volume’s impact remains similar to our main 
specification, adding needed robustness to the finding.  
Third, we switch from using BHARs into using CARs when calculating our abnormal returns. 
As we expect, we see drops in our coefficient estimate magnitudes. However, statistical 
significances are not impacted by the methodology switch. Therefore, the inferences we have 
drawn from our findings remain the same. 
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We conclude by stating that our results are fairly robust to methodological choices in terms of 
abnormal returns. There are methodologies that would yield better results vis-à-vis our main 
specification methodology. However, there are also methodologies that would result in worse 
results as the ones we are now reporting with our main specification. 
Alternative main variable definitions 
As discussed in Section 5.4.2, we run alternative definitions of our main study variables. To 
see whether or not seasonal declining trend in news volume impacts our results, we run our 
main specifications with a standardized version of market and news volume variables. Also, 
we test the abnormal aspect of both variables by deducting average past volume. We find 
mixed impacts on our coefficients and their statistical significance. However, there are no 
apparent systematic pattern changes. Therefore, in line with prior literature, we conclude that 
seasonal trend is not driving our results, and standardization is not necessary. 
Secondly, we test our alternative metrics of sentiment, as specified in section 5.2.4. The 
results show some variance from sentiment metric to sentiment metric. However, as the 
differences are not major, after several experiments we choose to stick to our original LPS 
method of aggregating sentiment of all media for one day. 
Additional control variables 
To mitigate the possibility of an omitted variable impacting our results, we run several 
alternative specifications with additional controls.
192
 The variable descriptions are listed in 
Section 4.2.2, and the specifications in Section 5.4.2. The findings of our alternative control 
specifications are listed below. 
Impact of analysts 
To test the impact analysts have on information dissemination and on the subsequent impact 
on our dependent variables, we include the number of analysts following a company as well 
as analyst dispersion to our main specifications. After the inclusion, our results remain similar 
to main specifications. However, analyst variables subsume the significance of share turnover, 
while also turning the coefficient into negative. We conclude that the variables seem to proxy 
for analyst disagreement that conveys belief dispersion in the market previously captured by 
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 Additional controls are added to the main specifications described in Section 5.3.1. We do not run the 
alternative specifications previously introduced with additional controls.  
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share turnover, while turnover moves to capture liquidity effects. In such case, the signs 
appear rationale. However, as noted, both turnover and analyst variables remain insignificant.  
Calendar effects 
As we are using matching portfolios as our benchmark returns in our main specifications, we 
are implicitly controlling for calendar effects.
193
 Also, our abnormal volume specification 
takes into account abnormal market trading volume that implicitly controls for calendar 
effects in the same manner as benchmark returns. Nevertheless, as described in Section 4.2.2., 
we include calendar variables into our main specifications. We include January, Monday, and 
end-of-month dummies into our specifications. The result is not surprising: all of the dummies 
are insignificant, and the results are practically unchanged. 
Dividend effects 
In line with Li (2006), we control for the potential impact of dividends on our abnormal return 
main specification. We do not perform this check for abnormal volume or abnormal volatility, 
as there is no prevalent hypothesis that dividends should bear an impact on these variables. 
After the inclusion of dividends, we do not see significant changes in our other variables. 
Dividends seem to have qualitatively a positive relationship with abnormal returns, but lack 
statistical significance. We conclude that dividends are not impacting our results. 
Industry specific effects 
To study the possible impact of industry effects, we start with a simple analysis by calculating 
the average values of all of our dependent variables for all industries. We calculate these 
averages in order to see whether any industry would have significantly different values 
compared to others and thus be impacting our results. For example, we hypothesize that 
during the financial crisis the ‘banking’ and ‘trading’ industries could have significantly 
differing values. 
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 The matched portfolio that acts as a benchmark return is also impacted by calendar effects. 
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Table 19: Stock performance metrics by industry
194 
Average stock performance metrics over the whole time period for each industry. Only average values for 60-
day event windows shown (average values are similar regardless of event window). Return and volatility average 
figures have been multiplied by 1 000. 
 Abnormal return Abnormal volume  Abnormal volatility 
 
 
    
 
The data clearly shows that most industries have close values to each other. Contrary to our 
presumption, banking and trading are also well in line with the average values. The only 
larger outlier appears to be electronic equipment industry that consists of three companies: 
Cisco, Intel and Qualcomm. We do recognize that this industry may be leading some part of 
our results. However, as the industry is relatively small: only 3/100 companies, we do not 
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 Only values for 60-day event windows shown (average values similar regardless of event window 
Aircraft
Apparel
Automobiles and Trucks
Banking
Business Services
Candy and Soda
Chemicals
Computers
Construction Materials
Consumer Goods
Electronic Equipment
Entertainment
Food Products
Insurance
Machinery
Nonmetallic Mining
Petroleum and Gas
Pharmaceutical Products
Printing and Publishing
Restaurants, Hotels
Retail
Steel Works
Telecommunications
Tobacco Products
Trading
Transportation
Utilities
-0.4 0.2 -0.02 0.08 0 0.7
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consider that this would be a significant issue. Also, as the industry is small in terms of the 
number of companies, it is possible that only one company performing extraordinarily could 
be driving the finding. 
As described in Section 4.2.2, we next incorporate industry dummies to take into account the 
potential driving impact of an industry related factor. After categorizing our firms based on 
Fama and French (1997) classifications, our sample is divided into 28 different Fama and 
French industry categories. Hence, we include 27 industry dummies with one category acting 
as the omitted category. 
We run regressions for the whole data sample both with and without industry dummies. Most 
industries do receive significant coefficients in our regression. The main coefficients for our 
main specification with and without industry dummies are reported in the Table 20. 
Table 20: Alternative specification: Included industries 
The variable definitions are found in Section 4, Data. Discussion on methodology specification can be found in 
Section 5, Methodology. We run a regression with SVM-sentiment for the full time period at once, with and 
without industry dummies. The table reports the LPS-sentiment coefficients. Coefficient values for returns and 
volatility have been multiplied by 1 000. Results differ slightly from previous as we limited the number of 
control variables only to those that have shown significant coefficients in previous regressions. 
 
In these results we do not notice significant variation in the coefficients or t-statistics for our 
main variables (t-stats and coefficient remain typically very similar). Thus this analysis leads 
us to believe that industries are not driving our results.  
Finally, we test the coefficients of some of the largest companies with the largest news 
volumes: Apple, Google, Ford, AT&T and Citi. As the sample size would be too small for a 
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Return [0,1] -0.397 -0.769 -0.379 -0.723
Return [1,5] -1.952 -1.949 -2.027 -1.995
Return [2,32] -0.735 -0.301 -1.609 -0.649
Return [0,4] -5.417 -1.608 -6.902 -2.021
Volume [1] 110.053 3.103 115.404 3.210
Volume [2,5] 533.992 5.188 538.542 5.188
Volume [3,32] 2.317 5.752 2.659 6.526
Volume [3,62] 2.450 4.497 2.972 5.373
Volatility [2,32] 5.843 24.024 5.881 23.627
Vola [2,62] 5.926 24.870 5.964 24.408
Industries included Industries excluded
Alternative Specification: Included industries
The variable definitions are found in Section 4. Data. Discussion on methodology specification 
can be found in Section 5. Methodology. We run the same regression for the full sample and with 
and without industry dummies included. The table below reports the sentiment coefficients. 
Coefficient values for returns and volatility have been multiplied by 1000.
 tility [2,62] 
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quarterly Fama-McBeth regression, we only split the sample to three parts
195
. Similarly to our 
main regression, we notice that the coefficients for these companies are in line with main 
regression results. This also indicates that the largest companies are not driving the results, or 
that adding smaller companies with less news does not distort the results. 
Based on these tests, we conclude that industries or individual companies do not appear to be 
driving our results. However, we recognize that adding the industry dummies can add some 
explanatory power to our regressions. 
Additional dependent variable study: market index returns 
After studying the impact on firm-specific returns, we wish to also test for the possibility that 
a market sentiment could have an impact on index returns. For example, firm-specific news 
could be well studied by analysts and therefore there might not be a visible impact, but on the 
overall market level the news could still carry some value. There are two reasons we 
hypothesize that impact of the sentiment could show in the performance of the market index 
more significantly than for individual firms. First, the aggregated score from hundreds of 
daily news varies significantly less from day to day than the firm-specific sentiment. Second, 
there could be market-wide effects that may not be visible if reading company-level texts (e.g. 
news about the economy that have only marginal impact on a specific firm). However, when 
all market news are aggregated and the impact on the market index is studied, these effects 
could become visible.  
To test the hypothesis that the market sentiment, and the development of the market index, 
could have a connection, we pool all news in the market, and contrast this to the market index. 
Due to the short time period, we divide our sample only into three parts
196
 and test various 
specifications of the SP100 sentiment and stock performance metrics. We include in each 
regression Market news volume, and control also for momentum, past abnormal volatility, 
and average market share turnover and average market SUE. We test similar combinations of 
returns and predicting factors as in the firm-specific context. 
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 We split the sample into three equally sized parts, the first part containing data from Jan-06 to Oct-07, the 
second from Oct-07 to Jun-09, and the third from Jun-09 to Mar-11. This lets us have a sufficiently large sample 
size of >440 for each time period. Running regressions for the index by quarter would not be sensible due to too 
small sample size. 
196
 Similarly as for individual companies (see previous footnote), we split the sample to three equally sized parts. 
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Table 21: Index stock performance regressions- coefficient significance 
Dependent variables are shown with their time period at the end (e.g. “Return4 = Return for period [1,5]. For 
sentiment, we also test whether a longer-term average would lead to more significant results: past 4-day average 
sentiment = “LPS_4d”, past 30-day average sentiment = “LPS_30d”. 
 
For most of the combinations that we try, our coefficients vary between the three time 
periods. However, we cannot rule out the possible significance of the following regression 
results. 
Table 22: Index stock performance regression - coefficients 
 
For all of the regressions above, our coefficients keep the same sign during the 3 time periods 
and the t-statistics are significant. As pointed out, we try a number of combinations to arrive 
to these results, and the question of data mining is a relevant concern in this case. However, 
we do recognize that it could be possible that sentiment would have some predictive power 
over market index returns or volatility. To properly test this, a longer time frame of data 
would naturally need to be applied, and the exercise should preferably be combined by adding 
multiple market indexes to test if this possibly a peculiarity of the S&P index. We also 
illustrate our results below in Figure 27: Sentiment vs. stock performance.   
SVM SVM_4d SVM_30d
Return1
Return4
Return30 * * **
Return60 ** ** *
Volume1
Volume4
Volume30
Volume60
Volatility30
Volatility60 * ** **
* Significant after regression
** Significant after splitting sample into three pieces
D
e
p
e
n
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Independent variable
Dependent Main independent Coefficient T-stat
Return [2,62] LPS -0.256 -2.65
Return [2,62] 4-day LPS -0.471 -2.749
Return [2,32] 30-day LPS -0.936 -2.621
Volatility [2,62] 4-day LPS 0.02 2.128
Volatility [2,62] 30-day LPS 0.063 3.052
   LPS LPS  LPS  
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Figure 27: Sentiment vs. stock performance  
-50%
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35
60-d 
return
SVM score
60-d return vs SVM
-50%
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35
60-d 
return
SVM score
60-d return vs 4d-SVM
-40%
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
0.125 0.175 0.225 0.275
30-d 
return
SVM score
30-d return vs 30d-SVM
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
60-d 
volatility
SVM score
60-d volatility vs 4d-SVM
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
0.125 0.175 0.225 0.275
60-d 
volatility
SVM score
60-d volatility vs 30d-SVM
 
LPS 
 
  
 
LPS 
LPS LPS 
LPS 
164 
 
 
6.4 Discussion on the implications of results 
Our results have several interesting implications on financial theories and for future research. 
We start by discussing the impact on sentiment methodologies. Next, we explain how 
behavioral finance theories, especially limited attention, fit in line with our results. Finally, 
we discuss the implications on the possible link between media metrics and stock 
performance. 
6.4.1 Impact on sentiment methodologies 
Prior literature has debated on the complexity of methodology used in estimating investor 
sentiment, as we have discussed in Section 2.3. Scholars have proposed compelling 
arguments on the behalf of simple and rudimentary methodologies for estimating investor 
sentiment, reasoning mainly that transparency, objectivity and replication of results would 
suffer with the use of more advanced and complex methods (e.g., Tetlock et al., 2008). 
However, some researchers have attempted to employ more sophisticated methods; alas, with 
unexciting results (e.g., Antweiler and Frank, 2004, 2006; Das and Chen, 2006). The failure 
of advanced methods has been allocated to the scope of the qualitative text sources, and the 
limited sample sizes used in the studies in question. However, another explanation is that the 
findings documented with more naïve methods are in fact spurious. Our study utilizes a wide 
cross-section of qualitative texts with a fairly large sample, and can therefore offer improved 
interpretations over previous studies with issues relating to sample size and scope. 
In section 6.1.1, we benchmark the existing prevalent methodology of vector word counts 
against our proposed methodology: the Linearized Phrase-Structure -model. The results are 
clear: our model outperforms its precursor. Neither of the two dictionaries used with word 
counts: Loughran and McDonald (2011) dictionary, or the Harvard Psychology dictionary, 
can match the performance of Linearized Phrase-Structure -model. Also, we find that 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) dictionary outperforms the Harvard Psychology dictionary, 
as Loughran and McDonald (2011) suggest. Hence, we can confirm that finance scholars 
should employ context dependent dictionaries when using word counts, as suggested by 
Loughran and McDonald (2011). Our results are based on a wide cross-section of different 
qualitative texts which attenuates the possibility that our results are driven by a sample 
specific pattern. Our benchmarking process is conducted in line with the latest norms of 
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content analysis literature. Therefore, we conclude that our findings stand as unequivocal 
evidence in favor of the use of more sophisticated methodology in estimating investor 
sentiment. We argue that future research should also use more advanced natural language 
programming techniques when estimating investor sentiment; the methodology can 
substantially improve the accuracy of sentiment estimation. 
After evaluating the performance of prior methodologies, and establishing that more complex 
methods are warranted, we move on to study the impact sentiment has on financial metrics. In 
light of our benchmarking, we would expect Linearized Phrase-Structure -model based 
sentiment variable to outperform word count based sentiment estimates when analyzing the 
relationship with financial metrics (more of this in section 6.4.3). 
As we had expected, Linearized Phrase-Structure -model outperforms its rivals; however, to 
our surprise, word count based sentiment variables (both dictionaries) lack significance in all 
our specifications.
197
 In other words, we do not find any cause to support a relationship 
between word count sentiment variables and our dependent variables. In fact, we hypothesize 
that prior literature’s findings fall prey to data dredging concerns proposed by EMH 
advocates (e.g., Fama, 1991). In other words, the choice of event window, and the source of 
qualitative text, in combination with arbitrary time period for the study, and other 
methodological choices, are driving the results of extant literature. Indeed, in line with the 
thinking of Fama (1998), we argue that with the use of different methodology, the 
documented results would most likely disappear. We conclude by positing that prior literature 
has reported spurious regularities. 
Another implication of our findings is the proof that Loughran and McDonald (2011) 
dictionary does not perform as a predictor of stock market performance outside the scope of 
10-k reports. Loughran and McDonald suggest in their article that future research should 
study their dictionary in the context of different qualitative texts to determine the dictionary’s 
performance outside 10-k reports. Our findings seem to indicate that a word count sentiment 
based on Loughran and McDonald dictionary fails to classify text outside the 10-k context for 
the purpose of predicting stock metrics. Nevertheless, we do find support that Loughran and 
McDonald dictionary does outperform Harvard Psychology dictionary in the task of 
classifying text. 
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 The few exceptions when word count variables are significant, do not pass a more closer inspection of 
significance. To elaborate, the coefficient signs of the variables are not consistent inside the 21 quarters; casting 
doubt on any inference drawn from them. 
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6.4.2 Impact on behavioral finance theory 
Our findings do support some of the findings of prior behavioral finance literature. In 
particular, our results suggest that the distraction hypothesis suggested by Hirsleifer et al., 
(2009) does exist. Aggregate market news volume has a distracting effect on investors, 
resulting in abnormal profits and abnormal volume, as suggested by the hypothesis. Indeed, 
our results offer strong evidence in favor of limited attention theory that sets the ground for 
the distraction hypothesis. 
Prior literature has hypothesized that firm specific news volume can proxy for attention 
grabbing firms, and that a firm specific news volume variable can be used to forecast returns 
and other financial metrics. Our findings indicate that firm specific news volume is not related 
to abnormal returns, and the relationship to abnormal volume may be limited to a short-term 
effect. However, it appears that firm specific news volume is indeed related to abnormal 
volatility – most likely due to the fact that noise traders are attracted towards attention 
grabbing stocks. Therefore, our results indicate that companies that actively attract news 
coverage, and attention, exhibit more volatility. 
Qualitatively our findings seem to support our hypothesis that limited attention is driving the 
relationships between our dependent variables and our key independent variables. Indeed, 
both volume and return findings indicate underreaction which is in line with limited attention. 
On the other hand, underreaction can be explained by several different theories. For instance, 
anchoring can explain underreaction to new information. Another explanation, closely related 
to anchoring, is conservatism that can also explain underreaction when new information is not 
clearly related to the saliency of the model it is being used in
198
. However, as our multivariate 
specification is a holistic media model, we can examine the alternative theories with more 
precision. Indeed, aggregate market news volume, as discussed, has a statistically significant 
relationship with abnormal returns and volume. Aggregate market news volume relationship 
is explained by limited attention theory that predicts underreaction. Moreover, competing 
hypotheses for aggregate market news volume’s impact are far more difficult to establish as 
aggregate market news volume per se has no other competing explanations. Therefore, as 
demonstrated by aggregate market news volume findings, we argue that limited attention is 
indeed a phenomenon affecting the decisions and actions of agents. We posit that limited 
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 In fact, such would be the case with qualitative information as valuation models employ point-estimates, 
meaning that qualitative estimates need to be transformed into quantitative estimates. 
167 
 
attention theory is the leading explanation behind the link between media factors and financial 
metrics. 
As our results indicate underreaction, we can infer that our media variables appear to have 
new information content, as underreaction is the dominant effect in the case of new 
information content
199
. Consequently, we provide additional evidence to the field of research 
studying the informational content of qualitative texts, arguing that qualitative texts do indeed 
possess new information on fundamentals. Therefore, we conclude by positing that investors 
should not ignore the information content in qualitative texts, and that at the aggregate level, 
the market does incorporate the information in qualitative texts into asset prices. 
6.4.3 Impact on link between sentiment and stock performance 
To our disappointment, our method for estimating investor sentiment: the Linearized Phrase-
Structure -model does not have a significant relationship with abnormal returns or abnormal 
volume. We recognize the fact that our study limits might explain the lack of significance. 
However, we also maintain that our methodology is superior to that of prior literature, and our 
study is – to our knowledge – the most robust study undertaken in the field. Therefore, we 
argue that in light of our findings, sentiment is not a driver of abnormal returns or volume. 
Based on our findings, we cannot draw precise conclusions on market efficiency.
200
 The 
reasoning is three-fold. First, our sentiment variables and firm specific news volume variable, 
with the majority of our controls, are unable to explain future variations in abnormal returns. 
Second, aggregate market news volume and momentum factors can be used to forecast 
abnormal returns, and therefore stand as a testimony against market efficiency. Third, we 
have not tested specific trading strategies to examine the economic feasibility of our findings 
in the scope of this study. Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility that the market is 
efficient based on its economic definition of having no abnormal profits ex-post trading costs 
(e.g., Jensen, 1978). However, we can argue that the market is not efficient in allocating 
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 If qualitative texts would not have new information, the reaction would be characterized by an overreaction 
(e.g., Tetlock, 2007), as discussed in previous sections of this study, or by no reaction at all. 
200
 We have not included abnormal volume in the efficiency discussion as EMH does not give clear predictions 
on the impact of efficiency and volume. Also, we have excluded volatility from the discussion as we view it to 
be subject to the critique of Schwert (1991) discussed in Section 2. 
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assets based on its stricter more theoretical definition of no relationship with abnormal 
returns.
201
 
Even though Linearized Phrase-Structure -model variable is unable to explain variations in 
abnormal returns or volume, it can be used to forecast abnormal volatility variations. As such, 
Linearized Phrase-Structure -model can in fact act as a tool for profitable trading strategy that 
revolves around trading volatility. For instance, option pricing is based on the volatility of the 
underlying asset. In other words, if Linearized Phrase-Structure -model can be used to 
forecast future volatility of a firm’s share, it can be used to forecast the price development of 
the option that is a derivative of the firm’s share. Moreover, Linearized Phrase-Structure -
model can have applications in forecasting index volatilities such as the VIX –index, and 
trading strategies leveraging the movements of such indices. We conclude that using 
Linearized Phrase-Structure -model to forecast volatility holds promise, and future research 
should study volatility trading strategies that leverage Linearized Phrase-Structure -model as a 
tool. 
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 Our findings offer strong support for underreaction as the dominant effect; therefore, questioning the ‘even-
split anomaly distribution’ efficiency argument of Fama (1991). 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
In this final section of our research, we start by summarizing our findings. We first conclude 
on sentiment methodology and then on the impact of various factors on stock price 
performance. We finish by discussing possible avenues for further research. 
7.1 Sentiment methodology 
With the growing demand for sentiment analysis tools in financial and economic applications, 
it is increasingly important to pay attention to the ability of the models to capture the domain-
specific use of language. As observed in the previous studies on general sentiment analysis, it 
is well-known that models which work in one domain may not work well in another one. In 
particular, when considering the specialized vocabulary encountered in finance and 
economics, building a model requires a combination of expert information in the form of 
high-quality lexicons as well as more sophisticated learning algorithms which are better able 
to account for the contextual dependence of semantic orientations. 
The commonly applied bag-of-words approaches impose several restrictions. In particular, by 
treating sentences as unordered collections of words, they fail to take syntactic information 
into account. We have obtained encouraging results with our Linearized Phrase-Structure -
model in the financial domain, where we have made a substantial effort to take into account 
phrase-structure information and the way the semantic orientations of financial concepts are 
influenced by other parts of text. Our findings contribute to the methodology employed in 
investor sentiment estimation: we have shown that by using more sophisticated sentiment 
estimation methodology researchers can reach more accurate sentiment estimate, which can 
potentially further lead to better predictions for stock performance metrics, such as volatility. 
Also, we have validated the assertion of Loughran and McDonald (2011) that states that 
researchers should employ context dependent dictionaries when using word count 
methodology in finance. Indeed, we posit that Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) dictionaries 
should be utilized as the preferred dictionary in future research that employs word counts. 
7.2 Media and stock performance 
Our second objective of testing the relation between media factors, both sentiment and others, 
with stock performance is far more ambitious. In fact, finding a strong relation here would be 
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surprising, as this would potentially represent a market inefficiency that would likely be 
exploited rapidly in the financial markets. Our conclusions here relate to testing financial 
theories on the impact of media factors, the possibility that limited attention theory explains 
the impact of media factors, impact of qualitative information on financial metrics, and 
market efficiency. 
First, we offer insights to the significance of the three major media factors (firm specific news 
volume, market news volume and sentiment, on financial metric) that have been studied in 
prior literature. We study the three major media factors simultaneously, and show that three 
factors affect markets in chorus, and are not mutually exclusive. Furthermore, we validate the 
findings of Hirsleifer et al. (2009) on the importance and impact of aggregate market news 
volume on financial metrics. However, we fail to find a statistically significant relationship 
between sentiment estimates and abnormal returns or volume. We hypothesize, that in light of 
our sentiment estimation methodology benchmarking, the sentiment findings of prior 
literature are described by sample specific patterns, and are in fact spurious in nature. 
Therefore, the theoretical link between sentiment estimates and financial metrics is not 
empirically validated. That being said, we find a statistically significant relationship between 
sentiment and future abnormal volatility. In addition, even though lacking in statistical 
significance, we find that qualitatively our findings indicate an underreaction to sentiment 
changes, in line with extant literature. As a result, we suggest that the limitations impacting 
our sentiment estimation methodology can result in such a significant measurement error in 
the sentiment estimate that our results fail to represent the true significance of the variable. 
Therefore, we conclude by suggesting that sentiment can have a relationship with financial 
metrics. Finally, we document that firm-specific news volume impacts abnormal volatility, 
and to some extent, abnormal volume. We do not find a relationship between abnormal 
returns and firm specific news volume. In fact, we hypothesize that the documented link 
between returns and firm specific news has in fact acted as a proxy for the relationship 
between aggregate market news volume and abnormal returns. 
Second, based on our findings, we suggest that limited attention is in fact the underlying 
theory behind most of the findings related to the media factors. We find that aggregate market 
news volume findings correspond to the findings of prior literature. Aggregate market news 
volume is hypothesized, by Hirsleifer et al. (2009), to have a relationship between financial 
metrics due to limited attention – no other competing viable theoretical explanation for the 
relationship exists to our knowledge. Based on our findings, we can validate the 
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aforementioned relationship. Therefore, our findings also support the theory of limited 
attention. Furthermore, as limited attention implies an underreaction, and qualitatively our 
findings indicate an underreaction pattern with all the media factors, we suggest that it is not a 
farfetched idea to suggest that limited attention is the theory explaining the underreaction 
pattern with other media factors. In fact, as limited attention is already a phenomenon in the 
market place, as is demonstrated by aggregate market news volume findings, it is plausible to 
assume that the impact is not isolated to aggregate market news volume. Therefore, we posit 
that limited attention is the theory explaining the relationship between media factors and 
financial metrics. 
Third, we offer our findings as a contribution to the discussion relating to the impact 
qualitative texts have on financial metrics. We have consistently documented a qualitatively 
indicative underreaction pattern between sentiment and variations in financial metrics. As 
extant literature has documented that texts with overreaction are associated with framing 
effects, and texts with underreaction are associated with novel information content, we 
suggest that our findings indicate that qualitative texts have novel information content, and 
that investor reaction is dominantly led by information content over tone effects. However, as 
our sentiment findings lack statistical significance, our findings simply provide a qualitative 
indication of the aforementioned. Nevertheless, we find that aggregate market news volume 
impacts financial metrics, and that relationship is statistically significant. We infer that this 
clearly indicates that qualitative texts do matter, and they are considered by investors during 
decision making. Therefore, we argue that while aggregate market news volume sheds no 
light on the nature of the impact: novel information vis-à-vis tone, the finding does indicate 
that qualitative texts do play a role in financial markets. In tandem with our qualitative 
findings for sentiment estimates, we suggest that qualitative texts impact financial metrics, 
and retain some novel information content. 
Fourth, in culmination, our findings provide significant evidence to the discussion relating to 
the state of market efficiency. We find that both momentum factors and aggregate market 
news volume explain future variations in abnormal returns. Indeed, our findings stand in stark 
contradiction to the theoretical definition of the efficient market hypothesis. Also, when 
applicable, our findings describe a pattern of underreaction that has been the dominant pattern 
relating to media factors. Therefore, the critique of Fama (1991) that anomalies are distributed 
with an even split, does not seem to hold with media factors. However, we have not tested the 
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economic significance of our findings, and therefore cannot take a stand on whether or not our 
findings are in contradiction to the economic form of market efficiency (e.g., Jensen, 1978).  
As our study has employed a wide cross-section of methodologies, and qualitative text 
sources, we argue that our findings are robust to methodology changes, and free from data 
dredging concerns. However, we recognize that the limitations of our study can materially 
impact our results, and the interpretations drawn from them. We urge future research to 
especially improve our methodology, and to focus on the areas we have listed for future 
research in order to improve our understanding of the importance of media factors in financial 
markets. 
7.3 Avenues for future research 
While we consider our findings to be robust in several dimensions, we feel that future 
research can improve our current understanding of the role that media factors play in financial 
markets. First, there are multiple ways we can improve on the way to measure sentiment. To 
elaborate on this, we continue by describing the features that an ideal, ‘comprehensive 
sentiment model’, should possess to be able to detect sentiment in a human-like manner. 
Finally, we discuss the key research directions we see related to finance literature. 
7.3.1 Sentiment methodology 
While our sentiment estimation methodology is a significant improvement from prior 
simplistic word count methodology, our method has several caveats. One of the key 
difficulties in phrase-level sentiment analysis is the lack of deeper contextual information. 
Since each phrase has to be interpreted in isolation, a human reader would often prefer to see 
more context than one sentence in order to draw any conclusions. For instance, although 
acquisition events are commonly described in quite positive tone (e.g. “The acquisition of 
Sampo Bank makes strategic sense for DB"), it is quite uncertain whether they will add or 
destroy value. Therefore, human analysts tend to be generally skeptical about the positiveness 
of such news, and would require considerable amount of background information before 
wanting to judge statement positive or negative. In addition to the lack of prior knowledge on 
the companies, the LPS algorithms are unable to distinguish between advertising-like 
positiveness following from a company's own statements vs. independent reviews about the 
company. Also some events, such as nominations of new executives, are conventionally 
described in overly positive manner instead of reflecting the actual facts. An interesting 
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problem is also the detection of roles or perspective in a sentence (i.e. from whose viewpoint 
do we interpret the sentence when multiple parties are involved). For example, a sentence 
may talk about a company getting money from another company after a legal case. Good 
news for someone may well be bad for the other. 
Clearly, there is still a number of ways to improve the performance of the sentiment models 
reported in this paper. In addition to the enrichment of lexicon with weights for different 
concepts and events, an important direction for future research will be to examine how 
phrase-level models can be merged with content models. We recognize specifically the 
following development areas for future models: 
 Developing a sentiment methodology able to identify the topic of a text, and to capture 
the relevance of that text. For example a study by Antweiler and Frank (2006), which 
uses an algorithm to identify news stories by their topic rather than their tone, does 
find some return predictability. As a further step, researchers could test for the impact 
that qualitative texts dealing with company’s key products have on sentiment, possibly 
looking at media that does not even mention the company’s name 
 Creating a method that is able to assess the credibility of a text source in order to 
establish a proper weighing score for the text 
 Studying alternative ways of aggregating sentiment besides the use of negative 
fractions: for instance, Das (2010) disagreement sentiment. Also, different “shades” of 
negativity, e.g. bad news of events that have happened vs. increase in risk could have 
a different impact on the stock performance 
 Assembling dictionaries in different languages, and researching whether or not a 
sentiment constructed from them has any difference to sentiment constructed from 
source texts written in English 
 Constructing a methodology able to differentiate between texts dealing with historical 
information, present information, and forecasted estimates. For example O’Hare 
(2009) points out that traditional media reports most likely news relating to a stock’s 
past performance but only few statements about a company’s future. However analysis 
about future performance of a stock should be the part that investors consider most 
7.3.2 A comprehensive sentiment model  
To foster future development efforts, we finish our discussion on sentiment methodology by 
describing what a future model for detecting sentiment could potentially look like. This 
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comprehensive sentiment model would take all the media on a given day, analyze this 
information in the context of previously publicly known information, and give an estimate of 
 What news this information says about the company’s fundamentals and how should 
this affect the company’s valuation (information) 
 How this information may impact different investors and thereby the demand for the 
company’s stock (tone) 
For this goal, we describe the parts of that a comprehensive model could consist of. In 
addition to illustrating the purpose and workings of each part of the model, we also give our 
early hypotheses on how this model could be implemented, and potential pitfalls for each part. 
The proposed model is described in Table 23.  
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Table 23: Proposed comprehensive sentiment model 
Model part Purpose Example Implementation Pitfalls 
Word 
detection 
Detect polarized 
parts in text, 
possibly also with 
sentiment strength 
Detects word “well” in a 
sentence “We believe that 
Samsung will not do well” 
and assigns labels to it, e.g. 
“reversal” and “positive” 
Word lists for keywords 
of different categories 
Use of flawed 
word lists 
Pattern 
matching 
for 
polarized 
words 
Translate a 
pattern of 
detected words to 
a sentiment, 
possibly with a 
score for strength 
Based on training data, 
assigns label “negative to 
tags “reversal + positive”  
Quasi compositional 
sequencing (SVM) with 
pattern compression 
Training data 
that uses more 
knowledge than 
is available at 
this stage of the 
model 
Credibility 
filtering 
Assess the 
credibility of a 
sentence 
Detects that the praising 
document is written by the 
company’s sales 
department and reduces the 
strongly positive sentiment 
Author recognition with 
entity detection, 
credibility assessment 
(entity-database  
from a Wikipedia-based 
ontology
202
 + database of 
historical source 
sentiments)  
Entity database 
lacking key 
entities, 
difficulty of 
assigning a 
credibility 
estimate to listed 
entities 
Topic 
detection 
Detect the key 
topic(s) in a 
sentence 
Detects  from “Samsung’s 
new Galaxy is selling 
moderately well” that it 
relates to galaxy sales / 
smart phone sales 
Topic recognition with a 
Wikipedia-based 
ontology 
Hierarchy of 
topics, 
colloquial 
language 
Impact 
assessment 
Detect how much 
further impact 
will this media 
item have on the 
topic have when 
added on top of 
the existing 
information on 
the market 
Detects whether a piece of 
information has been 
discussed before (Is it 
novel news/analysis?), 
confirms a previously 
uncertain information (Is 
this source more 
credible?), or if it reaches 
now a new audience (Did 
this information previously 
reach only people who 
read the specialized 
industry magazine?)  
Database on information 
by topic for comparing 
novelty,  
impact factors for 
different sources based 
on reach, prestige etc. 
Difficulty of 
novelty 
assessment, lack 
of impact factor 
data for news 
Topic 
relevancy 
filtering 
Assign a 
relevancy score 
per topic, 
highlighting the 
most important 
topics 
Ranks e.g. the topic 
“mobile phones” higher 
than “laptops” for Nokia 
A layered ontology of 
concepts: importance of 
concepts for all 
companies, for different 
industries and for 
individual companies, 
based on metrics such as 
word-of-mouth in media, 
company’s own releases, 
and analyst reports 
Difficulty of 
ranking 
concepts, hype 
of concepts vs. 
reality 
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 For more information on Wikipedia-based ontologies, see Malo et al., 2010 
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A sentiment model of this kind would be significantly closer to mimicking the key stages of 
an analyst’s thoughts in assessing the impact of news on a company and could potentially 
form similar conclusions as financial analysts who study a company regularly. As for the 
moment, most studies have implemented only the first part of this model, which is likely to 
yield sentiment scores with significant biases. Though the proposed model includes some 
significant challenges in implementing, we find that models that go towards this direction 
could significantly improve the detected sentiment and make it more relevant in relation to 
stock performance.  
7.3.3 Data and specifications 
As with all studies, our study faced limitations in terms of data accessibility. Also, in light of 
our findings, there are areas that future study specifications should consider when conducting 
their research. We feel that the key areas of interest in the aforementioned areas are: 
 Analyzing sentiment using social media text sources, such as, i.e., Twitter 
 Studying the impact media factors have in Fringe markets (i.e. smaller countries such 
as Finland), and whether or not the impact differs from the findings of extant literature 
 Using intra-day data when studying the impact media factors have on financial metrics 
 Constructing trading strategies leveraging aggregate market news volume, and 
sentiment volatility forecasts, to measure economic feasibility of such trading schemes 
 Studying the impact high firm specific news has on volatility, and whether or not that 
translate into a rise in cost of capital as time passes on 
To conclude, we have casted some additional light on the big picture of how media factors 
and sentiment link to each other. Future research could complement these findings in 
particular by further improving on the research, and by tapping to further data sources.  
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9 APPENDIX  
Appendix A – History of the efficient market hypothesis 
In this appendix, we aim to give the reader a quick review of the history of the EMH before 
the 1960s when the theory was introduced by Eugene Fama. A review of the history of the 
EMH might seem superfluous at first glance. However, in the words of John Maynard Keynes 
(1926):  
“A study of the history of opinion is a necessary preliminary to the emancipation of the 
mind” 
The roots of the EMH date back far beyond 1965. The EMH is, and has always been, closely 
linked with the random walk -theory. In fact, the random walk -theory can be considered as an 
extension of the EMH (Fama, 1970).
203
 Random walk asserts that successive price changes 
(or returns) are independent and identically distributed whereas the ‘fair game’ models; also 
known as the expected return models, of the EMH state that prices (returns) ‘fully reflect’ the 
information-set in question which implies that successive prices (returns) are independent of 
each other. Subsequently, the ‘fair game’ models restrain from taking a stand concerning the 
form of successive distributions. In fact, the stochastic process generating returns is left 
unanswered in the EMH.  
The history of the random walk -theory predates the EMH. Random walk -theory is based on 
the findings of a Scottish botanist Robert Brown who found that grains of pollen suspended in 
water had a rapid oscillatory motion when viewed under microscope (Brown, 1828).  The 
finding of Robert Brown was later named as Brownian motion, the phenomenon used to 
model stochastic stock price movements among other things. In 1880, Thomas Thiele 
described the mathematical properties of Brownian motion (Thiele, 1880). Independent of 
Thiele’s work, Lous Bachelier (1900) derived the mathematical and statistical properties of 
Brownian motion in the context of stock and option markets in his renowned PhD thesis: 
Theorie de la speculation. However, Bachelier’s work attracted little academic attention at 
that time and it was until the 1960s when Bachelier was awarded the credit he deserved. 
Unaware of Bachelier’s work, Albert Einstein (1905) developed the mathematical properties 
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 Indeed the early studies often involved testing random walk -models when in fact it can be shown that they 
were testing for a more general ‘fair game’ -model (Fama, 1970. 
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of Brownian motion and introduced it to the field of physics. From there on, Brownian 
motion, and the following random walk -models, have been widely used and studied. 
Also the EMH assertion that prices ‘fully reflect’ all available information dates back beyond 
Fama’s introduction of the hypothesis in 1965. In 1889, George Gibson wrote the following: 
‘shares become publicly known in an open market, the value which they acquire may be 
regarded as the judgment of the best intelligence concerning them’ in his book entitled: The 
Stock Markets of London, Paris and New York (Gibson, 1889). The similarity in Gibson’s 
statement vis-à-vis the EMH is striking. Furthermore, the renowned economist John Maynard 
Keynes has been linked with the roots of the EMH. In 1923, Keynes argued that investors on 
financial markets are rewarded for bearing the risks associated with their investment instead 
of having privileged information compared to the market (Keynes, 1923). Keynes (1936) 
expressed a similar line of thought in his milestone work: The General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money. Besides Keynes and Gibson, Alfred Cowles III was a key 
figure in the history predating Fama’s introduction of the EMH. In 1933, Cowles analyzed the 
performance of investment professionals and concluded that stock market forecasters cannot 
forecast (Cowles, 1933). In 1944, in continuation of his previous work, Cowles reported that 
investment professionals cannot beat the market (Cowles, 1944). In addition to the supportive 
evidence for the upcoming EMH, Cowles was the only author, to our knowledge, to publish 
evidence contradicting the EMH before the 1960s by pointing out inefficiencies in the market 
in the form of serial correlation in averaged time series indexes of stock prices (Cowles and 
Jones, 1937). However, Working (1960) showed that the use of averages can introduce 
autocorrelations not present in the original series.
204
 In response to the critique, Cowles 
revisited his previous conclusions and corrected the error caused by averaging. However, 
Cowles still found mixed temporal dependence in results (Cowles, 1960) contradicting the 
forthcoming EMH and thus remains, to our knowledge, as the only author to publish 
contradicting results to the EMH before the 1960s. 
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 Independent of Working (1960), Alexander (1961) finds that averaging could introduce spurious 
autocorrelation. 
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Appendix B – Main variable definitions 
 
Dependent Variables Description Reference Literature (e.g.)
Abnormal returns Demers and Vega, 2010
[0,1] Hirsleifer et al., 2009
[1,5] Engelberg, 2008
[2,32] Chan, 2003
[2,62] Barber and Lyon, 1997
Daniel and Titman, 1997
Fama and French, 1992
Abnormal volume Loughran and McDonald, 2011
[1] Hirsleifer et al., 2009
[2,5] Tetlock, 2007
[3,32] Antweiler and Frank, 2006
[3,62]
Abnormal volatility Loughran and McDonald, 2011
[2,32] Demers and Vega, 2010
[2,62] Engelberg, 2008
Independent Variables
Sentiment Loughran and McDonald, 2011
LPS Demers and Vega, 2010
MPQA Davis et al., 2008
Wordcount Engelberg, 2008
Finance dictionary Tetlock et al., 2008
H4N dictionary Tetlock, 2007
Market news volume Hirsleifer et al., 2009
Firm news volume Loukusa, 2011
Fang and Peress, 2009
1
 Retrieved from Kenneth French's website on July 2012: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html
Firm news volume counts the number of news 
in our sample for a given day for a given firm
Main Variable Definitions
This appendix provides definitions for the main variables used in the paper
Returns are based on buy-and-hold approach 
for the event period using close-to-close 
prices. Each stock is matched with 1 of 25 book-
to-market and market equity portfolios at the 
end of June based on their respective market 
capitalization at the end of June and book 
equity of the last fiscal year-end in the prior 
calendar year divided by the market value of 
equity at the end of December of the prior year. 
The daily returns of the 25 size / Book-to-
market portolios are retrieved from Kenneth 
French's website.
1
Abnormal volume is defined as the log of the 
sum of the daily abnormal volumes for the 
event period. Daily abnormal volume is defined 
as: (day's volume - mean volume) / standard 
deviation of volume. The mean and standard 
deviation estimates are based on days [-65, -6] 
from the event date.
Abnormal volatility is defined as the standard 
deviation of daily abnormal returns for the 
event period.
The quantitative estimate of investor 
sentiment. We estimate the value using 
alternative approaches LPS, MPQA and bag-of-
words (wordcount.) We aggregate multiple 
daily news with equal weighting via averaging 
in both methods.
Market news volume counts the number of 
news in our sample for a given day to establish 
a proxy for distraction
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Appendix C - Main specification control variable definitions 
 
Control Variables Reference Literature (e.g.)
Size Loughran and McDonald, 2011
Hirsleifer et al., 2009
Tetlock et al., 2008
Book-to-market Hirsleifer et al., 2009
Tetlock et al., 2008
Momentum Loughran and McDonald, 2011
[-4,-1] Tetlock et al., 2008
[-34,-4] Tetlock, 2007
[-255, -34] Chan, 2003
Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993
Share turnover Loughran and McDonald, 2011
Tetlock et al., 2008
SUE Loughran and McDonald, 2011
Demers and Vega, 2010
Hirsleifer et al., 2009
Davis et al., 2008
Tetlock et al., 2008
Li, 2006
Abnormal volatility Loughran and McDonald, 2011
[-252, -2] Demers and Vega, 2010
Engelberg, 2008
Institutional ownership Loughran and McDonald, 2011
Hirsleifer et al., 2009
Engelberg, 2008
Abnormal market volume Loughran and McDonald, 2011
[1] Hirsleifer et al., 2009
[2,5]
[3,32]
[3,62]
Main Specification Control Variable Definitions
This appendix provides definitions for the control variables used in the paper
Description
Abnormal volatility is defined as the standard 
deviation of daily abnormal returns for the time 
period.
Log of last reported book value of equity 
divided by the market value of equity.
Log of the sum of the volumes for [-252, -2] 
divided by shares outstanding at event date.
We define Standardized Unexpected Earnings 
as the difference between the last reported 
quarter's EPS and the corresponding median 
analyst forecast for that EPS divided by the 
closing share price on the day of the 
respective earnings announcement.
Log of market equity defined as the number of 
shares outstanding times the price of the 
share.
Abnormal volume is defined as the log of the 
sum of the daily abnormal volumes for the 
event period. Daily abnormal volume is defined 
as: (day's volume - mean volume) / standard 
deviation of volume. The mean and standard 
deviation estimates are based on days [-65, -6] 
from the event date. Daily market volume is 
based on the sum of the volume of the SP 100 
firms.
We control for firm's past returns by utlizing a 
buy-and-hold approach with close-to-close 
prices to calculate abnormal returns for the 
given time intervals before the event date. 
Abnormal returns are calculated in the same 
manner as the dependent variable abnormal 
returns.
The most recent number of shares reported 
under the ownership of institutions divided 
shares outstanding
208 
 
Appendix D – Alternative specification control variable definitions 
 
 
  
Control Variables Reference Literature (e.g.)
Industry Loughran and McDonald, 2011
Fama and French, 1997
# of analysts following Demers and Vega, 2010
Hirsleifer et al., 2009
Analyst dispersion Loughran and McDonald, 2011
Demers and Vega, 2010
Tetlock et al., 2008
Calendar Hirsleifer et al., 2009
Tetlock, 2007
LTM Dividend Fama and French, 2006
Li, 2006
No LTM dividend Fama and French, 2006
Fana and French (1997) 48 different industry 
dummies
Day of the week, end of the month, and 
January dummies
No dividend dummy for firms that have paid no 
dividends during the last  twelve months
Log ( 1 + the number of analysts following a 
given firm )
Standard deviation of EPS forecasts for the 
most recent reported EPS divided by the share 
price of the respective earnings announcement 
date
Last twelve month dividends divided by the 
last reported book value of equity
Alternative Specification Control Variable Definitions
This appendix provides definitions for the additional control variables used in the paper
Description
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Appendix E – Outlier values in financial data 
We check the dataset for outliers. List of share price changes in the sample above +50% and 
below -50% are listed in the table below.  
Date Company Return Explanation 
11/24/2008 CITIGROUP  58 % Citigroup bailout package announced during the financial crisis 
10/13/2008 MORGAN 
STANLEY  
 87 % Morgan Stanley gets a significant investment during the financial 
crisis 
 
Additionally, we list all exceptionally large jumps in market capitalization. Due to M&A and 
capital structure changes (changes in number of shares) these are not equivalent to the share 
price changes. Market capitalization changes in sample above +50% and below -50% are 
listed in the following table. 
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Date Company Change Potential explanation
205
 
4/8/2008 ALTRIA GROUP  -70 % Kraft Foods to spinoff (actually split-off) Post Cereal that 
will merge with a Ralston company 
6/12/2006 LOWE'S COMPANIES  -50 % Potential change in capital structure related to stock split 
(jump does not exist for stock price data) 
12/29/2006 AT&T   63 % Completion of acquisition of BellSouth Corporation 
7/2/2007 BANK OF NEW 
YORK MELLON 
  59 % Merger of BNY and Mellon on Jul 1; jump has been 
corrected in stock price data of Datastream 
11/26/2008 CITIGROUP   58 % No clear event, but change visible also in stock price. 
Potential correction (Citi stock price down from >$130 to 
<$40 in less than a month  
7/30/2009 CITIGROUP  101 % Citi Announces Final Results of Public Share Exchange and 
Completes Further Matching Exchange with U.S. 
Government; Citi Pushing for Quick Asset Sales 
9/14/2009 CITIGROUP   96 % Potentially a change in capital structure (jump has been 
corrected in stock price data of Datastream) 
3/22/2007 CVS CAREMARK   84 % Merger of CVS Corporation and Caremark Rx Inc. 
3/19/2007 FREEPORT-
MCMOR.CPR.& GD. 
  66 % Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. acquired Phelps 
Dodge Corporation, including Chino. 
4/2/2007 KRAFT FOODS  246 % Change related to Kraft spinoff by Altria during Mar 2007 
3/7/2006 LOWE'S COMPANIES   96 % Potential change in capital structure related to stock split 
(jump does not exist for stock price data) 
1/1/2007 MASTERCARD   69 % Potentially a change in capital structure (jump has been 
corrected in stock price data of Datastream) 
10/13/2008 MORGAN STANLEY   87 % Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Closes $9 Billion Equity 
Investment in Morgan Stanley as Part of Global Strategic 
Alliance 
3/14/2005 NATIONAL OILWELL 
VARCO 
  65 % National Oilwell Varco emerges (from Oilwell Supply,1862 
and National Supply, 1894) following the completion of the 
merger with Varco International 
8/15/2005 SPRINT NEXTEL  102 % The Sprint/Nextel merger was finalized 
3/31/2008 VISA 'A'   97 % Potentially an error in the data (jump one week after listing) 
2/5/2010 XEROX   53 % ACS Signs $1.6 Billion California Medicaid Contract 
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 Source: internet search 
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Appendix F – Details on gathered media data 
This appendix explains in greater details how we have gathered our text data from the 
LexisNexis database. Due to the technical nature of the process, we have excluded this from 
the main section. The appendix details the list of excluded news sources, the looks of the 
database interface, and the process of downloading data. 
List of excluded sources 
The table below lists the excluded data sources and rationale for excluding each. 
Excluded source Rationale for exclusion 
Market News Publishing Only numerical data 
GlobalAdSource (English) Provides information on company advertisements in a tabular form 
News Bites - Nordic : Finland Provides automatically generated updates of stock price developments etc. 
 
LexisNexis search interface 
The following screenshot illustrates the LexisNexis user interface that we use to download the 
news with the web scraper. As can be seen in the example, we need to split our search for 
large companies to multiple small pieces to stay below the 500 news items limit. 
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Details of the web scraper 
We download our news from the LexisNexis database. As it is not possible to download more 
than 500 news at a time from the database, we develop a web scraper that imitates the actions 
of a human user navigating the LexisNexis website and downloading the news in small 
portions at a time. We develop our program using AutoHotkey, a free open-source macro 
program that can be used to automate different keyboard and mouse usage on a Windows 
computer. We program the scraper to imitate our mouse and keyboard movements: entering a 
date range and a ticker, and then downloading the news items. 
When searching for news, the number of search results depends on the time period. If the 
number of search results exceeds 500, LexisNexis lets us download only the first 500 news 
items, and we would miss the rest. Thus, we need to keep the number of found news items 
always below 500. In order to achieve the aforementioned, we need to split the whole time 
period into smaller pieces for each company, for which we are certain that the amount of news 
found never exceeds 500. For a company with less than 500 news during a period of 5 years, 
we can download all the news at once, while for companies with more news coverage, the 
frequencies need to be very small. Downloading news with small frequency for all the 
companies would not be practical, as downloading time is always constant. For example, 
using a 3-day time period would need 640 downloads per company
206
. Given that our web 
scraper can complete one download in approximately three minutes, a total download time 
would equal to 640*3 minutes = 32h per company, or over 133 days for the whole sample. 
Thus, we need to determine the largest possible time periods per company for which we are 
confident that the number of search results will not exceed 500 items. 
The amount of news varies considerably among the sample: the smallest companies have 
lower news coverage; however, the larger companies also have significant variation in their 
news volume.  Thus, we do a sample search for a period of one year per company, and based 
on these results, we estimate as a rule of thumb that the maximum volume that can occur in a 
certain timeframe is three times the frequency. For example, with a test search of 400 news 
items in a year, our estimate of the number of maximum news per that company would be 
1,200 per year, and hence would dictate a time frequency of 4 months to not exceed the 500 
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 As the speed of a webpage loading varies significantly depending on the number of found news items, the 
program needs to be set to wait for a webpage to load for a longer time than a human user would wait for. 
Otherwise, the scraper would start navigating on a page that has not been loaded yet. This causes the scraper to 
be slower than a human user would be. Furthermore, the download time does not correspond to the amount of 
news downloaded, but only to time period. 
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limit per download. However, instead of using arbitrary time period based on the 1 year 
sample news volume, we define constant time periods that we apply based on the 1 year 
sample period. Therefore, in our example case, we would use time period of 3 months to not 
exceed 500 news per year. The time periods we use are: all news at once (e.g. Weyerhauser 
Co.), one year per download, 6 months by download, 3 months by download, 1 month by 
download, 2 weeks by download, 5 days per download, and 3 days per download (e.g. Citi, 
Google and Apple).  By doing this, we are able to cut our total download time significantly. 
To further speed up the downloading process, we edit our scraper to split our download queue 
so that we can use multiple computers. 
Besides being fairly inefficient, another peril of a human-simulating scraper is the possibility 
of distractions. Other open programs that provide pop-ups, or unexpected search results on a 
webpage, may result in unexpected consequences, as the computer program keeps clicking on 
the wrong window. In the worst case scenario, this can lead to a scraper navigating itself to 
wrong places on a website - potentially even posing a threat to the whole computer. 
Therefore, it is not possible to leave the scraper fully unsupervised for long periods of time. 
We finally launch our scraper with total of 50 computers that we supervise as they download 
the whole sample within a few days. Once we have downloaded data for all the companies, 
we study the download results to find companies that may have exceeded 500 items. In these 
rare cases, we download the missing news manually. As an outcome, we have a folder for 
each of the SP100 companies, containing a number of HTML-files that represent less than 
500 news items per search. 
Details of processing LexisNexis data 
After the web scraper process, we have a sample of 5,389 HTML-files that contain all the 
news for our time period that have been marked with appropriate tickers in LexisNexis 
database. As all metadata: e.g. dates of news, publications, etc., are stored in these HTML-
files, we cannot proceed further without processing of the files more.  
To do so, we design a Java-algorithm that puts all news items in the files into a database in a 
common format. The program starts by taking a HTML-file and cutting it into individual 
stories. Next, the algorithm needs to discover the heading, the text, the publication, and other 
metadata. As LexisNexis HTML format is non-standard, it does not provide a clear indication 
of which part is what. Therefore, we program the algorithm to interpret the possible meaning 
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of a text from its relative position to others: e.g., the date comes before the heading etc. 
Sometimes there is other metadata between the classified items that does not match the 
standard ordering: i.e., date follower by heading etc. In such cases, the algorithm verifies the 
classifications by looking at the forms of the data: i.e., the words that start a sentence, the 
sentence structure and other format related things. 
Once the message and other metadata have been separated, we strip the HTML-tags off from 
the message to make it easier to process in the data analysis phase. While doing this, we also 
remove tables as they contain mainly numerical data that is not interesting for us. The 
exceptions are messages that are fully expressed in a table format: in this case, we only 
remove the html-tags and leave the content of the tables. We also alter some of the metadata, 
in particular the date field. The date format varies occasionally, and our algorithm recognized 
most of the date formats. Some messages are; however, discarded, as the date is not properly 
specified. Such messages are mainly composed of situations where the date is in a format 
such as: ‘November 2009’. Such formats are not useful as we wish to calculate the sentiment 
for a particular date, and we cannot place a message to a particular date using the 
aforementioned format as it does not specify a specific date, but only a month and a year.  
Once the structure has been discovered, we store the messages into the database including: 
dates, tickers, source publications, and other relevant data that LexisNexis provides. As the 
amount of data that we have at this point is very large, we choose to store the ordered news 
into a MySQL database that we setup on a home server. MySQL is a widely used relational 
database that is chosen due to its ability to handle large amounts of data, and its availability as 
a freeware. The stored data is then used as a basis for our analysis. 
  
215 
 
Appendix G – Annotation instructions 
The goal is to indicate if the following news would likely affect a company's share price 
positively or negatively. If you think that the share price could go in either direction, please 
select ‘Either way’. 
Please consider all sentences in isolation, i.e., how do you expect the company's stock price to 
react if this was the only headline that you saw, and you had no background knowledge on the 
company, or current economy. I.e. we don't want you to make your own stock analysis. Expect 
that you know that the economy is currently steady and that the company is a stock-exchange 
listed company (i.e. large company). 
When evaluating the sentiment of sentences and how the stock price would react, please use 
the following scale: 
9 +++ UP a lot 
8 ++ UP (hard to say how much) 
7 + UP a little 
6 n1 Either way (answering would require more background knowledge) 
5 n2 Either way (not possible to say, even if I had more background knowledge) 
4 n3 Either way (answering would require me to know which company we are talking 
about) 
3 - DOWN a little 
2 -- DOWN (hard to say how much) 
1 --- DOWN a lot 
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Appendix H – Financial entities -wordlists 
In this appendix, we list show our financial entity wordlists, originated from the online 
dictionary Investopedia (for further details on retrieving this list, refer to section). The first list 
shows words where an increase would be typically considered a negative event. The second 
list covers the opposite, i.e. words where an increase would typically considered a positive 
event. 
 
Negative-if-up word list 
ABI 
acquisition cost 
add-on 
administrative 
expenses 
antitrust 
bankruptcy 
bear 
beta 
capital employed 
capital loss 
current assets 
current liabilities 
debt 
default 
deficit 
dilution 
 
downgrade 
downside 
downtrend 
EAC 
erosion 
expense 
financial crisis 
gearing 
gearing ratio 
impairment 
income tax 
inflation 
interest rate 
inventory 
leverage 
liability 
loan 
 
long-term debt 
net debt 
net loss 
noise 
NWC 
obligation 
OPEX 
overhead 
profit warning 
provision 
receivables 
recession 
relative strength 
restructuring charge 
risk 
RSI 
seasonality 
 
seller 
sell-off 
shortage 
shortfall 
slump 
tariff 
tax expense 
tax rate 
taxation 
taxes 
underperform 
unemployment 
volatility 
working capital 
write-down 
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Positive-if-up wordlist 
AAA 
ADR 
asp 
basic earnings per 
share 
benchmark 
bonus 
book value 
boom 
bottom line 
brand 
budget 
business 
buyback 
CAC 
capacity 
CAPEX 
capital 
capital gain 
capital markets 
capitalization 
carried interest 
cash 
cash flow from 
operating activities 
catalyst 
closing price 
competitive 
advantage 
complement 
composite index 
comprehensive 
income 
consumer spending 
credit 
credit rating 
cash equivalents 
cash flow 
cash flow from 
investing activities 
customer 
customer service 
 
DAX 
delivery 
demand 
dividend 
EBITDA 
economic growth 
economic recovery 
economics 
economy 
efficiency 
end-user 
EPS 
equity 
exemption 
export 
financial market 
financial 
performance 
financing 
flotation 
franchise 
FTSE 
Fundamentals 
HAM 
holdings 
income 
index 
intangible asset 
intellectual property 
investment 
dividend policy 
earnings 
EBIT 
EBITA 
IPO 
leadership 
liquidity 
LSE 
MACD 
margin 
market 
market capitalization 
 
market price 
market sentiment 
market share 
market value  
maturity 
monopoly 
net cash 
net interest income 
net investment 
net sales 
Nikkei 
NYSE 
offering 
operating earnings 
operating income 
operating margin 
operating profit 
operational efficiency 
order 
outperform 
partnership 
payout 
pipeline 
plum 
GDP 
gross margin 
gross profit 
growth rates 
population 
portfolio 
pre-market 
price target 
private placement 
productivity 
profit 
profit margin 
quotation 
rally 
rating 
rebound 
refinance 
remuneration 
repayment 
retail sales 
retained earnings 
revenue 
ROCE 
ROE 
ROI 
rollout 
royalty 
savings 
sequential growth 
share capital 
share repurchase 
shareholder value 
solvency 
stock market 
stock option 
STOXX 
subscription price 
subscription right 
supply 
surplus 
synergy 
takeover bid 
throughput 
top line 
trademark 
TSE  
TSX 
turnaround 
turnover 
underlying asset 
unit sales 
upside 
uptrend 
valuation 
value 
volume 
WAL 
wall street 
wealth 
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Appendix I – Wordlist defects 
To test for possible wordlist defects, we go through the sentences that have been falsely 
assigned by our algorithm (vs. annotation). The most commonly occurring words from the 
word lists are listed below. 
 Wrongly assigned Correctly assigned 
deal 71 22 
acquire 55 12 
support 41 12 
agreed 35 7 
completed 34 7 
provides 32 6 
enables 19 1 
natural 19 3 
approval 14 1 
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Appendix J - Error descriptions for LPS 
After labeling our annotation sample with the Linearized Phrase-Structure -model algorithm, 
we categorize the cases in which the algorithm gives us false answers (different to human 
annotation). The definitions of these errors are as follows. 
Borderline cases: sentences that could be tagged by human as either/or 
Let us offer an illustration of such a case:  
‘The long-standing partnership and commitment enable both parties to develop their 
respective operations, and ESL Shipping will also have the opportunity to update its fleet and 
improve its efficiency.’  
The sentence implies that the company's efficiency will increase. A human reading the 
sentence could think that the increase could be substantial enough for the share price to 
increase. Another reader could think that the aforementioned is mainly glitter and the increase 
is not substantial. Thus, two readers might annotate the sentence differently. 
Company talking in advertising like -tone about its' own operations 
In some instances, a company can talk in a very positive tone about its operations, and our 
algorithm picks this up; tagging the sentence as positive. An analyst, on the other hand, would 
often disregard this information, or at least discount it significantly. Therefore, an analyst is 
able to recognize a difference between objective product reviews and company’s own review, 
for instance. A positive review can be good news for the company, while a company talking 
about its own operations in a positive way should often not be news to anyone. 
Inability to detect changes in numbers 
The algorithm is unable to detect that two different numbers in a sentence may mean an 
increase/decrease. For instance, for sentence:  
‘The company recorded sales of 100 million, vs. 10 million in last year’  
the algorithm would not recognize that sales have increased significantly. A human annotator, 
on the other hand, could record this as a positive event. 
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Inability to detect roles in a sentence 
The algorithm cannot detect roles of different entities in a sentence that may become 
problematic in cases when multiple parties are described in the sentence. For example, a 
sentence may talk about a company getting money from another company after a legal case:  
good news for one of the companies and bad for the other. As our algorithm does not know 
the point of view, it is prone to misclassify such sentences; hence, increasing noise in the 
sentiment.
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Inability to detect time expressions in a sentence 
An event that has already happened may be described in a very polarized tone. While a reader 
can be impacted by simply the tone of the text, it is also possible that an investor would not 
give much weight to events of the past - regardless of tone of the text. The reaction depends 
on whether or not investors are impacted by tone, or by information, or by both.  
Inability to reason from text 
In cases where a reader makes a connection that is not explicit in the text, the algorithm is 
incapable of uncovering such reasoning through logic. For example, a construction company 
building something over the next years could imply that it has received a large order even 
though such statement is not explicitly expressed in the text. 
Inability to recognize significance of events 
In some instances, events are reported that are not likely significant enough to make a 
difference to a company. These can be tagged as polarized, though they are not significant 
enough to impact share price. The sentiment is correct, but the impact on the company is 
likely too insignificant. In such cases, an ideal algorithm should either tag the sentences as 
neutral, or at least adjust the score with a smaller weight during the aggregation. In some 
instances, news may include polarized sentences that have nothing to do with the company 
that the article covers. 
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 This category has similar elements to the neutrally annotated category ‘Either way’ (answering would require 
me to know which company we are talking about). 
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Inability to understand the magnitude or value of items 
Our algorithm cannot understand magnitude. For example, if a ship yard gets ‘a new order of 
100 tankers’, the algorithm would recognize no difference to an order of 100 candy bars. It 
would be evident to a reader that the candy bars are unlikely to present much value to a 
company. However, the algorithm is unable to separate between the value of a tanker and a 
candy bar; hence, both orders seem to be of equal importance. 
Interpreting non-words as words 
In some instances, our algorithm interprets an entity, or a non-word, as a word. For example, 
when talking about the firm ‘Capital One Financial’, the algorithm recognizes that ‘Capital’ 
is the word ‘capital’.  
Need for more context 
In many instances, a reader would need more context than one sentence in order to make any 
conclusions. For example, a sentence ‘The CMO is thrilled that the acquisition is going 
through.’ may sound positive. However, acquisitions may often destroy value, and an analyst 
would want to know the background of the acquisition before making any conclusions based 
on the information.  
Polysemy of words and expressions 
Sometimes we recognize words as they would be used in a different context. For example, 
when a company ‘succeeds’, this is good news. On the other hand, when a person ‘succeeds 
another the meaning is that a person is replaced by another; not positive or negative news in 
itself. In order to correctly tag these sentences, we should move from word polarity to ‘sense 
polarity’: i.e. recognizing that words may have different polarity in different context (e.g., 
Maks and Vossen, 2010). 
Positive convention of talking about something 
With some themes, there exists a potential bias of positivity that relates to a convention with a 
certain theme rather than the actual sentiment. In such instances, the algorithm can classify 
sentences as positive whereas in reality they are simply reflecting the convention of the 
theme. For example, nominations are often described in an overly positive manner as a matter 
of convention instead of actually reflecting facts.  
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Recognizing patterns in descriptive text 
Often financial texts simply describe what operations of companies. In some instances, these 
descriptions may include words that are included in our wordlists. The algorithm may 
recognize a polarized pattern in such descriptive texts, even though they are in fact neutral by 
nature. 
Sentences with multiple parts 
The SVM is typically reading a sentence as a whole, ignoring punctuation that splits two 
parts. While the aforementioned does not generally matter, there may be instances where a 
sentence should be handled in two parts with different sentiment structures. 
Use of longer expressions and interpreting non-words as words 
Our algorithm can detect expressions that consist of only individual words. However, in some 
cases, multiple words form an expression that has a different polarity than individual words. 
For example, we may recognize ‘limited’ as a negative word, while the text may describe 
actually a ‘limited company’. To mitigate this, there would need to be a list of common 
expressions and their polarities. 
Words lacking from word lists 
The algorithm recognizes only words that are included in our word lists. While our lists are 
long, and include the most commonly used polarized words, they may lack some words. As 
the words are not recognized, the SVM remains unable to pick up the polarized pattern. 
Wrong computer patterns 
The computer patterns that have been created from the training set may be erroneous: for 
example, movement words can be misclassified to represent sentiment when in fact they do 
not. This may be a result of lack of training data for some of the patterns. Alternatively, we 
may be lacking some word types from our word lists that result in misclassified annotations, 
and hence may lead into a bias in the training set. In example, if we did not have ‘negate’ 
category in our training set, the set would be interpreted very differently by the SVM as 
positive words would lead to negative sentences etc.  
 
223 
 
Wrong label in training data 
When doing our error analysis, we also notice instances where we have a wrong label in our 
training set. In other words, while our algorithm is able to classify the sentence correctly, the 
human annotator has made a mistake when tagging the sentence. 
